PUBLICATIONS

OF THE

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

VOLUME X

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK

THE CUNNINGHAM, CURTISS & WELCH COMPANY
LOS ANGELES

THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON AND EDINBURGH

THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA
TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI

THE MISSION BOOK COMPANY
SHANGHAI

PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS

TENTH ANNUAL MEETING

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
DECEMBER 28–31, 1915

VOLUME X

WAR AND MILITARISM IN THEIR SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS

PUBLISHED FOR THE
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY
BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

COPYRIGHT 1916 BY
THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

All Rights Reserved

Published February 1916
Second Impression August 1917

Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

WAR AS DETERMINER. *Edward Alsworth Ross* 1

SOCIAL VALUES AND NATIONAL EXISTENCE. *Theodore Roosevelt* . . 12

DISCUSSION:

By John Mez 21
Mabel Boardman 25
E. C. Hayes 29
James Q. Dealey 32
John Martin 35
Charles B. Fernald 36
John A. Fitch 37

THE EFFECT OF WAR AND MILITARISM ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN. *Emily G. Balch* 39

DISCUSSION:

By Lillian Wald 56
Anna Garlin Spencer 58
George Elliott Howard 61
J. P. Lichtenberger 67
Francis D. Tyson 69

WAR AND MILITARISM IN RELATION TO GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. *Simeon E. Baldwin* 75

NATIONALISM AND STATE SOCIALISM. *William English Walling* . . 82

DISCUSSION:

By Albion W. Small 93
James W. Garner 96
Arthur MacDonald 101

CAN WAR BE DONE AWAY WITH? *Brooks Adams* 103

DISCUSSION:

By Roger W. Babson 124
A. B. Wolfe 127
H. M. Chittenden 133
C. H. Stockton 138
Mrs. J. O. Unger. 141

MEMBERSHIP STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY FOR 1915 149

STATEMENT OF CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY FOR 1915 . . . . . .

CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY . . .

MEMBERSHIP LIST OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY FOR 1916

WAR AS DETERMINER

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS
University of Wisconsin, President of the American Sociological Society

Karl Marx's doctrine of *economic determinism*, according to which it is chiefly changes in the technique of production which alter the course of society, needs to be rounded out with a doctrine of *martial determinism* which shall show how much the relations of classes, societies, peoples, races, and cultures have been influenced by the development of the technique of war.

War has always been a master force. A philosophy of history becomes a vain dream in view of the extent to which the current of history has been deflected by small differences at critical moments. Greek fire, used first against the Saracens in the seventh century, probably preserved the Byzantine Empire for several centuries against the Eastern pressure and gave Europe a chance to become strong. It was the armor of the Crusaders that enabled them to roll back the Saracens and maintain for two hundred years a Latin kingdom in Syria. Only the walls of Constantinople and Attila's ignorance of the art of siege spared the city from being laid waste by the Huns.

The native kingdoms of Mexico and South America were overthrown and the Indians enslaved by a handful of Spaniards who, however, had the enormous advantage of possessing horses, armor, and firearms. But for gunpowder, the whites of this country, instead of sweeping in a single century from the Alleghanies to the Pacific, might by now have outposts as far west as the Father of Waters. If, in the thirteenth century, the Slavs could have met the Mongols with guns, they would not have fallen under the hideous despotism which kept them far behind the other peoples of Europe in development.

As one today reconnoiters the Great Wall of China, that serpent in stone clambering boldly up the steepest slopes, creeping along

the sheer precipices, and following ever the comb of the mountains in order that the ground may slope from it both ways, one realizes what a perfect checkmate it must have given to the raiding nomads of Mongolia. Thanks to seventeen hundred miles of such wall the Chinese went ahead undisturbed until, by the eighth century, they possessed undoubtedly the most advanced civilization in the world.

Thus the destiny of societies and civilizations has turned on the issue of battle, and this has often been determined by the technique of fighting. Warfare, in fact, undergoes an evolution due, not to changes in the ethics and psychology of the combatants, but to *invention*. Any new weapon or tactics which proves effective is sure of early adoption. The dropping of the old but inferior is much prompter in the military field than in the industrial field, for, in a matter of life and death, no people is so foolish as to follow blindly the rut of the past. Be it never so custom bound, a race will discard its old-time weapons and tactics of fighting once it has suffered from new and more deadly weapons and tactics.

Now, within our own time the evolution of warfare has been greatly accelerated by the inventors and the trend of this evolution is fateful for the group development of mankind. For one thing the cumulative effect of modern martial inventions has been to push warfare constantly in the direction of capitalism. The amount of lethal capital the average soldier works with has greatly increased while the cost of the battleship has grown out of all proportion to the number required to man it. The overwhelming growth of the machinery factor has forever laid the affrighting specter of the subjugation of the civilized by brave and fecund barbarians such as broke through the defense of the Roman Empire. The easy destruction of the dervishes by machine guns at the battle of Omdurman settled it that henceforth the barbarian is out of the running save as the instrument of an advanced people.

A second consequence of war becoming capitalistic is that only the wealthy or highly industrial nations can wage war with any prospect of success. The money cost of fighting having grown much faster than the blood cost, that belligerent is doomed to defeat which has not either great resources and credit for buying

war material or else an abundance of technical knowledge and industrial skill to divert to their manufacture.

A third consequence is the greater time necessary for fabricating an efficient fighting machine. Big guns, turrets, emplacements, disappearing gun carriages, and battleships cannot be improvised, but must be begun months before they can be used. The soldier, too, is not to be made in a day, but is becoming like a skilled artisan who must be trained for a considerable time. The result is that less and less dares a nation consider its potential defensive resources as equivalent to available resources. Real security calls for preparedness and preparedness becomes steadily more costly as warfare grows more capitalistic.

The advance of invention is, moreover, so rapid that war capital soon comes to be out of date. An improved rifle is adopted and at once millions of rifles of the old pattern become junk. A nation lays out some scores of millions in equipping its army with thousands of field guns and suddenly some inventor of a gun of longer range or quicker fire obliges it to scrap them all. The interval between the proud launching of an ironclad and its last service as target for the guns of a younger vessel continually shortens. The consequence is that the burden of armed peace approximates that of war and the nations welcome war as possibly opening a door of escape from the crushing weight of incessant rearmament.

Another way in which martial invention bends the stream of social history is by altering the relative strength of *attack* and *defense*. Walls, moats, drawbridges, casemates, mines, disappearing gun carriages, armor plate, steel turrets, abattis, wire entanglements, anti-air-craft guns, and strategic railways are landmarks in the development of defense. Battering rams, mortars, siege guns, armor-piercing projectiles, asphyxiating gas, hand grenades, bomb-dropping air craft, torpedoes, and submarines have told particularly on the side of attack. The distinction between attack and defense signifies most in land fighting. In sea fighting the distinction is less important and in air fighting it disappears altogether, the reason being that no uniform and fluid medium can be made to furnish either shelter to the defenders or obstacles to the assailants.

Now, the relation between the defense and the attack of a given *terrain* is an imperious determiner of social destiny. When defense has little advantage over attack, numbers count, conquest is easy, the little peoples cower before the big peoples, empires become more formidable the bigger they grow, and the nations are in unstable equilibrium. When, on the other hand, smokeless powder, high-power firearms, machine guns, steel turrets, and land mines make the defense many times stronger than the attack, a state that is strong in defense finds itself weak in invading the territory of another. Small peoples with powerful neighbors are able to maintain their independence. The aggressive empire stumbles over some handful of brave mountaineers and the nations tend to remain each in its own place.

Those who believe that true civilization is spread by peaceful radiation rather than by force of arms will rejoice when the developing technique of warfare gives a great advantage to defense and will grieve when it allows attack to overtake defense. When the new 42-centimeter howitzers at a stroke wiped out most of the military value of the world's forts, the future of the little nations and the peace-loving peoples looked black indeed. The unexpected development of the art of trench resistance has, however, restored them some measure of security. The military failure of the Zeppelins is another ray of hope in the gloom.

Of course, no one would wish defense to be so strong as to guarantee the success of every revolt and hence make large states impossible. The battering ram was the answer to the mud walls of Babylonian towns, but to the thick stone walls of the Dark Ages there was no answer until gunpowder made it possible to mine them or breach them with cannon balls. When count or baron or bishop could flout the authority of any king not strong enough to beleaguer him and starve him into submission, the state became too decentralized to fulfil its civilizing mission, and private war was the order of the day. It was gunpowder that enabled law to quell the near-anarchy of the feudal régime.

Today, however, national freedom and the independent evolution of the peoples are bound up with the art of war taking such a course of development as shall make aggression costly and dangerous.

There is no assurance that war and the dread of war will be less potent in deflecting and deforming the life of society than they have been. Indeed, it is possible that the hand of Mars will be heavier upon us in the future. The improvement of communication lowers those natural barriers and wipes out those distances which formerly gave the nations a sense of security. Moreover, far from arriving at settled spheres and final relations between the nations, we find ourselves in a tumultuously dynamic epoch which will certainly outlast this century.

There is population pressure, which tends to control the policy of Japan, Russia, and Germany, and will eventually shape the policy of China. The diffusion over the globe of the arts of saving life, long before the masses have abandoned blind multiplication, threatens to subject the comfortable peoples to violent endeavors at readjustment on the part of the teeming peoples. If surplus population does not migrate, it must at least find a vent abroad for its products. Hence, the population pressure reflects itself in a struggle among the nations for colonies and dependencies to serve as markets. Since the secretion of capital goes on at an accelerated pace, there is an eager quest for opportunities out over the globe to invest capital in the profitable exploitation of natural resources. The appeal of capitalistic syndicates to their national government to find them such opportunities, to protect them in the resulting property rights, and to checkmate their rivals makes states aggressive and unsettles friendly international relations.

We have no warrant for expecting soon an economic equilibrium among the different regions of the globe. Asia and Africa have been making progress, but Europe and North America have been forging ahead still faster. The interval between the advanced countries and the backward countries determines the eagerness of the former to act economically upon the latter and there is no prospect that this interval will lessen in our time. And it is precisely the scramble of the advanced nations to take part in the control, settlement, and exploitation of the rest of the world which constitutes the chief trouble-breeder among them.

How often we hear it said: "*This* is to be the *last* war!" These outbursts of destructive human energy so shock the growing humane feeling and are so alien to the habits of thought fostered

by industrialism that civilized man refuses to recognize their inevitableness. Yet, if anything may be safely predicted, it is that wars as bad as this will occur in the future unless a Great Union be formed to canalize *international* rivalries as the American Union has canalized *interstate* rivalries.

No doubt this generation will not tolerate another such orgy of destruction. Through our time war will be known for what it is. But when the cripples, widows, and orphans are gone, when invention and the exploitation of fresh natural resources have lightened the war debts and have created a new basis for national borrowing, when mothers yet unborn have reared millions of youths to be bred in a febrile nationalism and inflamed with a machine-made patriotism, then the dynasts, the *Junkers*, the traders, and the drillmasters will prepare the materials for another explosion on perhaps a still vaster scale.

Incredible? But where is the force that will be able to prevent it? May we look to religion for any clearer or more authoritative utterances as to the wickedness of bloodshed? Is there the slightest prospect that the peace movement will control the opinion-forming agencies and the prestige commanded by highly organized governments reaching out for lands, markets, and dependencies in the less-developed portions of the world? Nor will the clearest demonstration of the economic waste of war and armament have more effect upon commercial minds than it has had in the past. The aggressive nation that forces militarism upon its unwilling neighbors always dreams of recouping itself by conquests and indemnities. The growing aversion to wanton aggression, instead of hampering the provocative foreign policy of statesmen, simply obliges them to resort to a more elaborate hypocrisy. The extent to which the people may be deluded with the idea they are dying in a war of defense seems limitless.

In the absence of visible menace or actual aggression nothing but state-worship will induce the common people to face the burdens and horrors of war. How, then, if among the masses there spread a resentment at the ghastly sacrifices they are called upon to make for this idol? Is there any hope of a turning of popular opinion to the wholesome internationalism that captivated thinkers of half a century ago?

The fact is, nationalism today has a far stronger appeal than it had in the days of Cobden and Bright. The evils of unregulated machine industry and private capitalism have opened to the state a new sphere of service and have led the bulk of the people to look to it, to trust it, and to love it for the protection it affords. The popularity the state gains by its salutary intervention in the industrial and social field it has very cleverly turned to account in winning support for its aggressive policies. Thus much of what is saved by its beneficent activities is poured into the insatiable maw of armament and war. The paternal state saves the workingman from unguarded machinery, industrial poisons, and a pauper old age, only to oblige him to perish miserably in battle as a state slave. Under its present guidance the modern state has proved to be something the working people can neither live *without* nor, alas, live *with*.

But suppose democracy spreads. What if the working class, instead of remaining a mere beneficiary of state action, should succeed in wresting control of the state from the land-owning aristocracy, the capitalists, and the traders? What if foreign policies were determined by working-class leaders or by statesmen dependent upon working-class support?

A political revolution in this sense would solve our problem only in case it were general. Otherwise peace-loving democracies might be forced into the hated path of armament and war by the pace-making of a single powerful militarist autocracy. Furthermore, democracies may be reckoned as anti-militarist only in case they limit their numbers. The sense of pressure, which will soon appear in a blindly multiplying people, can be successfully appealed to by the jingoist demagogue who argues for breaking by force or the threat of force into the preserves of some less crowded people. With mystic clerics, a priori moralists, sentimentalists, militarists, aristocrats, and monarchs at one in teaching the people that it is a deadly sin to restrict the size of the family, population pressure seems likely to resume its ancient baleful rôle of gadfly.

No doubt much may be done to drag foreign policy out of its dark corner, but it is vain to dream of putting a brake on the chariot of Mars by relegating to the people the determination of foreign policy. The citizens at large lack the basis of a reasoned judgment on such matters; so that their vote could record nothing

but their comparative confidence in the champions of rival policies. Idle likewise is it to demand that, before a nation be committed, the question of peace or war shall be decided by a popular referendum. Aside from the fact that, owing to the technique of warfare, the delaying nation may put itself at a grave disadvantage, there is the difficulty that the people are ignorant of the interests involved. Much as the people may hate war, they hold some things as worse than war. As to what is really at stake in a dispute with another country they have no means of judging save what their leaders tell them; so that their vote amounts to nothing more than an expression of confidence or doubt respecting the statesmen at the helm.

Some hope much from the admission of women to the electorate, arguing that they are free from the innate pugnacity of males and that those who bring life into existence will instinctively recoil from the policies which lead to its wholesale destruction. It is certain that if women obeyed the promptings of their own natures their participation in government would strengthen the party of concession and compromise. But there is little indication that enfranchised women are going to register in politics their native intuitions and reactions. There must come first an intellectual emancipation of women which has little more than begun. The readiness of most women to believe what men tell them as to matters remote from their ken and their hysterical, uncritical response to the appeals of militarists wearing the mask of patriotism forbid us to expect much from their votes.

It appears then that the nations taken separately have no power to extricate themselves from the vortex into which they are being sucked. As the horizon darkens, a people so far from the center of strife as the Americans find themselves obliged to abandon the traditions of a century and to begin casting their sons and their substance into the lap of the war god. Not only will such sacrifices tend to grow with time but they will be made use of by militarists to spur jaded peoples across the sea into making still greater sacrifices for "defense and security."

It is a great pity that the means provided for defense admit usually of being employed as well for aggression, and therefore

may inspire suspicion, fear, and counter-arming in other nations. If there were a kind of cannon which would go off only when on home ground, or a type of military training which would be useless away from the national soil, the government adopting them would be no more minatory than if it girdled the country with cement-lined trenches. The submarine torpedo boat did at first present itself as peculiarly a weapon of protection. But the rapid development of a seagoing submarine able to create havoc at a long distance from its home base has converted it into an offensive arm of great deadliness. The devising of the superdreadnaught carrying guns of a weight and caliber which had been supposed to be possible only in coast-defense guns has wiped out another distinction between the instruments of defense and those of attack.

The civilized peoples find themselves, therefore, confronting this situation:

1. The treaties between the great powers guaranteeing the security of the little peoples have become "mere scraps of paper."

2. Warfare has become a capitalistic enterprise and fighting a skilled occupation, so that, more and more, success in war hinges on elaborate preparation.

3. The armament and training a militarist government desires in support of aggression may be secured of its people under the pretext that they are necessary for national safety.

4. The prudent preparations a peace-loving people makes for defense may be construed by other peoples as designed for aggression.

5. Armament and training acquired for defense admit of being employed in aggression in case the nation changes its attitude toward international law and morality.

6. The nation that outarms the others runs no risk in so doing and *may* be rewarded for its preparedness by success in war.

7. The nation that is first to disarm or that lags behind the rest in preparation for war runs the risk of being thwarted or beaten.

8. From the foregoing it follows that the war-loving nations have the power to force the peace-loving nations into the gloomy path of armament or war, whereas the peace-loving nations have no power to force the war-loving nations into the sunny path of peace. The men of Mars set the pace for the rest of the world.

A cool, relentless analysis of the situation discloses, then, little ground for hopeful anticipation. On the contrary, the prospect is one of the blackest that humanity has ever faced: A spread over the world of the policy of competitive armament; an ever larger share of production shunted into the bottomless pit of preparedness; a more general sacrifice of the flowering years of male life to military training; a gradual starvation of such state services as education, research, public recreation, and social amelioration—all this, punctuated from time to time by colossal wars resulting in the slaughter of millions and the laying waste of populous and flourishing areas of the globe.

Such is the appalling outlook if we continue on the national line. Is there no door of escape? One, indeed, there is. A thousand times groups of men have faced a crisis like that which confronts the nations. The well-disposed have been obliged to go always armed and on the *qui vive* because of the presence in their midst of a few bullies who encroached upon others and would not submit the resulting disputes to arbitration. A traveler informs us that among the feud-ridden Berdurani of Northeastern Afghanistan

> the villages and fields bristle in all directions with round towers. These are constantly occupied by men at enmity with their neighbors in the same or adjoining villages, who, perched up in their little shooting boxes, watch the opportunity of putting a bullet into each other's body with the most persevering patience. The fields, even, are studded with these round towers, and the men holding them most jealously guard their lands from anyone with whom they are at feud. . . . . If even a fowl strays from its owner into the grounds of another it is sure to receive a bullet from the adversary's tower. So constant are their feuds that it is a well-known fact that the village children are taught never to walk in the center of the road, but always from the force of early habit walk stealthily along under cover of the wall nearest to any tower.

This recalls the chronic strife among the Scotch Highlanders of olden times and the Albanians of today, the vendettas of Corsica, the feuds of Kentucky mountaineers, and the hereditary enmities between adjacent Chinese villages—all due, not to love of combat, but to the absence of law. In the Icelandic saga of Burnt Njal we see very clearly that domestic peace has been brought about, not by the spread of the spirit of reasonableness and love, but by the creation of courts the awards of which have force behind them.

Men united to create and to support legal institutions, not out of friendliness, but because they had found their feuds intolerable. On the whole the pacific disposition has been the offspring rather than the parent of the régime of law.

Now the only way of escape of the advanced nations from the ruinous results of their inevitable competition for place and advantage in the backward parts of the globe lies in their combining to create an organization provided with the means of adjudicating disputes and enforcing awards. Thinking in terms of the *nation* is destroying the people of Europe at the rate of ten thousand a day. Is it not high time we were thinking in terms of some Internation, League of Peace, World-Federation, or other vast unit capable of keeping the peace without stereotyping the *status quo* or hindering the survival of the fittest and the success of the adapted?

SOCIAL VALUES AND NATIONAL EXISTENCE

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Infinitely the most important fact to remember in connection with "War and Militarism in Relation to Moral and Social Values" is that if an unscrupulous, warlike, and militaristic nation is not held in check by the warlike ability of a neighboring non-militaristic and well-behaved nation, then the latter will be spared the necessity of dealing with "moral and social values" because it won't be allowed to deal with anything. Until this fact is thoroughly recognized, and the duty of national preparedness by justice-loving nations explicitly acknowledged, there is very little use of solemnly debating the question "How war and militarism affect such social values as the sense of the preciousness of human life; care for child welfare; the conservation of human resources; upper-class concern for the lot of the masses; interest in popular education; appreciation of truth-telling and truth-printing; respect for personality and regard for personal rights." It seems to me positively comic to fail to appreciate, with the example of Belgium before our eyes, that the real question which modern peace-loving nations have to face is not how the militaristic or warlike spirit within their own borders will affect these "values," but how failure on their part to be able to resist the militarism of an unscrupulous neighbor will affect them. Belgium had a very keen sense of the "preciousness of human life" and of "the need for the care of child welfare and the conservation of human resources," and there was much "concern" by the Belgian "upper classes for the lot of the masses," great "interest in popular education and appreciation of truth-telling and truth-printing and a high respect for personality and regard for personal rights." But all these "social values" existed in Belgium only up to the end of July, 1914. Not a vestige of them remains in 1915. To discuss them as regards present-day Belgium is sheer prattle, simply because on August 4, 1914, Belgium

had not prepared her military strength so that she could put on her frontiers at least half a million thoroughly armed and trained men of fighting spirit. In similar fashion the question of the internal reformation of China at this moment is wholly secondary to the question whether any China will remain to be reformed internally. A Chinese gentleman wrote me the other day that he had formerly been absorbed in plans for bringing China abreast of the modern movement but that the events of the past year had shown him that what he really ought to be absorbed in was the question whether or not China would be able by military preparation to save itself from the fate of Korea. Korean "social values" now have to be studied exclusively through a Japanese medium. At this moment the Armenians, who for some centuries have sedulously avoided militarism and war and have practically applied advanced pacificist principles, are suffering a fate, if possible, worse than that of the Belgians; and they are so suffering precisely and exactly because they have been pacificists, whereas their neighbors the Turks have not been pacificists but militarists. They haven't the vestige of a "social value" left to be "affected" by militarism or by anything else.

In the thirteenth century Persia had become a highly civilized nation, with a cultivated class of literary men and philosophers, with universities, and with great mercantile interests. These literary men and merchants took toward the realities of war much the same attitude that is taken in our own country by gentlemen of the stamp of Messrs. David Starr Jordan and Henry Ford. Unfortunately for these predecessors of the modern pacificists they were within striking distance of Genghis Khan and his Mongols; and, as of course invariably happens in such a case, when the onrush came the pacifists' theories were worth just about what a tissue-paper barrier would amount to against a tidal wave. Russia at that time was slowly struggling upward toward civilization. She had become Christian. She was developing industry and she was struggling toward individual freedom. In other words, she was in halting fashion developing the "social values" of which the foregoing extract speaks. But she had not developed military efficiency; she had not developed efficiency in war. The Mongols

overwhelmed her as fire overwhelms stubble. For two centuries the Russians were trodden under foot by an alien dominion so ruthless, so brutal, that when they finally shook themselves off, all popular freedom had been lost and the soul of the nation seared by torment and degradation; and to this day the scars remain on the national life and character. The chief difficulties against which Russia has had to struggle in modern times are due ultimately to the one all-essential fact that in the early part of the thirteenth century she had not developed the warlike strength to enable her to hold her own against a militaristic neighbor.

There are well-meaning people, utterly incapable of learning any lesson taught by history, utterly incapable even of understanding aright what has gone on before their very eyes during the past year or two, who nevertheless wish to turn this country into an occidental China—the kind of China which every intelligent Chinaman of the present day is seeking to abolish. There are plenty of politicians, by no means as well-meaning, who find it to their profit to pander to the desire common to most men to live softly and easily and avoid risk and effort. Timid and lazy men, men absorbed in money-getting, men absorbed in ease and luxury, and all soft and slothful people naturally hail with delight anybody who will give them high-sounding names behind which to cloak their unwillingness to run risks or to toil and endure. Emotional philanthropists to whom thinking is a distasteful form of mental exercise enthusiastically champion this attitude. The faults of all these men and women are of a highly non-militaristic and unwarlike type; and naturally they feel great satisfaction in condemning misdeeds which are incident to lives that they would themselves be wholly unable to lead without an amount of toil and effort that they are wholly unwilling to undergo. These men and women are delighted to pass resolutions in favor of anything with a lofty name, provided always that no demand is ever made upon them to pay with their bodies to even the smallest degree in order to give effect to these lofty sentiments. It is questionable whether in the long run they do not form a less desirable national type than is formed by the men who are guilty of the downright iniquities of life; for the latter at least have in them ele-

ments of strength which, if guided aright, could be used to good purpose.

Now, it is probably hopeless ever to convince the majority of these men except by actual disaster that the course they follow is not merely wicked because of its subordination of duty to ease, but from their own standpoint utterly shortsighted—as the fate of the Armenians and the Chinese of the present day shows. But I believe that the bulk of our people are willing to follow duty, even though it be rather unpleasant and rather hard, if it can be made clearly evident to them; and, moreover, I believe that they are capable of looking ahead, and of considering the ultimate interest of themselves and their children, if only they can be waked up to vital national needs. The members of the Sociological Society should pride themselves on furnishing leadership in the right direction to these men and women who wish to do what is right.

The first thing to do is to make these citizens understand that war and militarism are terms whose values depend wholly upon the sense in which they are used. The second thing is to make them understand that there is a real analogy between the use of force in international and the use of force in intra-national or civil matters; although of course this analogy must not be pushed too far.

In the first place, we are dealing with a matter of definition. A war can be defined as violence between nations, as the use of force between nations. It is analogous to violence between individuals within a nation—using violence in a large sense as equivalent to the use of force. When this fact is clearly grasped, the average citizen will be spared the mental confusion he now suffers because he thinks of war as *in itself* wrong. Of course whether war is right or wrong depends purely upon the purpose for which, and the spirit in which, it is waged. Here the analogy with what takes place in civil life is perfect. The exertion of force or violence by which one man masters another may be illustrated in the case of a black-hander who kidnaps a child, knocking down the nurse or guardian; and it may also be illustrated in the case of the guardian who by violence withstands and thwarts the black-hander in his efforts to kidnap the child or in the case of the policeman who by force arrests the black-hander or white-slaver or whoever it is

and takes his victim away from him. There are of course persons who believe that all force is immoral, that it is immoral to resist wrongdoing by force. I have never taken much interest in the individuals who profess this kind of twisted morality; and I do not know the extent to which they practically apply it. But of course, if they are right in theory, then it is wrong for a man to endeavor by force to save his wife or sister or daughter from rape or other abuse, or to save his children from abduction and torture. It is a waste of time to discuss with any man a position of such folly, wickedness, and poltroonery. But unless a man is willing to take this position, he cannot honestly condemn the use of force or violence or war—for of course the policeman who risks and perhaps loses or takes life in dealing with an anarchist or white-slaver or black-hander or burglar or highwayman must be justified or condemned on precisely the same principles which require us to differentiate among wars and to condemn unstintedly certain nations in certain wars and equally without stint to praise other nations in certain other wars.

If the man objects to war, objects to the use of force in civil life as above outlined, his position is logical, although both absurd and wicked. If the college presidents, politicians, automobile manufacturers, and the like, who during the past year or two have preached pacificism in its most ignoble and degrading form are willing to think out the subject and are both sincere and fairly intelligent, they must necessarily condemn a police force or a posse comitatus just as much as they condemn armies; and they must regard the activities of the sheriff and the constable as being essentially militaristic and therefore to be abolished.

There are small communities with which I am personally acquainted where the general progress has been such as really to permit of this abolition of the policeman. In these communities—and I have in mind specifically one in New England and one in the province of Quebec—the constable and sheriff have no duties whatever to perform, so far as crimes or deeds of violence are concerned. The "social values" in the communities are not in any way affected by either the international militarism of the soldier or by the civil militarism of the policeman, and on the whole good

results; although I regret to say that in each of the two communities I have in mind there have been some social developments that were not pleasant.

We ought all of us to endeavor to shape our action with a view to extending so far as possible the area in which such conditions can be made to obtain. But at present the area cannot, as a matter of plain fact, be extended to most populous communities, or even to ordinary scantily peopled communities; and to make believe that it can be thus extended is a proof, not of goodness of heart, but of softness of head.

As a matter of practical common-sense it is not worth while spending much time at this moment in discussing whether we ought to take steps to abolish the police force in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, or Montreal, because no police force is needed in a certain Vermont town or a certain Quebec village. Such a discussion would not help us in the least toward an appreciation and development of the "social values" of any one of the big cities in question.

Exactly the same principle, only a fortiori, applies as regards war. On the whole there is a much greater equality of intellectual and moral status among the individuals in a great civilized community than there is between the various nations and peoples of the earth. The task of getting all the policemen, all the college professors, all the business men and mechanics, and also all the professional crooks, in New York to abandon the reign of force and to live together in harmony would be undoubtedly very much easier than to secure a similar working agreement among the various peoples of Europe, America, Asia, and Africa. One of the commonest failings of mankind is to try to make amends for failure to perform the duty at hand by grandiloquent talk about something that is afar off. Most of our worthy pacificist friends adopt in this matter the attitude Mrs. Jellaby took toward foreign missions when compared with her own domestic and neighborhood duties. Instead of meeting together and passing resolutions to affect the whole world, let them deal with the much easier task of regulating their own localities. When we have discovered a method by which right living may be spread so universally in Chicago and New York

that the two cities can with safety abolish their police forces, then, and not till then, it will be worth while to talk about "the abolition of war." Until that time the discussion will not possess even academic value.

The really essential things for men to remember, therefore, in connection with war are, first, that neither war nor peace is immoral in itself, and, secondly, that in order to preserve the "social values" which were enumerated in the quotation with which I began this article it is absolutely essential to prevent the dominance in our country of the one form of militarism which is surely and completely fatal, that is, the military dominion of an alien enemy.

It is utterly impossible to appreciate social values at all or to discriminate between what is socially good and socially bad unless we appreciate the utterly different social values of different wars. The Greeks who triumphed at Marathon and Salamis did a work without which the world would have been deprived of the social value of Plato and Aristotle, of Aeschylus, Herodotus, and Thucydides. The civilization of Europe, America, and Australia exists today at all only because of the victories of civilized man over the enemies of civilization, because of victories stretching through the centuries from the days of Miltiades and Themistocles to those of Charles Martel in the eighth century and those of John Sobieski in the seventeenth century. During the thousand years that included the careers of the Frankish soldier and the Polish king the Christians of Asia and Africa proved unable to wage successful war with the Moslem conquerors; and in consequence Christianity practically vanished from the two continents; and today nobody can find in them any "social values" whatever, in the sense in which we use the words, so far as the sphere of Mohammedan influence and the decaying native Christian churches are concerned. There are such "social values" today in Europe, America, and Australia only because during those thousand years the Christians of Europe possessed the warlike power to do what the Christians of Asia and Africa had failed to do, that is, to beat back the Moslem invader. It is of course worth while for sociologists to discuss the effect of this European militarism on "social values," but only if they first clearly realize and formulate the fact that if the European militarism

had not been able to defend itself against and to overcome the militarism of Asia and Africa, there would have been no "social values" of any kind in our world today, and no sociologists to discuss them.

The Sociological Society meets at Washington this year only because the man after whom the city was named was willing to go to war. If he and his associates had not gone to war there would have been no possibility of discussing "social values" in the United States, for the excellent reason that there would have been no United States. If Lincoln had not been willing to go to war, to appeal to the sword, to introduce militarism on a tremendous scale throughout the United States, the sociologists who will listen to this paper, if they existed at all, would not be considering the "social values" enumerated above, but the "social values" of slavery and of such governmental and industrial problems as can now be studied in the Central American republics.

It is a curious fact that during the thirty years prior to the Civil War the men who in the northern and especially the northeastern states gradually grew to take most interest in the anti-slavery agitation were almost equally interested in anti-militaristic and peace movements. Even a casual glance at the poems of Lowell, Holmes, and Whittier will show this. They were strong against slavery and they were strong against war. They did not take the trouble to think out the truth, which was that in actual fact slavery could be abolished only by war; and when the time came they had to choose between, on the one hand, the "social values" of freedom and of union and, on the other hand, the "social value" of peace, for peace proved incompatible with freedom and union. Being men fit to live in a free country, they of course chose freedom and union rather than peace. I say men; of course I mean women also. I am speaking of Julia Ward Howe and Harriet Beecher Stowe just exactly as I am speaking of Longfellow and Lowell and Whittier.

Now, during the thirty years preceding the Civil War these men and women often debated and occasionally in verse or prose wrote about the effect of war on what we now call "social values." I think that academically they were a unit in saying that this effect

was bad; but when the real crisis came, when they were faced by the actual event, they realized that this academic discussion as to the effect of war on "social values" was of no consequence whatever. They did not want war. Nobody wants war who has any sense. But when they moved out of a world of dreams into a world of realities they realized that now, as always in the past has been the case, and as undoubtedly will be the case for a long time in the future, war may be the only alternative to losing, not merely some "social values," but the national life which means the sum of all "social values." They realized that as the world is now it is a wicked thing to use might against right, and an unspeakably silly and therefore in the long run also a wicked thing to chatter about right without preparing to put might back of right. They abhorred a wanton or an unjust war and condemned those responsible for it as they ought always to be condemned; and, on the other hand, they realized that righteous war for a lofty ideal may and often does offer the only path by which it is possible to move upward and onward. There are unquestionably real national dangers connected even with a successful war for righteousness; but equally without question there are real national dangers connected even with times of righteous peace. There are dangers attendant on every course, dangers to be fought against in every kind of life, whether of an individual or of a nation. But it is not merely danger, it is death, the death of the soul even more than the death of the body, which surely awaits the nation that does not both cultivate the lofty morality which will forbid it to do wrong to others, and at the same times spiritually, intellectually, and physically prepare itself, by the development of the stern and high qualities of the soul and the will no less than in things material, to defend by its own strength its own existence; and, as I at least hope sometime will be the case, also fit itself to defend other nations that are weak and wronged, when in helpless misery they are ground beneath the feet of the successful militarism which serves evil. At present, in this world, and for the immediate future, it is certain that the only way successfully to oppose the might which is the servant of wrong is by means of the might which is the servant of right.

Nothing is gained by debate on non-debatable subjects. No intelligent man desires war. No intelligent man who is willing to think can fail to realize that we live in a great and free country only because our forefathers were willing to wage war rather than accept the peace that spells destruction. No nation can permanently retain any "social values" worth having unless it develops the war-like strength necessary for its own defense.

DISCUSSION

John Mez, of the American Peace Society

It is with great pleasure that I shall attempt to discuss in the few minutes given me some of the points made by our distinguished opponent, Mr. Roosevelt, who in spite of his apparent opposition to pacificist theories has done so much in the promotion of the cause of peace that he is among the few great men who have been honored with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. In commenting from the pacificist and sociological viewpoint upon Mr. Roosevelt's address, I want above all to state that the peace movement today is no more a merely sentimental or emotional movement of a few "well-meaning" or "soft and slothful" people, but a very rational movement based upon undisputable truths of scientific research movement. Pacificism today is distinctly a new social science, an applied science, i.e., the investigation and determination of the causes of war and the best means for their removal, which it aims to advocate and propagate. We look upon the social phenomenon of war as a social disease which can be cured, or, rather, prevented, by the application of new methods of social hygienics.

It is extremely gratifying, therefore, that the American Sociological Society should have given us the opportunity at this annual meeting to discuss the problems of war and peace.

The contents of Mr. Roosevelt's address amount to saying that the only thing worth while discussing is the question of national preparedness. For this is apparently what the speaker had in mind in saying that "infinitely the most important fact to remember is the duty of national preparedness," and that "the members of the Sociological Society should pride themselves on furnishing leadership in the right direction to those men and women who wish to do what is right." This overemphasis of the problem of military preparedness is of course absurd if carried too far. If we were to discuss, for example, the problem of the nationalization of the United States railroads, or any other subject, Mr. Roosevelt might again with equal justification say that "until the duty of national preparedness is explicitly acknowledged, there is very little use of solemnly debating the question" again "for the excellent reason

that there would have been no United States" unless certain wars in the past had been fought!

It is perfectly true that Belgium, Korea, and Persia have suffered terribly from wars waged against them in the past. But what is the reason of all this suffering? Is it not the very fact that some of those aggressive outside nations that have inflicted all that suffering had too much cultivated and emphasized that beautiful and moral "duty of national preparedness"? And what conclusions are we to draw from these facts? Are they that the very thing that has caused all that suffering in the past should be cultivated, that the killing instruments and the fighting machines should be increased all over the globe to the largest possible extent, or should not rather all our efforts be directed toward preventing a repetition of all these horrors and sufferings?

The shining centers of "Western civilization" to which Mr. Roosevelt refers *have* remembered what he calls "infinitely the most important fact to remember." They *have* "made themselves able to resist the militarism of the unscrupulous neighbor," but they have done this to such an extent that their very preparedness has become the cause of their downfall and is destroying today not only all social values but their very existence.

Mr. Roosevelt says that only when Chicago and New York are able with safety to abolish their police forces "can we talk about the abolition of war," and he adds that pacificists "must necessarily condemn a police force" "just as much as they condemn armies."

Now, this would be perfectly true if we actually used the police force of Chicago against that of New York and vice versa. This, however, is not in accordance with the facts, and I venture to say that the analogy between police forces and armies in this connection is utterly untenable. Fortunately for us, such disputes as may arise between such cities as Chicago and New York on questions of commercial and trade rivalry are no longer settled by sending the police forces of these cities against each other. On the contrary, they are settled by exactly those other and better methods which the sensible man wants to put into effect in the relationship between nations. These cities abstained from the use of force against each other, not because they are "timid and lazy" or "absorbed in money getting" or "absorbed in ease and luxury" or "soft and slothful," but because they realize the absolute futility and irrelevance of physical force for obtaining any real benefits whatsoever. They realize that the legal methods of justice and law are better and less costly and less bloody than the ancient methods of brute force.

Mr. Roosevelt makes a specialty of giving the Chinese tag to everybody who talks against his particular notion of what to do. He says that there are pacificists who "wish to turn this country into an occidental China—the kind of China which every intelligent Chinaman of the present day is seeking to abolish." To this I wish to say that the Chinese have had a war every ten or twenty years during the last centuries, far more than Germany, and very much

more than the United States, and to speak of the Chinese as an emblem of peace is as far from the truth as one could possibly get.

The point in which, in my opinion, Mr. Roosevelt's theories are particularly fallacious is his one-sided reasoning,[1] a common fallacy well known to every student of logics. We find this so-called "unilateral aberration" in most militaristic argumentation. Most militarists think merely of defense, never of attack. The eminent Russian philosopher, Jacques Novicow, the former vice-president of the International Institute of Sociology, has dealt with this point at length in his book, *War and Its Alleged Benefits*. He says:

> Without doubt, to defend one's rights at peril of death is a most generous deed; without doubt, the communities unwilling to bring themselves to do so soon fall into the lowest state of degradation; only—we forget the other side of the question. That the A's should be obliged to defend their rights with their lives, there must perforce be B's who violate those rights also at the risk of their lives. Defense necessarily involves attack.

There can be no war without an aggressor, and, however beautiful, moral, and "right" defense may be, war in itself always is one of the principal causes of the degradation of the human race and one of the main destroyers of social values, and this in my opinion is the truth we are after. Novicow summarizes this line of thought in one sentence, "A man's first duty is not to defend his country; it is not to attack anybody else's." Mr. Roosevelt has absolutely failed to see or to state these most important facts and overlooks entirely that armaments in themselves constitute a constant threat and menace to other nations and *their* "social values." I am pleased to note, however, that he explicitly states that "nobody wants war who has any sense" and that "no intelligent man desires war."

But, to believe that wars can best be prevented by preparedness, to state that the increase of armaments alone is "infinitely the most important fact to remember," is perfectly absurd in view of the lesson we might have learned from the events in Europe. The problem of preserving social values cannot be solved by the simple method of piling up armaments all over the world. The reasons why Mr. Roosevelt should say that "nobody wants war who has any sense" are not given in his address. But apparently he possesses an instinctive and subconscious notion of the truth that we are trying to find. This truth

[1] As explained by Norman Angell: "The failure to realize that in all matters connected with the relations between men the action of one party makes only half the operation, and that we must necessarily misunderstand the operation as a whole unless we think of the acts of the two parties together, as that defense necessarily implies attack, sale purchase, inferior superior; . . . . the tendency to consider a problem of two parties—war—in terms of one, as when we are told that the way for a nation to be sure of peace (or in this case of 'social values') is to be stronger than its enemy, an 'axiom' which, stated in the terms of the two parties, amounts to saying that for two nations to keep the peace (or their social values) each must be stronger than the other."

is, of course, that war is opposed to the interests of society, that it destroys social welfare rather than promotes it.

The fact is that certain military writers are constantly telling us that war is good in itself, that it is moral, that it is beneficial, that it *promotes* social progress and national welfare, and thus tends to increase the social values with which we are particularly concerned here. We are told that wars keep nations from degenerating, that, as the Jesuit Charles Plater puts it, war "remains the final means of preventing earth from becoming a pandemonium and humanity from lapsing into the brute." To this theory, however, the pacificists object most vigorously, and in this we are supported by the truths of social science. For we know that war is opposed to and destroys social values, that, as a matter of fact, militarism and wars are the greatest preventives of social reform, of the uplift and betterment of society.

The losses of social values incurred through wars and the evils of armed peace—which is nothing but "latent war"—are, of course, appalling. In my opinion, there are three main causes for the destruction of social values through the war system:

1. Since social values are largely depending upon economic values, the constant tremendous expenditure of huge sums for armaments (amounting to three billions of dollars in the last twenty years in the United States alone) and for wars must naturally tend toward destroying social values.

2. The mere loss of lives in wars, amounting to more than fifty million lives in the last three thousand wars and to approximately three million in the present war, cannot possibly in any way promote social values.[1]

[1] What war has done and is doing in reality with respect to the sense of the preciousness of human life has been summed up in a statement published in the *Survey*, March 6, 1915, from which I quote the following:

"War has brought low our conception of the *preciousness of human life* as slavery brought low our conception of human liberty.

"It has benumbed our growing sense of the *nurture of life;* and at a time when we were challenging Reichstag, Parliament, and Congress with the needlessness of infant mortality and child labor, it has entrenched a million youths with cold and fever and impending death.

"It has thwarted the chance of our times for the *fulfilment of life*, and scattered like burst shrapnel the hands of the sculptors and the violinists, the limbs of the hurdlers and the swimmers, the sensitive muscles of the mechanics and the weavers, the throats of the singers and the interpreters, the eyes of the astronomers and the melters —every skilled and prescient part of the human body, every gift and competence of the human mind.

"It has set back our promptings toward the *conservation of life;* and in a decade when England and France and Russia, Germany and Austria and Belgium, have been working out social insurance against the hazards of peace, it has thrown back upon the world an unnumbered company of the widowed and the fatherless, of crippled breadwinners and of aged parents, left bereft and destitute.

"It has blocked our way toward *the ascent of life;* and in a century which has seen the beginnings of effort to upbuild the common stock, it has cut off from parenthood the strong, the courageous, and the high-spirited."

3. The indirect and more subtle losses caused through the present militarization of society are due to the fact that nine-tenths of our thoughts, of our energy, of our public attention, of our discussions in press and parliament, are concerned with military affairs and with the problems connected with them. Thus a large part of public attention is constantly diverted from those ends that would make *for* the increase of social values toward such ends as necessarily must tend to *decrease* social values.

If we simply apply our common-sense and compare the nations at war at present with those nations at peace, like the United States, we at once realize that social conditions are infinitely better maintained in those countries that have been able to preserve peace than in those which are fighting for their national existence or for the preservation of social values in the sense of Mr. Roosevelt.

War and the appeal to brute force, the reliance upon military power as the main and underlying factor for the maintenance, protection, or promotion of the welfare of society, is always and always has been "a degradation, a descent into animalism and barbarity that demoralizes victors and vanquished alike," and destroys what little social values mankind has been able hitherto to produce. Suppose that all wars in history had never been fought; undoubtedly society today would be far better off than it is in every respect. War, from the sociological viewpoint, is nothing but destruction and negation. Social values cannot be promoted by fighting—they are based upon peace and the activities of peace, upon law and justice, education, organization and co-operation, the preponderance of the social over the fighting instincts, and of association over dissociation. The only true basis for social progress, national existence and security, and for social values, therefore, is the maintenance of peace and the reliance upon law instead of the methods of the past—the resort to brute force!

MABEL BOARDMAN, AMERICAN RED CROSS SOCIETY

I agree with Colonel Roosevelt and many others as to the necessity of being prepared for national defense, but I confess I am puzzled as to where the line is to be drawn between preparedness and militarism. What one man calls preparedness, another declares militarism; what one nation claims as preparedness, another pronounces militarism.

Great Britain, an island kingdom, with many important colonial possessions, finds that her preparedness lies in the creation of a navy far larger than that of any other nation—a navy powerful enough not only to sweep the seas free from the naval and merchant ships of any other country with whom she may be at war, but which also makes it possible for her at such a time to control the commerce between neutral countries contiguous to the territory of her enemy and all other neutral nations. Thus her preparedness permits her to dominate the seas and to dictate orders to the commerce of independent countries with which she is not at war.

Germany, situated in the heart of Europe, lying between powerful nations with whom she has had previous wars, and believing her national existence in frequent danger, finds her preparedness lies in the creation of a great army—in making her entire nation part of a huge military system, an organization strong enough not only to meet the attacks of her neighbors but which under the plea of military exigencies led her to invade the territory of a neutral nation, disregarding treaty rights.

The preparedness of each of these countries is made in all good faith, and according to what their needs seem to them to be. In the minds of the people of each state preparedness means preservation of their respective national existence, for the sense of self-preservation is as strong in nations as in individuals.

The question of right or wrong is not settled by the size of the military force and its efficiency. Might does not make right, and the fact must not be lost sight of that in the present conflict each nation believes the righteousness of the cause lies upon its side.

At the time of our war with Spain all continental Europe believed that our purpose was a selfish desire to acquire Spanish colonies. We did take Porto Rico. Exonerated as we were by our action regarding Cuba, we yet placed a certain control over that island that led many of our former accusers to maintain that it was only a matter of time before it finally became United States territory. There are European diplomatists, students of history, who are today convinced that sooner or later destiny will lead the United States to sovereignty southward to the Panama Canal, and that some excuse will be found by us to justify such a conquest. The motives attributed to another nation are rarely altruistic, whereas those a people assume for themselves are always of a righteous character.

Virtue does not lie in preparedness itself. Rome in her decadence became a prey to the barbarian militarists. But Rome in the heyday of her own military power utilized this power not for defense but for the aggressive conquest of other nations.

Suppose today China, warned by this European war, became suddenly a military nation as efficient as Germany, so that she might protect the integrity of her empire and maintain her rights. With her teeming millions, with her overcrowded country, with food problems often resulting in serious famine, would her people be content not to utilize this great power of preparedness for the acquisition of complete control over Manchuria and Mongolia and the obtaining of new territory in Siberia and possibly the Philippines? How far preparedness for defense may lead to preparedness for aggression is a vital question.

That wars have a certain analogy to violence between individuals, as Colonel Roosevelt says, is true, it seems to me, only in a limited sense. Even in a war for principles, such as religious freedom or the abolition of slavery, we

cannot claim that the people who contended on the side now realized as wrong were consciously committing wrong, and this is still less the case in wars between nations. In the action of man the individual who attacks to murder, or to rob, is, at least among civilized nations, fully aware of his offense against the law, and if caught in the act pleads guilty before the bar of justice.

Nations, on the other hand, disregarding treaty rights and international obligations, justify their acts by pleas of defense and military necessity. A plea of "guilty" would place so great a stigma upon their national honor that such a confession is, as far as I know, unrecorded.

The police officer cannot enforce the law and arrest the criminal until the law has been created by a majority of the people and authority has been given him for its enforcement. Nor is the fate of the violator of the law left to the police officer, for the arrested man has the right of defense and a trial by a jury of his peers before punishment is inflicted. The *habeas corpus* act provides for the individual the right to freedom from restraint without legal process. The plaintiff may appear against the defendant, but has not the power to pronounce his sentence. Is a nation to receive less right than an individual? Are its acts to be judged and its punishment to be inflicted by the nation it may have wronged, smarting with a sense of such wrong, and determined on revenge rather than justice? This would be contrary to the laws for individuals, and why not, therefore, contrary to the law between nations?

Furthermore, the individual may be a base and criminal character. But the composite citizen of any nation is constructed of its many virtues as well as its vices. Belgium has a keen sense of social values; but so has Germany. The insurance laws for the working classes in the latter country are remarkable for their efficiency in providing old-age pensions and sick benefits. The workingmen's gardens, children's welfare work, visiting nurse organizations, and other institutions for social service are well developed in Germany. In such matters one nation may be quite as advanced as another. To what, therefore, is the military dominion of an alien enemy fatal? Not necessarily to the welfare of the conquered people. The welfare of the common people of Egypt and India may be in far better hands under their British conquerors than under native rulers. The poor Korean may obtain better protection under Japanese authorities than when, under native rule, every penny earned above the barest necessary living expenses was taken from him by local officers who, in their turn, had to pay their superiors for the offices they held. The northern hordes that overran Italy left the degenerate Roman Empire Latin at heart, but grafted upon it eventually new life and vigor. The Norman conquest of England did not destroy Anglo-Saxon predominance. The British conquest of North America gave rise to a new, vigorous, and many-sided people of far more value to the world than the few Indian tribes it supplanted. Our own conquest of the Philippines has brought educational, sanitary, and other progressive benefits to the inhabitants of these islands. The military

power of the Moslems, where it proved successful, has deterred progress, as would the military power of China or India if so developed as to lead to conquest.

It seems to me, therefore, that something in addition to military preparedness is essential—something having to do with fitness to have the right to be prepared.

Furthermore, international law by agreement between nations should be more fully developed and made to conform more nearly to the law that exists for the maintenance of peace and order between individuals. This should be followed by some form of federation of states as men are federated for the maintenance of law. International courts of justice must provide proper means for the adjudication of international differences. If any nation fails to resort to such a court for the redress of its wrongs and takes upon itself the defiance and disobedience of the law, the police power of all the federated states should unite in its enforcement and in bringing the offender before the court of justice, to be fairly tried by its peers before further punishment is inflicted. The placing of the offending nation outside the pale of all international intercourse, such as commercial, postal, and diplomatic, would lend a strong aid to the military police power in enforcing the recalcitrant nation to yield.

The world is richer in social values, in art, in literature, and in all things that pertain to the welfare of man by the existence of many races rather than by the preponderance of any one race. For this reason, and not because of any excessive virtue on our part, or on the part of other peoples, it seems to me that each nation has a duty to perform in the maintenance of its own existence and welfare as long as such existence and welfare do not conflict with the rights of other nations. Until some successful federation of states for the maintenance of international law and order is provided, strong measures for defense appear necessary for the individual nations. If, however, such preparedness leads to abuse and to aggression, as it has a tendency to do, the question as to its limitations is a very important one. Should we have the misfortune to enter into a war with Great Britain we must realize that our navy would be powerless and our merchant marine helpless, as are Germany's; that whereas our enemy would purchase ammunition and supplies from any and all neutral countries, we could buy from none that could supply us with such articles. For this reason an adequate navy for preparedness under all conditions would have to be as powerful as that of Great Britain. Would such a navy lead us, in case of war with another country, to be arbitrary regarding the rights of neutrals?

Such a navy and a strong coast defense would be a safe protection from the invasion of any strong military power such as Germany; but would this lead us to further suspicion of Japan's motives, or to aggressive acts against our pan-American neighbors?

In the hands of a wise, conservative, just, and peace-loving people the strongest line of defense need not become a menace to our fellow-nations,

but whether or not we may be trusted with the powerful weapons of adequate preparedness is a matter for grave and serious consideration.

If we learn the lesson of preparedness and act upon it, we must learn also the harder lessons of self-control and international justice.

PROFESSOR E. C. HAYES, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Colonel Roosevelt commands my complete assent when he declares that so long as the individual has the right to defend himself or his family against assault the nation has the right to go to war in order to resist war. A nation has not only the right, it has the duty. And it may be added that when it becomes the collective duty of the nation to go to war, it is the individual duty of the men of the nation. If the strong man who sees a black-hander kidnaping a child or assailing a woman ought not to stand passively by, then it is all the more his duty to interfere if the child is his own or the woman is his wife. Similarly an intimate responsibility is laid upon the shoulders of every nation to protect its own destiny. And if a nation allows its destiny to be frustrated by violence which it might repel, then that nation is recreant.

Only defensive war is justifiable. It is justifiable to quell the black-hander who attacks you or another, but it is never justifiable to be a black-hander. Righteous war is justifiable as opposition to wickedness, but war is never justifiable except as a result of wickedness or colossal misunderstanding. Such wickedness and such misunderstanding as make war necessary are the great enemies of mankind.

There is, however, a type of conquest which is both justifiable and benevolent. When the virile and prolific stock spreads its sons and daughters over the face of the earth; when the enterprising stock sends its merchandise afar and plants the outposts of its industry in every continent; when the genius of a people diffuses its ideas, its discoveries, and its culture to subdue the minds of men and shape the civilization of the world—such conquest is truly glorious.

When nations meet in war the result is not decided chiefly by superior bravery. The men of all the great nations are brave. The normal human animal is a courageous beast. Where both adversaries are equally brave the victory will go to the nation that has the highest capacity for effective teamwork. This capacity for effective teamwork on a colossal scale is a cultural achievement which any great nation can attain, and its essence is *reliability*—the reliability that will not graft or shirk, but plays its dependable rôle in every lot and place. Physical bravery is not the supreme type of heroism. We have glorified in poetry and art the hero who in charging the foe upon the battlefield lays down his life; and I would not detract one jot from the honor paid him. Yet it is not such heroism so much as it is the solid virtue of reliability that determines how high the social structure of the nation can be reared, and even decides the triumph or disaster of nations when they meet in war. The

reliability which makes effective teamwork possible is both more decisive than physical bravery and harder to get in adequate amounts. It is easier and more instinctive to risk life and limb and hobble maimed through the remnant of one's days than for a man to refuse dishonorable wealth, decline to live on the corner of the avenue and see his name in the headlines, preferring rather to live obscurely on a side street, with his honor. Honorable as are the wounds of physical bravery, more honorable still are the unsung wounds of virtue, and the valor of virtue is both more difficult and more needed for the nation's life.

Up to this point I believe that I have been in hearty agreement, not only with the main point of the paper of Colonel Roosevelt, but also with other points which have been exemplified by the whole career of one whom many Americans regard as our foremost private citizen, and toward whom many of us, even when he had never heard our names, have had a feeling closely resembling personal friendship. But now I must run the risk of disagreeing with him, and some frank and honest disagreement in the course of discussion is not wholly to be deprecated.

He tells us that the business men and college professors, crooks and thugs, of a great city are more nearly alike intellectually and morally than are the nations and peoples of the earth. The truth of this statement, if it be true at all, depends upon including the savage and barbarous peoples. Concerning those great nations which conceivably might make war on us no such statement can be made. We Americans have no right to look upon any of those nations as crooks or thugs, misguided and barbarous as their present conduct is. They are by nature as good as we, though victims of a miseducation. That miseducation has been fostered by professional militarism and autocracy. It is a bastard birth issuing from the union of the traditions of a more barbarous past with modern half-science. That half-science is due to the fact that the physical sciences have outrun the social sciences, as they needs must for a time. Erroneous social theories have been drawn by analogy from the doctrine of biological evolution with its struggle for survival. They are erroneous even as analogies, and based upon certain selected features of the doctrine of evolution which have impressed the imagination but which do not correctly represent even the biological facts. These errors require to be exterminated. We must not allow them to take root in our own minds.

Colonel Roosevelt tells us that it would be far easier to achieve a time when in our cities no neurasthenic degenerates or victims of evil rearing will require to be watched by the police than to bring in a time when the great nations will not fight one another. But war is not the deed of crooks and thugs; it is the deed of great nations, acting as nations under the guidance of their trusted leaders. I submit that there is far greater hope that a time is not far distant when such action of the nations will accord with the obvious requirements of reason and morality than that crooks and thugs will cease to require to be policed. As a matter of fact, such a time had almost come. The present war was almost impossible. The laboring men of European nations had met

in conventions and had realized their common interests and their common brotherhood; and if they had had their way this war would not have been. The scientists of European nations had met in a score of international organizations, and realized their common interests and their common humanity. And though now they are so distraught by the passions of war that we may have to wait till they are all dead before the nations of Europe can be led toward peace, still if they had had their way before the war no war would have come. Eminent legislators of the German Reichstag and the French Chamber had convened to discuss the undoing of the wrongs that followed the Franco-Prussian war, restoring to France that part of Alsace which is thoroughly French, and reforming abuses in the remainder of the conquered territory. And if, instead of the military autocracy, these legislators had had their way there would have been no war. The dyke that should have kept out such an inundation was almost high enough, but not quite. The flood broke over and now the dyke is swept away. But this is no time to lose heart. Like an American city after a conflagration, we must arise and build higher and stronger than before. The great nations should be compared, not with crooks and thugs, but rather to gentlemen of a hundred years ago reluctantly obeying the code that forced them to the duel, or, at worst, with the turbulent barons of a somewhat earlier day.

Colonel Roosevelt has cited specific lessons of history, but has he not slighted a central lesson of history, namely, the fact of change? Nearly every great step of progress has been regarded as impracticable up to the very moment of its realization. Men have said: "That which is and has always been is the practicable, that which has never been is visionary."

Those who believe that the nations will agree to enforce order are in no more hopeless case than one who, in a British public school a hundred years ago, dared to hope that the time would ever come when the sentiment of a boarding-school would be set against bullying. The corresponding political achievement may well require the hard fist as well as the brace and generous heart of a Tom Brown among the nations.

Those who believe in the birth of international reason and morality are in no worse case than one who, among the Vikings, where every man's hand kept his head, foretold the day when the Danes would dwell in villages that need police as little as those of Vermont. And Professor Wallas tells us that the peaceableness of the berserker Scandinavians was brought about, not so much by force of discipline as by general recognition of the folly and waste and cruelty of strife.

Aristotle in his noblest dreams could not conceive a society that should not be founded upon slavery. Most of the sages of history have believed that with human nature what it is the strong must always enslave the weak. Yet slavery has disappeared from all the great nations.

Multitudes of wise men would have laughed to scorn anyone who said that the time would ever come when the mortal sentiment of society should

insist that the rich and strong man, instead of having as many wives as he cared for and could afford, should content himself with only one. Human nature, they would have said, makes such a dream absurdly impossible.

There was a time when the union of Northumbria, Mercia, the Saxon kingdoms, the Welsh, the people of Strathclyde, and the Scots was more unthinkable than the unity of Europe is today. The barriers between those tribes and peoples were far more bitter and intense than any barriers which nature has set between the Britains and the Germans of today.

Some six thousand years ago, when history was dawning, the men of Babylon—as their clay cylinders disclose—already thought that they had reached the climax of history and were living in a ripe and decadent age, when little further progress could be anticipated. They tell us that the sun has shone a hundred million years, and it will be strange indeed if it should not shine *one* million more. In comparison with that future time six thousand years are but a brief space. We require to be emancipated from the illusion of the near, from the hypnotism of the present. Future social evolution will not only be long, it will also be accelerated, as it already is. Past progress makes swifter progress possible. We have often been told that, in subduing the physical resources of our globe to human uses, greater progress was made during the nineteenth century than in all the preceding ages. It may well be that we are on the threshold of a comparable period of social progress. It would be pusillanimous for us to surrender the hope that, sooner or later, and in the main, the mutual relations of the great nations will be governed by reason and morality.

It is right for the practical statesman to emphasize the need of the hour, and urge us to arm ourselves to meet the conditions of the day in which we live. But it is also a part of our duty to prepare for the better day that is to be. And those who think must *neither* lose sight of the demands of the present *nor* become oblivious to the longer perspective. We must not let the glare of war, which now half blinds us, render us incapable of vision, nor let its shock and horror rob us of our courage.

PROFESSOR JAMES Q. DEALEY, BROWN UNIVERSITY

From the first paragraph of the paper presented by Colonel Roosevelt it is plain that the Program Committee intended to have a sort of academic discussion as to the effects of war and militarism on such moral and social values as "the sense of the preciousness of human life" or "the regard for personal rights." Colonel Roosevelt, on the other hand, is in these days not academic but is intensely practical and prefers to discuss the connection between national existence and social values, arguing that a nation unprepared to ward off hostile attacks need not concern itself at all about social values, since these will be determined for it by the victorious enemy.

The practical teaching throughout his paper is that preparedness is not militarism but national salvation, or that a peace policy without preparedness is suicidal.

Presumably no one would seriously argue that a democratic industrial system like ours incurs the slightest danger of becoming militaristic, in the sense that a military class would be in the saddle as against the civilian, or that the government would become autocratic, or would be engaged in war at somewhat frequent intervals. Unquestionably a nation might be fully prepared against hostile attack, and yet in its heart would hate militarism and love democracy. The social values of a militaristic system are of course radically different from those of industrialism, as Herbert Spencer has plainly shown, and no American of any prominence desires to see established in the United States militaristic moral standards and social values.

On the other hand, I question whether any considerable number of thoughtful Americans really suppose that an era of world-peace is at hand. Many would love to see it come, but few in these days believe in the possibility of its immediate arrival. Dreams of human fraternity and world-peace flit easily into the mind when war is far away, but when war comes and the country is in danger, peace advocates fight in the trenches, the clergy pray to the God of Battles, and mothers who "did not raise their boys to become soldiers" nobly send them and their husbands also to join the army. Attractive as world-peace is in theory, yet it must be remembered that the human race in its history has never seen a century or even a generation without its wars, and that the last fifteen years have been among the bloodiest on record. In the several millions of years that presumably yet lie before man on the earth, there may develop a period of world-peace, when the lion and the bear and the eagles may amicably eat together at the same feast, but civilization is still too near its barbaric infancy for nations to rely overmuch on international altruism. Nations, like individuals, singly or in combination, must struggle for existence, and survival in the last analysis depends on force and foresight.

It is a curious fact that most of the great social utopians, like Plato and Sir Thomas More, insisted that their utopias be thoroughly organized for defensive war. They intuitively saw that a perfect state would surely have to fight for its life against envious rivals. Many sociologists indeed hold that human progress heretofore has been largely due to the amalgamation and assimilation of rival nations, brought about through war and conquest. Furthermore, it can be shown that every great nation has had to fight its way to prominence, and that it maintains its "place in the sun" only by its ability to face an enemy. In other words, whenever a state presses to the front and seeks to become a dominant power, it may pray for peace but should be prepared for war. If anyone believes, for example, that the United States with its tariff policy, its control over the Panama Canal, and its Monroe Doctrine can win and maintain economic supremacy without war, he surely is the most

utopian of dreamers. Under present conditions a powerful nation aiming at supremacy must be able in the last resort to hit quicker and harder than any rival. Had the states of the Netherlands in the early seventeenth century adopted such a policy their naval and commercial leadership would not have collapsed through lack of preparation when England under Cromwell challenged the supremacy of the seas.

Aristotle in his *Politics* asserted that the state came into existence that society might live, and that it continues to exist that society may enjoy the fulness of life. In other words, the state as a war organization should, first and foremost, guarantee the safety of the lives and property of its citizens against attack. When national safety is assured, then the state may add on other functions aiming to broaden the social values of national life. In past centuries preparedness for war has been the best guaranty of a nation's safety. It is a weapon approved by experience and should not be rejected by any nation until a better one has been demonstrated. It is futile for a nation to rely on the altruism of its rivals or the generosity of its friends. National defense is best accomplished by national forces made efficient by generous appropriations, expended without partisanship or suspicion of graft. In any such policy there need be no militarism, jingoism, or braggadocio. War at the best is a bad business and should some day become obsolete. But in this century the best that a nation can hope is, not that through preparedness it may escape war, but that its wars may be fewer; or that if defeat comes, as come it may, it will be inflicted by a superior nation and not by a third-rate power.

Armies, navies, and national preparedness are unquestionably a heavy drain on a nation's resources, but they are cheaper than defeat and a war indemnity. Such expenses are like the insurance policies that men take out on life and property. They seem unnecessary and they are sometimes waste, but, as things are, careful men and intelligent nations make these expenditures as a guaranty against the possible ills of life. One might suggest that along with military preparedness should go a constructive policy. Internationally a state should define its attitude toward other nations. It should announce its determination to develop by fair and open methods its commercial and industrial interests, and also its desire to refrain from aggression, to live in peace with other states, and its willingness to arbitrate differences, to reduce armaments, and to promote world-peace by joint agreements. Within its own borders, a state, for every dollar spent for national defense, should spend much more toward the elimination of crime, vice, pauperism, sickness, accidents, and disease; for the promotion of the industrial arts and education; and for the advancement of science and invention. In this way, the international world would see that the interests of the state were not primarily aggressive or militaristic, but were fundamentally economic and cultural. "Millions for defense, not a cent for tribute," but the wealth of the nation

should be lavishly expended for the betterment of conditions, as a basis for the upbuilding of moral and social values.

JOHN MARTIN, GRYMES HILL, STAPLETON, L.I.

With respect to national defense there are three courses possible: nonresistance, fool resistance, and effective resistance. The only course that is indefensible is fool resistance.

Nonresistance involves scrapping the navy and disbanding the army. Were the pacifists to propose this course they would show that they had the courage of their convictions, whatever physical courage they may lack. For such a proposal I would vote, just to be counted, though I know that not one in ten thousand would support it. But the suggestion is purely academic, since not for hundreds of years are the mass of people likely to be so philosophical that they could carry through a program of nonresistance. Surely, when the test came, and a foreign power was thought to be affronting the national dignity, Uncle Sam would fly to arms. So, for practical purposes, nonresistance is beyond consideration.

Fool resistance means resistance with a force inadequate and unprepared. Belgium had an army more fitted for comic opera than for fighting. Belgium resisted. And Belgium was desolated. Better would it have been for Belgium had she possessed neither fort nor soldier, so that she must have submitted without struggle. In these days of scientific warfare guerilla fighting is wholesale suicide.

Therefore the question before the American people is: "Fool resistance or effective resistance?" Effective resistance is possible without the sacrifice of democracy. This point Switzerland has proved. But Swiss democracy is exceptionally efficient, while American democracy is deplorably inefficient. It remains to be seen whether the American people have the collective capacity to organize a powerful national defense on a democratic basis, or whether dishonesty and prodigality are so deep-rooted in their government that millions voted for defense mean millions wasted.

However, if we succeed in establishing a powerful navy and a democratic army, another policy should concurrently be pressed. These forces are not to provoke war, but to prevent war. And sustained, earnest efforts must be made to form a League of Governments to prevent war. Such a league must possess a strong force with which to suppress any member within the league which makes war on any other member. For it should be agreed that all members would submit their differences to the international court, and the joint forces, under the direction of the international commander-in-chief, would be the international police to enforce the decisions of the court. The more powerful the forces which any nation could contribute toward the international policy the more influence would it have in the councils of the league. Therefore America can make the organization of effective resistance, if it will, a

contribution toward final peace. Were the one program made conditional upon the other, pacifists could join militarists. Of course the danger is that we shall prepare for war without organizing for peace. Unless the advocates of preparedness will couple with their schemes some definite plan for an international police the pacifists are justified in distrusting them. Even while the great war rages, an offer of a union for an international police to prevent war should be made by the United States to all the South American countries and to the neutral nations. Any agreement reached would be a precedent for the consideration of the belligerent peoples when their peace convention ultimately assembles. Were the neutral peoples, themselves within a league, unitedly to invite the belligerent powers, upon the cessation of the conflict, to enter their league and forever to make war between themselves well-nigh impossible, it is possible that, exhausted and disillusioned, they would willingly accept the invitation. Simply to veto preparedness is to insure fool resistance. But a constructive plan for peace made a condition for co-operation in preparedness would unite the nation and satisfy the claims of all parties.

CHARLES B. FERNALD, PARIS, FRANCE

Just back from Europe, I want to add my word in support of the point so well made by Professor Hayes, that "the dyke was already built almost high enough" to prevent the breaking over of this wild war. This needs to be emphasized: if we forget its truth, and count that effort all misspent, we become too pessimistic.

Look at but two of the incidents in French relations of these last years, where in a former time war would almost certainly have come. Fashoda: French and English pushing from opposite directions their "peaceful penetration" of Africa, meeting at a point to which each laid claim; France withdrawing—because the Republic was determined not to make war on her neighbor. Agadir: how easy to have found *casus belli* when the German "Panther" crept into that Moroccan port in 1911! But the Republic's diplomacy found the way of "compensations," which left neither country humiliated, even if neither's pretensions were wholly satisfied.

Even when in July, 1914, come the unmistakable threatenings of the great war—you may read some of them in the documents published in the *Journal of the Society of International Law*—France cannot strike first: she must hold her frontier guards ten kilometers back of the line until her enemy makes that astounding declaration of war based upon imagined violation of Belgian neutrality—by France!—on August 3, after German soldiers have been killed fighting in France and in Belgium.

Why this holding back by France? Because the Republic was restrained within these dykes that had been so long and well a-building; because it had to respect the great public opinion against almost any war; in large part because of men like Jaurés and Hervé, the Socialists.

Jaurés, orator, member of Parliament, editor of *L'Humanité*, you know was working with the government to do every last thing that might avert the catastrophe, when shot down by a mad student as the first victim. Hervé was left as the leader—Gustave Hervé, who had spent many months in jail for his anti-army utterances: can you imagine with what apprehensions we waited for his journal, *La Guerre Sociale*, next morning? That issue of August 1 remains a historic document: one of the original sources that you must study if you would see where and how this flood broke over the dyke. It is a two-page sheet, and the back page is filled with the arguments against war: war that can cure no present-day ills, a crime of crimes in the twentieth century. But across the front page blazes: "La Défense Nationale d'abord!" And it is filled with exhortation to arms: "They are across our borders; every working-man's first duty is to defend our country."

A remark of my Swiss barber at Lucerne this autumn is illuminating. We were talking of Switzerland's attitude; of the republic divided in language and in racial sympathies, yet so united and prepared for defense that no foe can dream it profitable to set foot across those guarded borders. He said: "I wish they'd all thrown the emperors and kings and princes into the sea that summer; we wouldn't have had this war. I didn't use to think much of our government—thought an emperor would be better; but now I know a republic is the best."

A republic of free speech and popular deliberation is and must always be comparatively ill fitted for aggressive war. But we may thank France for showing us how such a republic can defend itself; and Switzerland for showing how such a republic may remain peaceful and serviceable and free from dreams of aggrandizement, even when surrounded by war.

John A. Fitch, of "The Survey"

The paper read at this session and the discussion following it recognize the existence in the world of an appalling situation. In recognizing that obvious fact, however, have we not lost sight of other factors that may become equally appalling, especially if we overlook them? What, for example, has become of the cry for social and industrial justice which was the paramount issue in 1913? In the discussion today of social values and national existence there seems to be small recognition of the necessity of establishing and maintaining social standards if nations are to demonstrate their fitness to exist.

In an appeal for the expenditure of vast sums of money to prepare to meet an imaginary enemy in the defense of a national integrity that has not been threatened we hear no word of comment on the fact that ours is a country in which thirty thousand wage-earners lose their lives and two million are seriously injured every year in industrial accidents—a record unparalleled anywhere else in the civilized world; that child labor has not been stamped out; that, contrary to the prevailing practice in the leading countries of Europe, women

are generally allowed to work at night; that hours of labor are too long in many of our industries to permit adequate physical recuperation; that wages in many industries are fixed at a point below a decent standard of living; that because of all these things there exist in the land disease and want and vice which, not in any remote or imaginary way, but immediately and definitely, threaten our national integrity.

Furthermore, we need to remember, in a discussion of military preparedness, that those industries which are now earning millions for their directors and leading stockholders out of the war in Europe and which stand to make millions more out of a military propaganda in this country are among the greatest enemies of those ideals supposed to typify the national spirit, the maintenance of which constitutes the only logical reason for fighting for our national integrity. I refer to the steel industry which today, employing in the neighborhood of half a million men, generally denies in effect the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and assemblage, and by denying to the workers the right of organization effectually prevents any democratic action looking to an improvement of their condition. It is in the steel industry also that the twelve-hour day is still maintained, along with, in many companies, a seven-day week, involving a twenty-four hour period of continuous employment once in two weeks—a schedule of hours that has been repudiated in practically every other industry of importance in this country and which is utterly inconsistent with physical and mental development or good citizenship. Yet the man for whom the city of Washington was named and who made its existence possible because he was willing to fight, did his fighting for the establishment of those very rights of individual and civil liberty which are denied today in effect by the industries that are growing rich and great out of the profession of war.

Further indication of the present lack of interest in these internal problems of such vast importance is to be noted in the programs of the various societies that are now holding their sessions here in Washington. Practically all of them have given a large place to war and preparedness, but not one could find room for the discussion of the report of the Industrial Relations Commission. You may say that this commission did its work in an unscientific manner and that it bungled its job, and I will agree. You cannot, however, get away from the fact that, from the standpoint of national existence, the subject-matter of the report of the commission is a thing of greater importance to this country than any other thing that can be discussed. For the success or failure and even the permanence of our government are likely to depend less upon the state of our coast defenses than upon the wisdom or folly, the justice or injustice, with which we deal with the problems of labor.

If we must consider whether we are to fight for our country, we ought to consider conscientiously and very soberly whether we have established such institutions and such standards as shall make our country one for which fighting and dying are worth while.

THE EFFECT OF WAR AND MILITARISM ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

EMILY G. BALCH
Wellesley College

The subject allotted me for discussion is "The Effect of War and Militarism on the Status of Women." This is a wide and difficult question. All that I can hope to do is to awaken discussion, and perhaps for this purpose I am more useful in proportion as my views are more debatable.

War, like anything else, affects the status of women by working upon some line of cleavage between men and women, so that we are brought, first, to face the prior question of what the nature of this cleavage or difference is.

The vast importance to the race is the greater plasticity made possible by prolonged infancy. Among mammals this period of infancy is not only one of helpless dependence of the young upon the parents, but one of a very peculiar burden upon the mother. Among birds and some animals where the young are also helpless for a time the parents share the care, both building the nest, brooding on the eggs, and feeding and protecting their offspring.

When the mother becomes the *alma mater*—the nourishing mother—the relation immediately becomes one-sided. The mother is not only more or less incapacitated for either fight or flight during her pregnancy, but she is in a special way the companion, protector, and support of the little ones of the herd or pack. In the human species the child is sometimes nursed for five years or more.

When the four-footed creature raises himself to the standing posture, walks on two legs, and brandishes his arms, the dependence on the mother is accentuated. Young calves or colts or lambs are, however unsteady on their four feet, yet able from the first to walk and run. It is two years or more before the difficult

art of walking is acquired (and very ineffectively then) by the human baby, and until then he must be carried in the arms or on the back, or guarded when he is not carried. About the house, on the march, in flight, the mother is burdened by the traditional "child at the breast" and little ones clinging about her and impeding her.

Furthermore, the human species is in a bodily sense not well fitted to the erect posture it has assumed. Men suffer from this, and are peculiarly liable to rupture and other results of an imperfect adaptation of structure to habit, but with the child-bearer the physical results are vastly worse. It not only makes pregnancy and labor abnormally serious, but for women more than for men long-continued standing involves fatigue and strain.

The peculiarity of the relation of the mother to the children in our own species is not merely physical. She is, as a result of the dependence of the child upon her, his companion and first teacher, the awakener of the earliest emotions and the earliest ideas. Hers are those plastic years that Jesuit teachers believe to outweigh the effects of all after-teaching, and she is the natural depositary of nursery tradition for all the growing generation, of the entire social code for girls.

Such is the peculiar position of the female of the human species. Child-bearing and child-rearing are to her at once a physical handicap and an engrossing occupation. Men are neither physically burdened nor are they occupied by this business of continuing the stock. In many ways this great human business controls and colors their lives also, but it does not carry with it these two all-potent results.

So far the function of motherhood under human conditions creates a difference on which war, like any other force, may seize to carry differentiation further. But besides the effects of this function the man and the woman, as such, are in greater or less degree differentiated. Apart from the immediate sex characteristics it is not entirely easy to limit and define these differences, and as we know more of the subject we are less sure of our ground. Much that was believed in regard to the inferiority of women a few generations ago now appears to be sheer prejudice; much of the dif-

ference that unquestionably exists proves to be a result, not a cause, of differences in dress, education, occupation, and instilled codes as to behavior and feeling. Unquestionably, vastly important secondary sexual characteristics exist, innate and unchangeable, but they are difficult to define, and most of the easy generalizations as to *woman* appear, whether favorable or unfavorable, to be premature and highly unscientific.

But there is no question, I suppose, that in general the females of a given stock are ordinarily, apart from different training, lighter, slighter, and physically less powerful. This physical handicap is superadded to those of the girl from adolescence onward, and those of the expectant mother and of the mother of a family, already referred to.

All this, apart from any psychical difference, makes women less fit for war than men. It places them behind the firing line, where they are worth more, looking after the children, than they could be with weapons in their hands.

In a simple, weak, pacific little horde, living on fruits, roots, grubs, and small, helpless beasts, where speed and force count for relatively little, and no great violence threatens, this difference would seem to be less important and less likely to lead to secondary differentiations. Where there is need of fighting fierce or swift beasts, whether the beasts figure as marauders or as game, and where there is need of fighting rival tribes, these new causes (as has been suggested and as is so obvious) place new emphasis on the fact that woman is less useful for the hunt and the fight, and that she can less well be spared from her duties of taking care of the helpless members of the group and for other pacific but necessary tasks.

How far a different psychology as to conflict is either a cause or a result of this difference of function it would be interesting to know. Every magazine writer, indeed, can tell us, but they do not all tell us the same thing.

Kipling says that the "female of the species is more deadly than the male." As far as this is true, it appears to be connected with her charge of the young. Here is the chief concern of all-conserving nature, the point to be defended at all costs, or, in less mythological terms, here is the fulcrum of the blind struggle to survive. The hen,

the cow, the she-bear, are not aggressive and peculiarly deadly except when with their young. Then when danger threatens they are both debarred from the first and easier alternative of flight by their hampering babies, and spurred to the bitter and reckless courage of despair by the double incentive of helplessness and responsible affection. The male more commonly fights for food or pride, at some distance from the home. When the safety of his children is really the immediate stake he too takes on an added "deadliness."

Other theorists place pugnacity mainly to the charge of the more mobile male, and what they deduct from woman's share they seem to add to his.

In view of the evidence there seems reason to question (1) whether the pugnacity of the human male is so universal and so powerful an instinct as many writers make out, and (2) whether instinctive pugnacity has the causal relation to wars of the modern type that is often assumed.

Veblen lays stress on the peaceful inheritance of our species, which he argues goes back, not only to an earlier, but to a much more long-continued experience than our inheritance of warlike tendencies.[1] War is said to be unknown among the Eskimos.

Even where war is practiced it is possible to exaggerate its importance. Mason goes so far as to say: "It is not to be sup-

[1] "Man," he says, "is a social animal, and the selective process whereby he has acquired the spiritual make-up of a social animal has at the same time made him substantially a peaceful animal. The race may have wandered far from the ancient position of peacefulness, but even now the traces of a peaceful trend in men's everyday habits of thought and feeling are plain enough. The sight of blood and the presence of death, even of blood or death of the lower animals, commonly strike inexperienced persons with a sickening revulsion. In the common run of cases the habit of complacency with slaughter comes only as the result of discipline. In this respect man differs from the beasts of prey. . . . . In his unarmed frame and the slight degree to which his muscular force is specialized for fighting, as well as in his instinctive aversion to hostile contact with the ferocious beasts," man is fitter to be classed with those that survive by means of aptitude to avoid danger than with those that depend on ability to fight. "It is his part to take advice and contrive," he did not become a formidable animal "till he had made considerable advance in contriving weapons." During by far the greater part of the period of human evolution (ie., all the time till tools were effective) he was "of a peaceable and retiring disposition by force of circumstances" (Veblen, "Irksomeness of Labor," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, IV, 193).

posed that war was ever the normal occupation of any people. As now, so in all ages, war is an incident, an outbreak, a frenzy that soon exhausts itself."

To read much of the literature of the present moment would lead one to suppose that either men alone, or both men and women (the women perhaps more than the men), are under a constant temptation to fight, partially and painfully controlled by artificial inhibitions; but what we know of human history does not support this sporting interpretation of humanity.

When, however, war does largely dominate the life of a people, how does it affect women?

My impression is that we are too eager to force complex and widely varying facts into simple formulations. War may well have had different aspects and different results at different times and places.

Under primitive conditions both men and women submitted unconsciously to the molding forces that played upon the plastic material of their instincts, desires, capacities.

Dependence on the successful use of force naturally put a premium on strength and the physical qualities of the fighter. Relative bodily weakness and the unfitness for war, involved, in other ways, in the function of motherhood, tended to lower the importance and social power of women. It also put them at the mercy of men inflamed with passion and revenge. War apparently brought in its train the conception of women as booty, women as property, with all that this implies of inferior status and rightlessness.

Consider women as shown in the Homeric legend. Beautiful as are some of the characterizations, their social status is a pitiable one. The wise and virtuous Penelope, keeping off her warlike suitors by strategem, is in tutelage to her son; high-born women, Queen Hecuba and Cassandra, virgin-vowed priestess, are allotted to lords as slaves or concubines, according to age. In all literature there is nothing more heart-breaking than the *Trojan Women* of Euripides.

In the moral sphere besides, the idealization of force and the exaltation, in the hierarchy of virtues, of those most useful to the

military man, and the inculcation of these as binding upon (and thereby honoring to) boys and not upon girls, tended to brand women as spiritually inferior.

In European military history subsequent to the Dark Ages we may perhaps distinguish three periods. First is the entire feudal age. At this time military service was the ordinary form of payment for every freeman's home and farmland; whoever could and would wage war might do so; and war was an interstitial disturbance, liable to be brought home to any and every household. It was the typical occupation at least of the gentleman.

After this intervenes the period of standing armies and professional soldiers, and wars (apart from some cases of civil wars on religious and other grounds) were fought between nations, largely on frontier and colonial battlefields. The professional soldier with his gunpowder and his tactics was a far more businesslike and effective killer than the mediaeval horseman, but he killed mainly other professional soldiers, and wars in this period did not affect the structure of society in anything like the same degree. Society became more and more industrial in character.

The third phase is the phase of universal conscription, not directly affecting all the nations of our civilization, but profoundly modifying those in which the system is introduced, converting, as it does, every normal male into a drilled and disciplined member of a fighting machine. Another aspect of this phase has been the ever-mounting burden of competitive armaments, bound, unless the tide turned in season, ultimately to burst in a welter of mutual destruction. With a surprise which we have not yet outgrown, we find ourselves living in the midst of occurrences and actions such as we had supposed peculiar to a savage and outgrown past.

One of the concomitants of the warfare of the first of our three periods was chivalry. Is this an example of prevailing warfare working to elevate the status of women? This peculiar Christian chivalry of mediaeval romance, and to some extent of mediaeval practice, flowered from complex roots—the worship of the maiden Mother of God, the pleasure in the refinement and beauty of the castle bower, the tenderness to the weak which is especially called out when the unarmed are at the mercy of the armed, the impor-

tance of the lady castellan left with the administration of affairs on her hands during long absences of crusading lords, the veneration of page and squire for the arbiter of seemly and honorable deportment and the awarder of honors and prizes—all these causes and effects become secondary causes, mingle.

Chivalry was an ideal which, while it indulged and flattered women, also made rigorous and elevating demands upon them, and created for them, too, a code of noble and highly honored behavior. But it was not without its price. Ladies, in their sharply differentiated glory, were debarred from much plain all-humanness, if I may coin a word; this train of feeling led to the courtly assumption that the Queen of Spain has no legs, and ultimately to the Victorian conception of the ladylike, with all its queer taboos, as the *ne plus ultra* for female conduct. In general also the chivalrous feeling with its resulting limitations failed to reach effectively beyond the circle of one's peers, even if it extended to the unlovely or unattractive among them. The gentleman who could not see a *lady* stoop to raise her handkerchief from the floor might feel no qualms at seeing a *woman* on her knees scrubbing the floor.

In the period of growing industrialism, which begins with the rise of mediaeval town life before the Renaissance and which carries us through to the machine era, paid armies came to relieve the normal citizen of any special responsibility for fighting. War became again an accident and an interruption to normal life. This has been, for good and for evil, the era of liberalism and individualism. And very slowly this liberalism and individualism, together with modern industrialism, began to revolutionize women's relation to the work of the world, their legal, political, and social status, their conception of themselves. This ferment of change affected in different degrees all countries of the Western world and even those of the Orient.

The military forces of our own period work therefore on very different social facts, as far as women are concerned, from the facts of earlier military periods. Even were modern militarism the same thing as the militarism of earlier ages, it does not, like the latter, work on comparatively passive objects. As to its effects we must obviously distinguish.

First as to "militarism" in the sense of a social organization aimed at and subordinate to military effectiveness. This would seem to tend to evolve the cock-and-hen type, the uniformed male strutting beside a dowdy wife with a market basket which it is beneath his dignity to carry for her. The lordly relegation of women to *Kinder*, *Küche*, *Kirche* and the correlated scorn for any sphere which is regarded as purely feminine—this, we like to believe, is a natural result of the militaristic point of view. In such a society there are, however, likely to be women in a conscious state of revolt, and driven perhaps to extremes by the force of reaction.

Now as to the effect of war, actual war once broken out.

First as to the psychical side. We see among some women, as among some men, the immense heightening of the solidarity of the political group, a veritable intoxication of national enthusiasm, of patriotism, at its worst of blatant chauvinism, beside which class consciousness lapses, and international or cosmopolitan sympathies seem alien and remote, ineffective to stir or to restrain.

In all this women are effected just as men are, except that those women who may happen to be more emotional than men, more hysterical (and they must be hysterical indeed if they "were made to match the men," that is, some of the men), if they are more mob-minded, if they are more idealistic yet believe all ideals to be linked to the success of their own country, if they are more uncompromising, less "positive," less "tough-minded," then they are likely to push even more eagerly than the men of the same way of thinking along the bloody paths of war.

And for this cheering from the side-lines and co-operation in all sorts of practical ways, from nursing to making munitions, they are fêted, honored, and made queens of the tourney by men who occupy the same standpoint. The old chivalric attitude is revived on both sides, the sharply marked differentiation, the ministering angel, admiring-helpmate attitude of woman to man.

"The only agreeable thing" about the war, to Miss Repplier, is the fact that "people stopped talking about women and began to talk about men. . . . . In this swift return to primitive conditions primitive qualities reasserted their value," to her great relief.

But among other women, as among other men, the facts of war acting on a different set of conceptions, a different understanding of history, above all on a different scale of values, produce a quite opposite result. Beside the current of national emotion flows the current of what Miss Addams has called the revolt against war. This manifests itself among both men and women, but with some tendencies peculiar, or peculiarly accentuated, among women. There is nothing that is more offensive to the taste of very many people, nothing that strikes them as more unreal and untrue to the facts, than the commonly expressed claim that women produce life and men destroy it, that women "are the race," that women detest war (cf. Virgil's "war hateful to mothers") while men enjoy it, or at least in their pugnacity cannot refrain from combat. There is, I think, unquestionably a good deal of rhetoric and conventional phrase-making and feminine megalomania in all this. But the sociologist cannot fail to discern in it, coming as it does from groups in all countries and of the most varying types, a new psychical element that is affecting and is bound to affect the moral and social status of women.

There is among many women of a certain type a new conception of woman, of her dignity as woman, of her endowment as woman, with sacred prerogatives and duties. The so-called woman's movement first took the form of abandoning the effort to achieve the type of womanhood that men realized and desired and rewarded. Instead, women tended to adopt men's standards for men and strove, more or less consciously, to show that they could do the things that men could do, that they could meet the tests of manly courage, "strong-mindedness," interest in political questions, etc. The second stage of more complete emancipation arrived when women came to want to be the kind of women that they themselves approved, to meet neither a man's standard for a woman nor a man's standard for a man, but a woman's standard for a woman.

Where war acts on the minds of women in this stage we get new reactions which will in the end give women a position from which they will judge social and moral questions with less dependence on men's judgments and, in some respects, more differently from men than they have done hitherto.

The magazines are full of verses of very great symptomatic interest. I will quote two.

WE MOURN FOR PEACE

Who is this pacing sisterhood,
Moving in silent, broken mood,
Clad all in mourning weeds?
Are ye the celebrants of martial deeds—
The work of dauntless spirits lifted high
From many a red field where the brave for country die?

No! We are not the celebrants of warlike deeds—
We mourn for World-Peace slain,
Hid in our hearts until she rise again!
We hate your fields of death,
Your brazen Mars that leads
Where men are reaped as grain!
Your "Glory" is to us but venomous breath!
A-near our hearts your "causes" do not lie—
Nor one, nor other, O ye warring States!
But we are they whom ye shall ask in vain,
In home's dear covert to remain—
Praying at home—yet serving still your needs,
Yielding to you our sons, our brothers and our mates—
We mourn for World-Peace slain—
We mourn—but oh, not that alone!
A heresy through all our ranks is blown:
The old order is changing—shall not come again;
No more shall tender cowardice restrain,
The "Call of Country" shall betray no more,
To trick our tears in bravery of a smile,
Gazing upon the glittering file
Of those that march away to war (so fain!)—
Of whom what remnant shall their fate restore?
We—celebrants of martial deeds?
Trading in precious lives more dear than our own?
At last, O warring States, the soul-of-woman know—
We will not give our men to serve your schemes,
Your cozzening plans, and your imperial dreams!
And if ye seize them, we to slaughter too will go,
And in the breach ourselves will throw;
Upon us, too, the quiver of your hatreds rain!
We mourn the World-Peace slain!

—EDITH M. THOMAS
(In *New York Evening Post*)

The Fighters

From the cathedral steps of Cracow,
From the little calvaries of the Argonne,
From the green landes tattered with shells,
From the windy East Coast and the sighing West,
From the empty lace-factories,
The deserted toy-shops,
The darkened squares of Paris,
And all the desolate decimated villages,
Comes the singing of the women.

We are the mothers of fighters,
We are the children of fighters,
We are the children unborn,
We are the children never-to-be,
We are singing to hearten you,
Brave fighters.

We are singing from the pig-pens,
And from the quarries,
And from the unploughed stubble,
The unsown fields,
From the cellars where we house us and hide us,
We are singing for you, brave fighters,
You who are fighting for your honor,
For your future,
For your existence,
You who think you are fighting for all these things,
And for us,
(Or who think not at all!)
We are they whom you love and cherish,
Whom you have left behind,
Whom you have stripped of everything,
Having robbed us of our sons
And of the hope of Mary,
Oh, brave fighters.

We are singing to you from our graves,
And from our sterility
And from our outraged virginity,
You are fighting against us, brave fighters.
We are your honor,
And your existence,
And your future.

We are your colonies
And your fruitfulness
And your life.
This war that you wage is against ourselves,
Against yourselves.
Fight for us, brave fighters,
Fight for a good cause,
The world needs a fight,
But not a fight to kill,
Oh, brave fighters.

When the fight to kill is ended
You will begin another fight,
You brave fighters.
The few that are left of you,
And the fight will be for us,
Not against us.
And oh, the up-hill work of the world
After the Fight to Kill is done,
When you begin the world's real work,
You brave fighters.

From the cathedral steps of Cracow,
From the little calvaries of the Argonne,
From the green landes tattered with shells,
From the windy East Coast and the sighing West,
From the empty lace-factories,
The deserted toy-shops,
The darkened squares of Paris,
And all the desolate decimated villages,
Comes the singing of the still small voices.

—FLORENCE WILKINSON
(MRS. WILFRED EVANS, WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT)

So that while we see women of one type more national-minded than ever, we see others, loving their country not less deeply, who look at events and make their several judgments in a simple, universal, human sense, with little or no national bias. They may believe that their country must and should fight out this war to its utmost bitter finish, but they never fall victims to the characteristic hallucinations of war. The fact that in belligerent countries the women are freer than the men to express and act out these ideas

and that their numbers are not depleted by military service gives them an influence and in many instances a leadership along these lines which affects the spiritual balance of the sexes and brings women nearer to an actual partnership with men working for the future of civilization.

But aside from the nature of the personal and moral reaction to the bugle and fife and the mobilization orders of one's king and parliament, the influence of the war on the political, economic, and social status of women must be considered.

In regard to the specific question of the suffrage it is impossible to dogmatize. In belligerent countries women have ceased to press their claims for the present, but the after-effects of the war may cut both ways and it may happen that in one country the influence may on the whole tend in one direction and in another in the contrary direction; in one it may retard, in another advance, the movement. It appears, to many of us at any rate, that the change is bound to come in any case and that the question is not *whether* but *when*.

As to the cold, hard facts of what the war will do, is doing, industrially and socially, to the women of the warring countries, there seem to be three types of effects.

For one thing, women are made relatively plenty, and therefore cheap *as women*. It may be that in more primitive times such a situation would be a cause of polygamy. In our day it will mean a vast overplus of women. They will be a "drug on the market," while men will return from war, not only with their importance enhanced by the glory of the battlefield, but with a scarcity value. So far as this effect is realized, women, who in many ways "do not count" now, will "count" still less hereafter.

A second and conflicting effect is that women, being more necessary, become more important instead of less. Everywhere they are being admitted into, or drawn or forced into, new lines of activity and into work from which they were formerly debarred by custom.

In the American Civil War the activity and helpfulness of women in the Sanitary Commission, in connection with the Freedmen's Bureau, and, in the South particularly, as substitutes for husbands

and fathers absent at the front, opened new channels and brought new consideration to women.

A writer in *The Independent* (Vol. LXXXI, p. 445) writes of "The Mobilization of German Women":

The war has swept away the chief argument against the admission of women to political and industrial equality in Germany. The opponents of woman's rights have been willing to admit that the bearing of children demanded as much courage as military service and even that it was as useful to the nation, but since it was an individual act it could not—in German estimation—rank with the organized activities of men. So long as women showed themselves deficient in the ability to organize and co-operate they could not claim membership in the supreme organization, the State.

But now the women have demonstrated that they can equal the other sex in what the Germans regard as the highest attainment of *Kultur*. Their success in forming and managing an association of varied activities and national scope is in some respects a more remarkable feat than the mobilization of the German army, for it was effected without compulsion or previous training. On the morning of the day when Germany declared war against Russia, Dr. Gertrud Bäumer, president of the Federation of Women's Clubs, issued a call for the mobilization of German women for social service. The Federation itself includes half a million members and with it are associated all the philanthropic and relief organizations of the country as well as an army of other women all working under the general direction of the Nationale Frauendienst. It corresponds somewhat to the Ladies' Aid Society of our Civil War, but has a wider range. While one branch is working with the Red Cross and another caring for the comfort of the soldiers in the field, the chief duty assumed is looking after the homes deprived—perhaps forever—of the bread winner. Here are women and children, sometimes sick and often helpless, thrown suddenly upon their own resources when industry is paralyzed and times are hardest. Self-supporting women were deprived of employment and the singers and actresses were harder to place than the discharged factory girls and housemaids. During the first months the volunteer visitors in Berlin made personal investigation of 255,000 cases and in October the twenty-three relief committees distributed 100,000 bread tickets, 56,000 milk tickets, and 300,000 meal tickets to the needy of the capital. . . . .

One of the most valuable forms of social service has been the establishment of cooking schools in various quarters of the cities, where free instruction has been given to housewives in the preparation of cheap and nutritious foods, in the use of the fireless cooker, and in making bread 20 per cent potatoes and in cooking according to the Government War Cook Book. In the National Women's Service the same spirit of unity has been displayed as in Germany otherwise, and for the first time in the history of the country rich and poor,

bourgeois and socialist, churchly and worldly, worked together in a common cause. Let us hope that when peace comes the German women will not forget what they have learned to do, and that the German men will remember it too.

A writer in *Jus Suffragi* says:

At Royaumont, the women's hospital has been twice visited by Général Février. On his first visit the General seemed inclined to doubt the capacity of women surgeons to fulfil their task, but after his second inspection he was full of praise of their work and asked how long they intended to remain. Dr. Ivens replied that the length of their stay was a question of money. Général Février expressed the hope that the French authorities would be able to make a grant to the hospital in order to keep it there, "as we cannot afford to lose your services."

This is one of many instances of exactly the same sort. Women doctors, refused at first, later, when their services became known, have proved indispensable.

News comes from Berlin, as I read in a news item credited to the *Chicago Tribune* (n.d.):

Women have taken advantage as never before of the absence of men from the various German universities to strive for the higher education that not so many years ago was denied them. During the last semester, which fell entirely in peace times, 4,130 women were registered at the various institutions. This number has increased to 4,570 during the past half-year, constituting a percentage increase of women attending German universities of from 6.74 to 8.54. In the last six years the percentage had increased only 2.7. The number of women studying medicine shows the largest increase, rising from 974 to 1,150. Five years ago there were but 512. There are 2,258 studying philology and history, against 2,120; 862 studying mathematics, against 761; 170 studying political science, against 132; 73 studying law, against 57; 82 studying dentistry, against 51; 7 studying theology, against 16; and 12 studying pharmacy, against 14.

"In England," writes Mrs. Fawcett, in October, 1914, "men's medical schools show an abnormally small entry, and the London School of Medicine for Women an abnormally large one."

An English paper publishes the following curious paragraph:

In a town in the South of France a girl of twenty-two has performed the functions of mayor since August. She was a teacher and secretary at the *mairie*, and also qualified as a military nurse. While waiting to be called upon to nurse the wounded, she found that the chief municipal functionaries were

mobilized, and was herself urged to take charge of affairs. The administration of the commune was left in her hands, and even in difficult matters concerning constructions, repairs, and workmen she carried out the work with no assistance from the councillors. The young *mairie* discovered that the latter, while willing to accept the honours of the position, were glad to remit its duties to a young Suffragist, whose claims to political recognition they would have ridiculed. She discovered many needed reforms in public health and other departments.

In humbler ways changes which permeate the social structure more generally are going on in the new work women are doing in fields and factories everywhere. I read:

Among the positions now being held by women in England are: railway clerks, railway porters, ticket collectors, station-masters, omnibus conductors, grocers, messengers, night telephone operators, book-stall clerks, motor-van drivers, pithead laborers, farm hands, carriage-cleaners, postgirls, newsgirls, munition and armament workers, sheep dippers, bank clerks, club servants, and motor agents.

Women in these new positions are often overworked and underpaid; it is a question what will happen when the men come home (or rather in those cases in which the men do come home) if they find their wage standards broken down, their customary hours lengthened intolerably by the weak and enduring women. Read Mary Chamberlain's extraordinary article, "War on the Backs of the Workers," in *The Survey* of July 24, or Sylvia Pankhurst's plucky little sheet, *The Woman's Dreadnought*, if you want particulars of governmental and semi-governmental sweating in England, and apparently the same thing is going on in Germany.

A generation ago the minds of most of us would have been much exercised about the women being thus thrust into hard kinds of work. I think today the commoner reaction is, not to regret that women are undertaking new tasks, but to realize the effort that must be made to secure hygienic and reasonable conditions and pay, so that the new work may be compatible with their other responsibilities as women.

A third effect, besides the surplus of women and the indispensableness of women, will be (what is a necessary result of the surplus of women over men) a great increase of unmarried women. This is of course a loss to the women who lose the great experiences of

wifehood and motherhood, and if the unmarried women are of fine quality, then a loss to the race. But I think the social advantages of the presence of a celibate class are often overlooked. We have heard a great deal of the loss to the race through the withdrawal of the intellectual and sensitive type of men by the mediaeval church. And there is doubtless truth in this. At the same time men, and to a much larger degree women, are absorbed and exhausted by family life and family burdens, financial and personal. Kipling's picture of the soldier who loses his pith when he marries finds its verification in the stories we all know of reformers, poets, artists, whose liberty and therefore whose value are lost through the family tie. The unmarried are the light-armed soldiers of civilization, the flying squadrons of reform, science, adventure, exploration, investigation, disinterested service, that need not count personal cost. For women, more than for men, these things are likely to be alternatives of marriage, and while few women do, or would, refuse a happy marriage for their sake, the presence of a body of single and relatively independent women is not all loss. Especially is this true of working women, women of the industrial group. The power of working women to organize, to secure reasonable pay, healthful conditions, respectful treatment, opportunity for advancement, education, depends on the presence of a sufficient body of unmarried women, permanently and professionally occupied, free to risk their living for a cause they believe in.

Another result already apparent is that there is forming under our eyes a new sex, "International." Women find at Berne and at The Hague that they can meet in war time and understand one another, that they still, even in war time, want the same thing, not as Francis I and Charles V both wanted the same thing when they both wanted Pavia, but in the sense that their desires harmonize. Someone has said, "If the brotherhood of man had grown as much in the last two centuries as the sisterhood of women has grown in the last two decades, this war would not have occurred." One may refuse to assent to this and still think that the solidarity of women is growing, that the war has quickened its growth, and that this is a fact worth the notice of the sociologist.

DISCUSSION

LILLIAN WALD, HENRY STREET SETTLEMENT, NEW YORK CITY

Who can forecast the changes, if any, that will follow this war with relation to the position that women hold? Miss Balch wisely has not attempted to summarize the possible effects of the present European war on the social and economic position of women in the countries involved —or indeed in the world—since there is no woman, nor, for the matter of that, man nor child, anywhere who is not involved in this throwback of civilization.

Fundamental human needs underlie the so-called woman's movements everywhere and participation in them has given invaluable training and consequent power to influence society not hitherto granted to women. These influences are logically not in accord with militarism, which to most women is translated into terms of death and destruction.

It was not without significance that the reaction of women in New York, when war was declared, was to organize at once as mourners and as such to parade the Avenue. And some months later, foolish as it may have appeared to the thoughtless onlookers, but tremendously important in the history of social organization, the women gathered at The Hague to state their abhorrence of war and on a world-stage to declare that they were conveyors of a message for vast numbers of women in every land: their belief that life is precious and that to destroy it is a wanton and unpardonable crime, a barbarism that women accustomed to band together for the conservation of life would not longer brook. Thus at a stage in history when women were first organizable they came together to protest against war and to offer reasonable substitutes for settling international disagreements.

There can be no doubt that women have never before been self-conscious enough to note the reactions of war, "inevitably disastrous to the humane instincts which have been asserting themselves in the social order," and theirs is a force operating in the world that it would not be less than absurd to ignore. At the same time the newspapers are daily reporting remarkable accomplishments of women in the unfortunate warring countries. Women are at men's work, in the industries, in the professions, digging subways in Germany, performing delicate operations in hospitals, proving themselves "as good as men." But these demonstrations of ability would be quite as likely to retard women's emancipation into full political and economic privileges or rights as to advance them were it not for this newly developed self-consciousness of women toward their own position. The same article that describes the wonderful organizing power of Hedwig Heyl and other women of her managerial type reports the current opinion that Germany is turning out *Superhausfrauen* (for the state) rather than suffragettes, and while high valuation is generally placed on the superb courage and practical ability of the women, there is an implication of a new kind of sex antagonism lurking in the background.

Obviously the effect on women's position must differ widely in the countries now at war, varying according to the stage of industrial development and the progress of women as organized bodies. It is of greatest importance to women, quite apart from moral and humane considerations, that after the war there should be civil rather than military domination, for the soldier's attitude to woman has not changed, certainly not in several generations. His relationship to her remains the same. On the other hand, there have been revolutionary changes in the normal conception of the functions of women by the workingman, the school-teacher, the banker, the merchant, the social thinker. Eventually the women of Europe will fill that position socially, economically, and politically which the great bulk of men in the ordinary walks of life will accord to them. Men are bound sooner or later to find it expedient to use, for the state and the home, what has been demonstrated as of value. The American woman has freer admission to the fields of activity and a more responsible position in public life than other women, and she has exhibited ability to organize and to lead in invaluable, socially progressive measures. It has come about that, even among men entrenched in traditional orthodoxy as to "woman's proper place," barriers have been lowered, and so it will be in the states in which the position of women is traditionally inferior to that of men. Expediency will govern the social and economic readjustment between the two sexes. It may be said, of course, that the expediency of admitting women to a wider sphere of industrial activity and public responsibility must ultimately depend on the qualities of the women themselves. The war has given opportunities for demonstrations of abilities and values to the state and it is also possible that under the influence of war and war conditions certain qualities have undergone great changes. Therefore, it may be said that in a measure directly traceable to the war itself there will be a different distribution of functions in home, industry, and community life between the two sexes. It is well to remember, however, that while the demands of expediency may change overnight, it takes a long time to change habits of thought and what some are pleased to term secondary sex characteristics, namely, the mental and physical attributes not directly resulting from sex functions but from the conditions of life imposed by them. Acquisition of new habits of thought concerning the mutual relation of the sexes and the place of women in the commonwealth is essential before women can really contribute their full measure of usefulness. Economic changes are likely to be the important outcome of a changed situation due to war conditions; for instance, the scarcity of men will result in the assumption by women of much of the men's work, temporarily and even permanently. But of course we must remember that economic changes are not speedily translated into moral and social changes. Examples are numerous, even in our country, of tenacious conservatism, in spite of radically altered economic circumstances. The old-time tradition of woman's place in society as the homemaker and homekeeper, and nothing else, has retained its hold upon the imagination in the very cities where thousands of

women have no home or where outside influence and public demands and business occupations have monopolized the time and the energies of the one-time housewife.

Even if we cannot in the midst of war forecast its effects on the position of women, we may venture to summarize the indications of what women themselves will attempt to derive out of the accident of war: (1) They will probably seek some social determination on matters of family life and relations, and legal and social regulations based upon justice to the illegitimate child. (2) They will hope to acquire for women a permanent entrance to all kinds of congenial work that they have proved themselves competent to perform during the emergencies of war. (3) And, of vastly greater importance, they will seek to establish their right to participate in councils of the state and of the interstate of the future, so that diplomacy and statecraft may include the humane interests that women have always held as precious and always will hold as of surpassing value to the race.

MRS. ANNA GARLIN SPENCER, MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

In the tentative program of this meeting first received all who attended were promised "an unemotional and scientific discussion of the social aspects of war and militarism." When I saw in the printed program the name of the principal speaker of this morning I wondered if our honored president had been suddenly bereft of his sense of humor. I am very glad that the scholarly, well-balanced, and comprehensive paper of Miss Balch has restored us to our wonted atmosphere.

Miss Balch has so well covered all the vital points concerning war in relation to the status of women that I find little to say in that connection, except to stress her point of the peaceful inheritance of humanity as modifying warlike tendencies. To a deifier of violence as a method of securing human advance, the sense of kind or kinship and the sentiment of sympathy seem like "the insubstantial fabric of a dream." Yet, that sense of kinship and that feeling of sympathy constitute the social cement that has built the individual powers, faculties, and achievements of the race into a social body; and these are the essential elements of our peaceful heredity. These have drawn together our social groups—first, the inner circle of blood relationship swelling to the tribal bond, then the patriarchal family growing into the early state and on to the modern nation, which is the dominant group division of our time. The course of human progress is marked by the ever-widening, concentric circles of kinship-grouping, which offer field for the play of human sympathy and the expression of co-operative action for the common good.

The development of the collective mind to direct the activities of the social body must surely indicate a time when there will be no limits to this sense of kinship, but a social solidarity will bind the world in international relationship.

Today, however, the sense of a common life to be lived together for common ends generally stops at the boundaries of national grouping; an iron ring incloses the growing sense of social solidarity and in the case of most people prevents the national feeling we call patriotism from giving way to world-sympathy. Many of us believe this is an artificially manufactured iron ring. It is not a natural end to the sense of kinship. It persists as a bondage to ideas that might have been outgrown. It so persists because dynastic ambitions, economic needs and exploitation, race feuds, political entanglements, and selfish and secret diplomacy have held the autonomy of each separate state so firm and unbending that human sympathy could not expand beyond national boundaries.

Art, science, education, philanthropy, have all become international; even religion has become universalized; and human sympathy has actually overleaped national boundaries in instinctive impulse. That is the reason that this war, as it seems demonstrated, counts larger numbers of the insane among its soldiers than any previous war. The natural, normal man today cannot help having sympathy for the suffering of the man he kills, and to keep on killing, in spite of that inner revolt, is to create chaos in the mind. The chief evil of war in our day consists in its re-creating and holding inflexible that iron ring which limits the sense of kinship to one's own nation.

How are women affected by this result of war? And what special contribution have women made to that growth of human sympathy which still persists in spite of war? All realize that women in their functional relationship to the family have intensified both the sense of kinship and its expression in sympathetic help to others. The first social group, the mother and child, which held the stage before the fathers learned the full meaning of parenthood, developed the core and heart of mutual aid to common ends. The widening of the sense of kinship, however, was long checked in woman by her enforced relationship to the social group through the family relationship alone. As women, however, have become individuated as persons, have become enlightened, educated, and free to develop and to express their moral and intellectual initiative, they have rapidly, at least on the upper levels of life, become sensitive to international ideals and the solidarity of the race. Already it is clear that many women are able to escape the long bondage of men to minor forms of group relationship and to step at once from family segregation of relationship into a truly social feeling and activity.

The class, vocational, and political groupings of men, into which women have entered so lately and so slightly, still hold the majority of men back from internationalism. Women seem on that account to be able when really enlightened to reach more easily the sense of world-relationship. One outstanding fact of this war to which Miss Balch alluded, and which we may well believe will loom large in future history when the smoke of battle has cleared away, offers unique testimony to this easy and rapid attainment by some women of the international point of view. This fact, the meeting of women

from the belligerent and neutral nations at The Hague in an absolute fraternity, even while their own men were killing one another, shows that the new-found ethical status of advanced women reacts upon the social situation during war, besides showing reaction to war. The overwhelming majority of women, however, are, like the majority of men, submerged in their international idealism by the upsurging of a narrower patriotism during war.

The paper by Miss Balch shows many ways in which the status of woman will probably be affected by this war, ways in part to her advantage and in part to her disadvantage. The paper also shows clearly what a terrible toll of suffering and outrage, of ill-paid and unsafeguarded drudgery, this war is exacting from women. My own feeling is that the condition is too confused, both in its economic and in its social aspects, for us to take comfort respecting any assured advantage to women to offset the terrible losses to the family life and hence to the common womanhood incident to every plunge through war back into barbarism.

Leaving the subject of the relation of war to the status of women, may I speak a word concerning the effect upon women of "armed peace," of militarism itself when there is no war? Victor Hugo said the eighteenth century was man's century; that is, the period in which man as a human being emerged from the mass and from the class to be counted as an individual of independent value to the social order. He said also that the nineteenth century was woman's century, that period in which woman as an individual human being began to emerge from her purely functional sex-relationship to the social order.

Miss Balch has shown the immense significance of this movement toward the individuation of women. Militarism strikes a direct blow to that social respect for women as individuals which is the only sure foundation for woman's advance in freedom and power. This is shown in two most vital particulars: First, militarism has for ages been the chief stronghold of support for legalized or permitted prostitution. This awful travesty upon marriage we know today to be the greatest foe to the family and hence to the healthful life of society now in existence; physically, mentally, and morally this social evil is proved to be one of the greatest menaces to civic life. The history of the struggle against the Contagious Diseases Act in England, the orders from the War Office concerning legalized prostitution for the supposed benefit of the British soldiers in India, and the attitude of leading military leaders toward the double standard of morals give abundant historic proof of this assertion. Even so late as the recent meeting of the International Congress of Hygiene and Demography held in this city it was demonstrated that while the leading physicians and surgeons who minister to civil populations were already prepared to lead a public crusade against the commercialized brothel, those physicians and surgeons who were set apart to care for soldiers and sailors were still in large measure in the old attitude of mind toward what they believed to be a "necessary evil." War leaves women indeed the prey of a

sudden whirlwind of violence and outrage. Militarism, armed peace, enormous armies and navies which hold great bodies of men segregated and apart from the discipline and opportunities of civic life, tend constantly and persistently to lower the status of women by fostering prostitution.

One more assault of militarism upon the modern status of women must be noted. If the eighteenth century was man's and the nineteenth century was woman's, we have already declared that the twentieth century belongs to the child. It belongs, not to one God-child with a halo around his head, but to all children as potential personalities, each capable of becoming a unique contribution to the social whole. War and militarism alike make the child but a creature of the state, a part of the mass material of human life which may be shaped to ends of military usefulness without regard to individual needs. This view of the child, reimpressed upon a human consciousness to which it has already become partially obsolete by war and the agencies which make for war, reacts upon the status of woman in a sinister manner. It makes of woman again simply the breeder and the drudge. The demand of war and militarism alike is for more children, the quality being a negligible element provided there be sufficient physical and mental power to serve in the ranks of fighters. Why have we begun to attain an idea of the sacredness of personality in the child? It is because the spiritual essence of democracy demands that every human being be given the opportunity to develop in order that the social whole may be enriched by the liberation of new power and the expression of more varied personality.

The object of this organization is to help in developing a social mind to control the activities of the social body for ends of universal social good. That process requires leadership, and the essence of democarcy is to liberate and develop all the powers of all human beings in order that the natural leaders may rise to efficient command. War and militarism set us back upon the old method of securing leadership from privileged classes and by means of violent subjugation of the weak by the strong. In proportion, therefore, as war and militarism secure those reactionary ends, in that proportion the new reverence for humanity and the new faith in its infinite progress as embodied in the new devotion to the child are destroyed. In that proportion, and for the same reasons, war and militarism lower the status of women and debase the feminine ideal.

PROFESSOR GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Warfare and the warrior-state are the capital mistakes of a man-made world and woman has paid more than half the price. Militarism, like all social products, is the result of choice and habit; and, like many other social products, it is due to the misselection of means to satisfy human cravings, whether or not such cravings are welfare needs. As I see it, this is the basic truth, revealed, first, in the history of the sex-division of the world's work, and secondly in the events of the present world-war.

Militarism and woman's work.—With Emerson, the seer, cross the zoölogical line and through the eons observe the slowly climbing procession of living things until at the top the man-animal with free hands stands erect.

> And, striving to be man, the worm
> Mounts through all the spires of form.

What do we see? That the mother-sex is primary in nature's scheme. The father-sex came later and it was slow in socializing. The father was tardy in sharing with the mother the burden of caring for the young. For the female is dominant in the conservation as well as in the reproduction of life. Accordingly, everywhere in the animal world, with few exceptions, the male appears as the wooer and the female as the chooser in mating. By nature's law, for the good of the race, the female selects the father of her child. This law is a part of our original precious heritage from pre-human experience; for a wide liberty of choice on the part of the female is also the rule, though not the universal practice, among primitive men.

This condition did not endure. Forces were at work which eventually caused a crisis in woman's status: the subversion of the original law of free choice of her mate. How did it come about that almost everywhere, in substance if not always in form, the rôles of the sexes in courtship were interchanged, man becoming the chooser and woman the wooer? Through what dire catastrophe did the wife exchange freedom for subjection? What is the genesis of the still widely persisting custom of wife-purchase for support; of wedlock as a woman's profession, as her means of getting a living? The riddle is not hard to read; for clearly the crisis is due to warfare and the warrior-state, both created by the male. In female infanticide, wife-capture, concubinage, wife-purchase, and the perpetual legal nonage of woman, the record of militarism is writ large. From the outset through sex-selection, which is but a phase of natural selection, the distinctive physical and psychic characteristics of the male—his superior size, strength, and lust for conquest—were fostered in the combats and other contests for the female's favor. Man crossed the zoölogical line, bringing with him a craving for fighting and domination. Warfare and the chase increased his superior muscular power and forced out his cunning or inventive faculty. He built the warrior-state, whose control he monopolized; exploited the institution of property, which woman had done most to create; and in effect usurped woman's primacy in courtship.

Though woman was thus seriously hampered, it was her hand chiefly that first moved the lever of civilization. She was the mother of industry and *par excellence* the social builder. While primitive man was hunting and fighting and governing, primitive woman was creating and practicing the arts of peace. In countless ways she shaped the archetypes, designed the first patterns of man's later and more specialized inventions. She was chief "provider" for the family in the early stages. Indeed, the "habit" of work—of labor as a conscious and persistent employment of effort for the attainment of some end—

is primarily woman's contribution. Mankind had to be trained to labor; and woman was the original learner and teacher.

A fantastic theory.—For there is no more baseless, not to say fantastic, notion that the doctrine that "nothing short of slavery" could have taught men to work. Here is a persistent tradition due to a sociological mob-mind. It is curious to see how even the acute intellect of Lester F. Ward is caught napping. In his conception, slavery in its origin appears as a beneficent, economic mode of exploitation by which human beings are inured to labor through fear of the lash, torture, or death. Social assimilation by conquest and subjugation discloses, he believes, two universal stages of economic exploitation in the ascending scale: cannibalism and slavery. The enslavement of the women and other captives is found to be economically more advantageous than eating them; while continuous toil under the lash teaches men to like work. By the same token, one would expect cannibalism through tradition to develop in humanity a love for being eaten as an ideal of race altruism!

What, then, appears to be the truth? Slavery as an institution is due chiefly to militarism; and woman was its favored victim because already relatively she was a skilled worker. The false theory of the genesis of work not only robs her of credit for discovering the social value and fostering the habit of labor, but transfers it to the warrior-made institution of slavery, which in fact was a heavy handicap in the performance of her precious task. Woman is the mother of industry, not because of slavery, but in spite of it. The habit of work is due to psychic causes: the perception of the power of labor to satisfy human cravings of every sort; and woman was first systematically to put it to the test.

Now, this social division of labor is only partially conditioned by nature's sex-division of function: that is, by motherhood and fatherhood. In the main, it is a male-made division. Would not the social system have been better had men and women shared on equal terms in the world's work? Might not peace rather than warfare have become the state ideal? For war, the capital mistake of a male-made world, is always and everywhere the scourge of womanhood. In every war the heaviest cost falls on woman, the race-bearer and the race-conserver. The fighting soldier pays less. Woman endures harder things than dying in battle. In the division of social work, the heavier load falls on her shoulders: "first a beast of burden, then a domestic animal, then a slave, then a servant, and then a minor," runs the epigram. The same is true of the sex-division: man carries the lighter load.

"With their sorry reasoning," exclaims Euripides' Medea, "they say we live secure at home while they are at the wars; for I would gladly take my stand in battle array three times o'er than once give birth."

A sinister fallacy.—Professor Balch is absolutely right in questioning the universality and importance of male pugnacity and in placing the accent on the "peaceful inheritance of our species." Decidedly the war-struggle theory of organic and social progress, of survival of the fittest, is the most

sinister fallacy, the most perverse blunder, which so-called science has ever committed. The biologist and the sociologist have each been guilty. Appealing to Charles Darwin, Bernhardi asserts that war is nature's law of growth. "War," he exclaims, "gives a biologically just decision, since its decision rests on the very nature of things." On the contrary, I dare affirm that peace and mutual aid are nature's law of uplift. Let the evolutionists speak. According to Ray Lankester, for instance, there is absolutely no basis in scientifically ascertained facts for the war-struggle dogma as applied to animal life. With one exception, he cannot find any instance of habits or procedure on the part of animals "which resembles warfare."

Equally baseless and far less plausible is the illusion called "social Darwinism." War has not been the mainspring of human social advancement. Like all social systems, structures, institutions, it is the result of choice, of habit, of artificial selection; and it always causes a net spiritual loss and thus retards progress. For struggles for defense, liberation, or other really righteous cause are due to aggressive militarism and the warrior-state, the fundamental blunder. War is not even a universally acquired human habit. It must be charged mainly to the selfish motives of a few exploiters, the war-lords; not to the spontaneous desires of the masses of men, much less the masses of women. Speaking of wars among the Greeks, Plato in his *Republic* wisely makes Socrates say, "They know that the guilt of war is always confined to few persons and that the many are their friends."

The human race-sense, untainted by perverted social ideals, shuns war as the foe of race-welfare; and woman, because less affected by such false ideals, is conserver of the race-sense in a higher degree than is man.

It is not hard to place the finger on the two weak links in the war-struggle argument. First is the elementary fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*: "Good follows war, therefore war is the cause of good." Just as reasonably one may assert that the less antiquated police system following an outbreak of crime, or the up-to-date system of sanitation installed after an outbreak of bubonic plague, is caused by crime or disease, each of which, therefore, according to Bernhardian sociology, is a beneficent provision of nature for securing socially "just decisions." In reality the swift progress sometimes made just after a war is due to the prior peace-produced spiritual assets of civilization: experience, scientific knowledge, a socialized public conscience. War, like crime and disease, spells social waste which should have been avoided.

The other weak link in the logic of social Darwinism is in the confusion of physical struggle with spiritual struggle. Society is a psychic fact; and it has been developed, not by dreadnoughts, but by discussion; not by the clash of arms, but by the conflict of ideas; not by the bayonets of embattled soldiers, but through the ideals of lofty souls.

War the blight of woman's ideals.—The great lesson of history is repeating itself with frightful emphasis in the present war. Never before, seemingly, has there been so cynical a destruction of the precious assets of civilization

gathered with such infinite toil in times of peace. Especially is this true of woman's share. Or is the shock felt more keenly because lately we have become more fully aware of the true value of our spiritual goods; of the fact that the war is menacing the highest and holiest possessions of modern society; that it is squandering, not merely the fruits of human toil—food and clothing and temples and cities—and vainly consuming nature's bounty in mineral and other material resources, but also that it is pitilessly wasting ideals? For it is not true that war forces out and strengthens idealism. War stifles the rising voice of race-brotherhood in the scream of Ernst Lissauer's "Hate-Song" and Heinrich Vierordt's homicidal frenzy. War recklessly squanders the emotional energy displayed in the courage, devotion, sacrifice, and heroism which it demands; and it depreciates the vastly nobler and harder tests of these virtues called for in the normal conflicts of peaceful life. War is the blight of ideals, especially of woman's ideals.

A ruthless discount of motherhood.—The European war, in a more deliberate and cold-blooded spirit than is recorded of any preceding war, is menacing the basic social ideals which center in courtship, wedlock, and the family; in the relations of mother, father, and child. The modern safeguards of the marriage institution, slowly and painfully constructed, are being torn down. The newer conception of wedlock as essentially a spiritual conpanionship of all life, resting on the mutual choice of equals, is giving way to the carnal or tribal view of marriage as a child-breeding alliance to satisfy the insatiable greed of the warrior-state. More sons must be produced even if wifehood and motherhood and childhood be sacrificed. Never has there been a more ruthless discount of motherhood than that which the movement for "war brides" and "war babies" reveals. Both church and state, notably in England and Germany, are guilty. In the name of patriotism the high priest and the magistrate have joined hands to loosen the bonds of marriage and to lower the moral standard of the sex-relations. By various means, legal or voluntary, a sinister assault on the home and the family is taking place. According to the *Imperial Gazette*, the Prussian government has authorized the minister of justice to transfer to the lower courts the power to grant exemptions from the existing law which forbids a woman to marry before the completion of the sixteenth year, thus encouraging immature breeding, one of the heaviest burdens of womanhood and a fruitful cause of disease, death, and divorce. Even unverified rumors and reports presage the imminent wreck of social control and the degradation of ethical standards. Thus we read that the Germans, "to replenish the ranks the war is thinning so terribly," are "contemplating heavy taxation of bachelors, old maids, childless couples, and those who adhere to the one- and two-child system"; that they are sending a certain number of their soldiers home "on furlough to breed"; and that "all society is being instructed that there is no longer any disgrace attached to bearing an illegitimate child if it is done for the Fatherland." The same is reported of England and France.

Verily the apologists for the new breeding policy of the warring nations seem to have forgotten the causes of the great movement for infant and child welfare! Once more as in Carthaginian days Moloch is clamoring for his burnt-offering of innocent babes. Measured by motive and social result, what difference is there between the morality of the Carthaginian and that of the British or the Hohenzollern god? What is to be the fate of the "war babies, " legitimate or illegitimate; of the orphans of "war brides"; of the children of unmarried mothers around the concentration camps; of the nameless infants of unwilling mothers in the ravished districts of Belgium, France, Galicia, Servia, or Poland? Can any "glory" accruing to a hero's orphan, or any elevation of the unmarried mother into a heroine, balance the social handicap with which the war babe enters upon its life-race? For the line between the child of wedlock and the child of shame is being wiped out; and, as Jane Addams tells us, woman's "long struggle to establish the responsibilities of fatherhood" is being forgotten. In France, the "revolving cradle" or foundling box—a hateful legacy from the Napoleonic wars through a cruel provision of the Code Napoleon—has again appeared; while in England school-attendance and child-labor laws are being relaxed in order to heap a part of the war load on the backs of little boys and girls.

Will the war retard or speed up the woman movement?—With the spirit of Dr. Balch's enlightening discussion of the probable after-effects of the war on the status of woman I am in absolute sympathy. To me it seems clear that in this war, as in all wars, woman pays. Her most precious assets are being sacrificed to the war god. Now what will happen after the war ends? Is the woman's movement seriously retarded? Or will it speedily regain lost ground and move forward again more swiftly than ever before?

There will be an enormous surplus of women, especially in Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain; and the chances of these women to secure proper mates will not depend solely on the number of surviving males of marriageable age. Allowance must be made for a host of returning soldiers whom this war, like all wars, in its pitiless "selection of the unfit" has rendered unsuitable for right wedlock. One should set aside the moral, the social, and the physical wreckage; the depraved, the diseased, the crippled, and those spoiled for steady work and the arts of peace. The stock of male "damaged goods" will be large. Many thousands of men will return to spread the taint of venereal disease, the heaviest curse of the innocent wife and mother. For the present war, like all wars, is the "culture-laboratory" of the "great black plague." By expert authority, we learn in the *Survey*, "it is pointed out that when the army returns home there will be a great increase of venereal disease among German women"; and who can believe that the women of the other peoples will be immune?

In the coming sex-crisis, then, will womanhood be cheapened through the keen rivalry for mates? For generations, notably during the last half-century, women have been regaining their primitive right of choice. The ideal of mar-

riage has been rising. Has the hand on the dial been turned back? After the war, will there be an increase in the proportion of those women who still in effect woo their mates—barter their sex-capital for the sake of support?

On the contrary, there are strong reasons for believing that women will win greater independence. They are not so fearful as formerly of becoming "old maids." In some of the more backward lands woman's subjection may be increased; but it is precisely in those lands that before the war a shortage of women existed. The war may do little more than restore the sex-balance. The fact is, the events of the war are clearing the air, revealing the absurdity of much of the argument against the social value of woman as a human being. It seems highly probable that the feminist movement will go on faster than ever when peace comes. This is so, and I wish to lay stress on the point, because women, as never before, have gained class-consciousness. Millions of them are organized to promote their interests. Day by day as the war proceeds they are interpreting its lessons. By adding to their own the industrial burden of the men who have been called to battle, they are proving their business capacity and gaining power. The skill and efficiency displayed by women in their new fields of labor are bound to win them greater economic independence and hence to secure them a larger share in the world's affairs. For if there is danger of "sweating" woman's labor, is it not very probable that the movements for short hours, minimum wage, mother's pensions, and better sanitation will be pushed swiftly forward by woman's increased power? The speedier triumph of equal suffrage is assured. It cannot long be delayed in Great Britain; while in the United States, best situated to profit by the true lesson of the war, equal suffrage is rising in a mighty tide.

It may follow, let us hope, that organized women shall have a full voice in framing the terms of peace and in constructing such a league of nations as shall make impossible such another crime against civilization.

PROFESSOR J. T. LICHTENBERGER, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The topic before us presents certain inherent difficulties for discussion. It has long been recognized by social students that a state of chronic militarism tends to create an authoritative society, of which centralized government, the curtailment of individual liberty, and the subjugation of women are among its chief products. But this state of society does not now exist. Had the writer confined her paper strictly to the subject it would have possessed merely historical or academic interest. Of all the modern nations perhaps Germany and Russia most nearly approximate this condition, but in Germany especially the forces of social democracy had, before the present war, become so powerful as almost to amount to a social revolution. The government was becoming democratized and wide liberty was enjoyed by its citizens in social activities. Even Russia was affected by the modern movement.

Militarism is no longer the dominant fact in the modern world. It has been replaced by industrialism and when wars occur they are incidents—very disastrous ones—in the affairs of nations. Such wars are not likely to initiate social changes, though they may serve to accelerate or retard processes already under way. The present European conflict is far less a struggle for political than for economic supremacy, and its results will be most significant in social and industrial conditions. Economic advantage and efficiency, not militarism, is the present interest of mankind, even though nations may revert to the method of war to secure it. The present war, great as it is, will not permanently disturb the course of modern social evolution. With the return to peace, social and economic forces will be accentuated.

One of the most significant trends of modern industrialism has been the increasing "admission of women to political and industrial equality." The present war will undoubtedly facilitate this movement for reasons pointed out in the paper, but the net results in the most backward nations will hardly achieve for women the status already required in the United States and several other European countries.

A celibate class of women is not the result of war. Countries farthest advanced in industrialism already have a well-defined class of unmarried women whose value to society is clearly recognized. War merely will increase this class both in numbers and in importance.

The organizing ability of women is, furthermore, the product of industrial and political conditions. This power has been initiated and developed, not by war, but through the necessities of industrial competition and organized philanthropy. The existence of the *Nationale Frauendienst* rendered possible the mobilization of German women and the war serves simply to bring the organization into national prominence. It will no doubt be of greater service still in the economic rehabilitation when the war is over.

To these points mentioned in the paper I should like to add another of similar import. The method of making a living, which after all is the dominant interest of mankind, has tended always to differentiate occupations on the basis of sex. In primitive society life was often precarious because of enemies and the scarcity of food and because the energies of men were consumed in war and the chase. Shielded from these sterner aspects of the struggle for existence, women cared for the children and "stayed by the stuff." The camp and the field fell to their lot and they became the originators of the arts and industries. The respective activities were thus clearly differentiated. Men were the warriors, women the artisans.

In widening areas of peace and with accompanying security men were released from their warlike pursuits. Group success depended more upon the products of the herd and the field, and the pastoral and agricultural industries were substituted for the more precarious methods of replenishing the food supply. In this shift the position of woman was affected less perhaps than that of man. His occupation changed to that of herdsman and farmer, supplanting

woman in these activities. In the resulting readjustment men came to assume the work outside the home, while women were assigned to the tasks within the home. Women changed their status of slave or chattel to one of economic dependence. So rigid did this status become that it has resisted the influence of the industrial revolution thus far. But "the old order changeth." New forces are producing decided effects in the modification of the activities of men and women. In the lower economic strata, family budgets, due to a rising standard of living, together with the increasing cost, are too large to be provided by the wages of one member of the family. In the upper strata women in increasing numbers are becoming unwilling to accept idle support of husband or father.

Both by necessity and by choice a new alignment in occupations is resulting. Women are invading industries outside the home, and are acquiring a new sense of freedom. Precisely what form this new alignment is to take it is difficult perhaps to predict. It is probable that it will be determined by physical and mental ability and fitness, with scant reference to sex. It is somewhat difficult to see how war can do more than facilitate this change. It is unlikely that women as a class will ever be displaced from occupations for which they have demonstrated their fitness during the period of war.

Unless, therefore, modern warfare shall change the character of modern industrialism it would seem to me that its effect on the status of women will be incidental rather than fundamental.

PROFESSOR FRANCIS D. TYSON, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

Much that is said on the subject of the effect of the war on the status of woman must remain in the realm of conjecture, and, as Miss Balch's judicious paper showed, dogmatism is unwarranted. But our conjecture should be based, as nearly as is possible, upon fact. A fault of the discussion of the subject, it seems to me, is the recurrence in it, from time to time, of a rather uncritical idealism, which, although prompted by our higher selves or reflecting our own well-being, may lead to a blind optimism and delude us as to the true meaning of a world-catastrophe. This note is to be found in the latter part of the papers of Miss Balch and Professor Howard and in the discussion of Professor Lichtenberger.

May I try to isolate two phases of this idealistic overemphasis? First, the tacit or implied assumption that there exists in modern society a separate feminine consciousness, sufficiently widespread to be effective in preventing and abolishing war, or, at least, coherent enough to secure a strengthening of woman's position in the present crisis. Secondly, this making a virtue of necessity—this search and discovery of definite economic and co-operative advantages, for woman, which may not exist at all.

Of the first point Miss Balch says, early in her paper: "How far a different psychology as to conflict is either a cause or a result of difference of [sex

function it would be interesting to know. . . . ." But surely, so far as group conflict is concerned, the answer to this question given by social psychology, speaking in the main, is definite enough. There is no discernible difference of reaction on the basis of sex. Certainly any generalization would state that woman as a sex has not in the past or today developed a distinct and appreciable rationalism favoring peace and submission, or an effective emotional opposition to the ills of warfare. Indeed, it was almost inevitable that she should not do so. Her subservient position in society, which Professor Howard has outlined, made her the conventional and routine sex; her unique interests have been those of kinship and tradition. Even more than with the individualistic and mutable male, woman's loyal allegiance has been given to the group. So the war *mores* have been woman's *mores* as well as man's. The mob-mind is her mind and she shares in full the enthusiasm of patriotic sentiment. Her sympathy, just as is the case with man, vanishes and gives place to the hate accompanying instinctive pugnacity, whenever group ends are thwarted or the life of family and state endangered. As we look at history, woman has ever urged her man to do battle for gain, or for the defense of home; has exulted over the spoils of triumph, or silently borne, and comforted man in bearing, the burdens of defeat.

Even the self-conscious women of the belligerent nations to whom Miss Balch pays tribute "believe that their country must and should fight out this war to its utmost bitter finish," but she adds, rather inconsistently, "though they never fall victims to the characteristic hallucinations of war." It may be, too, that Miss Balch is mistaking the wish for the thought, and idealizing just a little when she writes: "The fact that in belligerent countries the women are freer than the men to express and act out these ideas, and that their numbers are not depleted by military service, gives them an influence and in many instances a leadership along these lines which affects the spiritual balance of the sexes and brings women nearer to an equal partnership with men in working for the future of civilization."

There is no desire on my part to question the growth of the new peace sentiment among women or to minimize its significance for the future, but we must be warned against the exaggeration of the present extent and power of this separate sentiment. The claim, so frequently made of late, that woman suffrage would have made the present war impossible is pathetic illusion, based upon this fallacy. Even had the women of Europe had the will to prevent the war they would still have lacked the economic power and the organized political means of making that will effective. This new psychology of woman is, I fear, attributed by a relatively small and isolated group of intellectuals to the mass of their sisters of the common life. The pitfall of the feminist, strangely enough very similar to that of the reactionary, is the stressing of the separation of the sexes. Though the distinction is made for so different a purpose by the feminist, it is, nevertheless, contradictory and unfortunate. The belief is assuredly futile that the interests of men and women can ever be long severed, and

that a catastrophe bringing loss to the one can ever advance and benefit the other.

My second point is with regard to the assumed economic and social benefits of the war to women. "War affects the status of women by working upon some line of cleavage between men and women," says Miss Balch; but she gives no detailed analysis of the nature of the lines of economic cleavage brought about by modern war. Let us look more closely at the effects of the war upon the division of labor between man and woman. To be brief: In peace times, as Dr. Lichtenberger has just pointed out, industrial society was effecting a readjustment in woman's work. We were slowly realizing that her sphere was no more the restricted routine of a past agricultural order, but the rendering of socially valuable services in an expanding civilization. Dr. Lichtenberger admits that any interference with industrial development will halt this process; but apparently he fails to consider war as a retarding or destructive force. We may only say that the degree of retardation will certainly depend upon the length and cost of the war, the extent of the waste of life and capital goods, and the tendencies that are dominant in the social reconstruction which will follow.

But so far as the war itself is concerned, the present evil effect is clear. Our complex economic society has been disrupted, temporarily at least. Many of our specialized and varied social interests have given place to more antiquated simple ones. The expanding activities of education and art, and of science and business as well, except in so far as these latter have been subverted to provide the sinews of war, are atrophied for the time. These higher interests become meaningless in face of the war crisis; they shrink in importance beside the consuming primal needs for food, clothing, and the tools of destruction.

In war the evolving work-alignment of man and woman in peace is broken down. Man the warrior is in the field by virtue of his physical strength, and upon woman devolves the task of feeding and clothing her soldier mate; to her wonted household tasks is added the burden of much of the industrial work which has still to be carried on in war times. This means the complete absorption of the margin of her leisure just as the time when the realm of cultural activity was being opened for her by the magic of modern machinery and the developing processes of school and state. The definite separation of function brought by war will limit "woman's sphere." Man may once more be lordly hero and woman his adoring servant. In such a situation will not the double standard of morality again be entrenched and vice and social disease spread when women are overplus and cheap?

Nowhere is the war so destructive as in rendering more difficult woman's function of motherhood. Her great duty in war time, according to the group sanction, is the bearing of children. She must become the mere breeder again, to refill the ranks of armies and repair the ravages of war. Marriage restrictions and even the claims of legitimacy are swept aside before this primitive group need. In a shattered family, woman must undertake the whole task of caring for fatherless children, or assume the added burden of a maimed and

handicapped husband. An instance of British acceptance of this situation is the newly formed "League for the Marrying of Broken Heroes."

It is probable that woman will receive but little aid from the state in bearing her burden. In any case, a week's love and a widow's pension are but scant reward for a narrowed life, and a disastrous social substitute for the normal family, our most effective institution for educating the child. So the cost of the war will fall largely upon woman's shoulders. She will face the task of rearing the new generation against the well-nigh hopeless odds of restricted income, excessive taxation, and a heightened living cost. It is saddening indeed that this sacrifice should be exacted at the very time when so much wealth was being spent in manifold attempts to provide social means of relieving woman's age-long burden of care for the child, the weak, and the defective. The very wealth wasted in war and the preparation for war is that which would have been spent in peace to free woman in fuller measure from menial toil, and to provide her opportunities for socializing the home and leading her children to a larger life. Now all such higher social values are submerged; they are no more the foremost ends of human attainment. Definite reversion, hard to measure, perhaps, is bound to occur because of the strengthening in woman of traditional sanctions like those of sacrifice, self-abnegation, and other-world reward.

The claim has been made repeatedly that woman gains by free entrance into new industrial occupations from which she cannot be dislodged after the war. But in our enthusiasm to find gain in the mirage of battle we have not stopped, I fear, to consider fully what these new activities are, and what disadvantages they present. For instance, Miss Balch enumerates among the new positions now being held by women in England those of railway clerks and porters, messengers, omnibus conductors, night telephone operators, motor-van drivers, pit-head laborers, farm hands, carriage-cleaners, postgirls, newsgirls, munitions and armament workers, sheep dippers, and club servants. Many students of the problem of women in industry would find it hard to be optimistic about plunging them in such large numbers into what are for the most part unskilled activities of men, that involve heavy physical strain. There is the unpleasant knowledge that temporarily at least this process of quickening the speed of the industrialization of woman really means crushing her. In the urban centers, where women will be numerous and their labor cheap, they will face ills in industry even more onerous than those in the towns and agricultural districts. And even stronger evidence presents itself with regard to the blighting of the new generation.

It is strange that at the very time when we were coming to realize fully the evils of uncontrolled industrialism the feminist should idealize the thrusting of woman into industrialism under the worst auspices. In reality here is but another of the tragic mistakes of a blinded civilization run amuck. Woman will find neither independence nor the means for development in such labor. Concerning this point Miss Balch mentions Miss Chamberlain's splendid discussion of the overwork and underpay which universally characterize this

new economic activity in England.[1] We are given a vivid picture of broken health and wage standards, involving the sweeping aside, through cruel exigencies of war, of a protective code, the result of three-quarters of a century of labor and legal struggle. We must admit that the really significant problem of woman in industry is not so much to provide her with new kinds of work as to safeguard her health and insure her skill and income in that work. On the other hand, there is no question but that the gaps in the ranks of male workers must be filled in the reconstruction after the war; and new standards of working skill and efficiency will have to be set and applied if the tremendous cost of the war is to be paid. Let us hope that woman is to have no mean part in this great task.

Miss Balch pays a fine tribute to the increasing celibate class of women workers who are leaders in every phase of the woman movement. But it seems to me the opportunities of this superior group lie almost entirely in the increasingly specialized functions of art, science, the professions, public and social service, and the extending interests of the organized home—all activities of peace and rendered insignificant by the cruder needs of war preparation that consume all the energies of the European peoples. Again, of whatever temporary social value, such a celibate group of women is itself a reflection of the maladjustment in modern society. The ultimate need, here, is that society find ways to make these productive tasks of our superior women compatible with marriage and the rearing of a stronger new generation.

The illuminating shock of the war has truly revealed the work of woman in all its casual meagerness and has shown how much of it, both inside and outside the home, is inefficient, traditional, and even unnecessary. It is to be hoped that much of the devotion to luxury, fashion, and bad taste which has made woman the slave of convention so long may be permanently abandoned with the heart-searching born of the economic pressure of war. Let us trust that new standards of effectiveness in her work will be attained through the need that follows the war. But so far as the present situation concerns us, are we not compelled to admit the sad lack of co-operative and organizing power among women in every country? Are we not in danger of sentimentalizing about the significance of much of the so-called "relief work" which now engages her? Even among the higher-income groups, where leisure and culture are assured, a great deal of the present fevered activity may be mere reversion to the domestic "busy-work" of our grandmothers, and reveal little more than an antiquated individualism in the palliation of disease and defect.

Let me cite one illustration of the diversion of woman's activity, which, though it may mean internal peace to England, may also represent social reversion. Practically all the propagandist work of the English woman's movement has been diverted to war assistance. Miss Chamberlain writes: "Almost every woman's organization in England is engaged in relief work, while a small section of the Woman's Social and Political Union, under Mrs. Pankhurst,

[1] *Survey*, July 24, 1915.

is doing active recruiting." Again: "The National Union of Woman Suffrage Societies is devoting itself entirely to hospital work." And again: "The Women's Freedom League has organized a corps of sixty policewomen, the chief and assistant of whom are Ellen Dawson and Mary Allen, militants who have served many prison terms after wrangles with the London police." At last the wild women are tamed, the criminals become policewomen. Who may say in the face of such facts what will be the English sentiment with regard to women when the war is over?

I simply wish to point out the danger of being too hopeful about finding unforeseen gains from the war. Are we not rather brought by the crisis of struggle to discern more clearly the measurable advances which we make in time of peace? Industrial society seeks adjustment to increase its efficiency, and in the process strives to mature the life of its members. Its experiments of economics, democracy, and education assure the freedom and development of woman. So that her permanent emancipation will, I take it, be brought by the gains of peaceful industry, by new forms of co-operation and service, and by more effective legal and social control. These gains are impossible of attainment by woman alone. They are the aims of the whole social group, to be brought about by slow evolution in peace and financed by the increasing wealth of industrial society. They are abolished by war and hindered by the waste of preparation for war.

War, then, as an interval in normal social evolution means bitter loss and retardation of civilization and woman. Nor will war pass until woman, with the man by whose side she labors, comes at last to feel and know the high values at stake in modern warfare, and to find really effective means for conserving those values.

WAR AND MILITARISM IN RELATION TO GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

SIMEON E. BALDWIN, LL.D.
Ex-Governor of Connecticut

War in its immediate effects is either a form or a phase of government. Civil wars are phases of it; other wars are forms, and may be phases of it.

Civil wars betoken a difference between the rulers of a nation and many of its people, and such an organization of the dissatisfied as virtually puts them, for the time being, in the position of a political society. All governments are planned with the view of giving their executive authority power enough to put down any uprising tending to assume that character before it reaches the stage of formal organization. The freer a government is in fact, the less likely is it to become involved in civil war. As a general thing, when it arises, no outside nation is concerned in the course which it may take, or the success that may eventually attend it, unless that attained by the insurgents is so pronounced as to compel diplomatic recognition.

This is true of every form of foreign intervention. Family quarrels must be settled at home, if they are to stay settled.

The time at my disposal will not allow me to stop for further study of the nature and incidents of civil war.

What are those of war in its ordinary sense?

It is a condition of things designed to impose the will of one country on another, so as to govern its political action or perhaps wholly to extinguish its political power.

War is an international relation. It exists only between nations. Incidentally it affects the citizens of each as individuals, but only as individual members of a political society.

Militarism is a quality of the mind. It is a spirit of conviction. It is a moral discipline. It may become a national characteristic. Wherever it does, it strongly influences national behavior.

It furnishes a foundation for war.

It may be also an incentive to it. Pressed to its verge, it may prescribe the only form of activity by which the higher rewards of human society can be attained. It was so among the Spartans and with the American Indian.

Such an order of things tends to shrink away before a high civilization. Intellectual power, moral power, industrial power, are each greater than military power. They owe it nothing. They can give it much.

Is it not the general tendency of modern life to advance them in importance, as factors in national well-being, and to treat militarism as belonging to an inferior era which is long past?

When diplomacy was a system of official lies; when government was by kings recognized as ruling by divine right; when the administration of justice between men was mainly an affair of revenge or reprisal; when the judicial procedure itself often took the form of personal combat or private war, the world saw nothing better than public war to regulate international relations. There was nothing better. War was useful, and a warlike spirit was a thing to cultivate. In our times a spirit of justice is the thing to cultivate.

But what is justice, in any particular matter? Is it something to be ascertained by the peaceful means of argument and agreement between the parties interested? By all means, if that be possible, but we all know that it proves often impossible. To settle such differences, in the last resort, society has invented courts. All civilized nations now have them. Moving in the same direction, all civilized nations, excepting Costa Rica and Ethiopia, met at The Hague in 1907 to unite in advancing the standards of international law, the first object named in the call being to improve the provisions of the convention, framed there in 1899, "relative to the peaceful settlement of international disputes," as regards the Court of Arbitration, and the international commissions of inquiry.

It was a natural movement. As we review the course of history we see a steady increase in friendly international co-operation. Alliances have become more common; and we have learned to regard alliances as serving more for peace among nations than

for purposes of war. International agreements for softening the rigors of war, like the Declaration of Paris and The Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, have turned the ideals of preceding times into the practice of the present. So far as they have yet gone they have been supported by the general public opinion of civilized lands. But war in its essential nature is untamable. "Gentlemen of the French Guard, fire first," spoke even in its day the overstrained spirit of chivalry, and chivalry is silent before machine-guns and cannon that hit the mark at twenty miles. Governments cannot afford to be quixotic. They must look facts in the face. They cannot but see that in some respects war has become more cruel than ever. As now waged, it is an inheritance from rougher ages, which has been modified by two great forces: scientific invention and public opinion. Scientific invention makes it more far-reaching and more deadly. Public opinion keeps the use of such inventions within bounds.

Everything that gives polish to manners has its influence on public opinion. It erects what Schiller has called the court of good taste. It is an outward sign of courtesy and moderation. These are the laws of the court through which it gives its judgments. Good manners are foreign to whatever is brutal and insolent. They are foreign also to whatever is hard, angular, and violent.

Good manners, once acquired, are not easily lost. The source of their original imposition may have passed away. They may have come, at the outset of life, from favorable social surroundings. They may have come from a sentiment of love for one's neighbor, or of deference to one's superiors. But he who has once worn them can hardly put them off, even if he desires to do so. If he becomes a militarist, the forms of courtesy will be likely to stick to him still. In dealing with an enemy he will not be as rough as the man whose habits and belongings have been always rough.

Manners, Emerson said, make the man. They are diffusive in their nature and effects. In general the leaders in government are likely to have those of the highest social circles of the people. By right of it their influence over their followers is all the closer. Politeness is one of their paths to popularity, and politeness is the

outer seeming of sympathy and affection. In the hands of the nations where it is the fashion to cultivate it, war will be less horrible, and also a resort to war will be less common. The crusading knight was, first of all, a knightly gentleman.

Carried to an extreme, and made as it were a religion, courtesy of speech and manner may be fatal to national strength. It has been to China's.

At the second Hague conference for promoting the pacific settlement of international disputes, when the subject of a formal proclamation of war was under discussion in the commission charged with this duty, the military delegate from China rose and in all seriousness asked the chair what should happen when one nation declared war against another, if the latter did not wish to fight.[1] Such a question could be possible only to a man in his position, who had been trained from his birth in the self-centered quietism of the Confucian philosophy. It ignores the capital distinction between defensive and aggressive wars. It does not recognize the natural aspirations and even duties attaching to national sovereignty. Yet that it could be asked at a congress of nations in the twentieth century is of itself some evidence that the spirit of militarism is not in accord with the tendencies of the times. It makes against government by the people and for the people. Because it makes against them, it will always have to contend with a strong opposition. Government in time of war is therefore made more difficult. It must, in large measure, look for sympathetic support to special interests promoted by war, because war enlarges their field or stiffens the market for their products.

Such interests are necessarily selfish. They are active in self-protection. They are generally well organized for mutual advantage. They have ready access to the public ear through the press, because they have money and position to influence the character of what it may publish. They work underground. Their efforts are essentially directed against free speech and a free press.

Militarism is a gospel of youth. It seizes upon men before age has taught them what life really is. In its best form, it bespeaks a spirit of national loyalty and worthy pride. But in the nature

[1] Scott, *The Hague Peace Conference*, I, 179.

of its outward expression it is instructed discipline rather than instructed patriotism.

It makes war easier to wage. It adds to the chances of success. But it gives it more the character of a business enterprise. Logically, it leads to conscription, and conscription is forcing all to fight for objects desired by some, perhaps by a minority of the voters, certainly by a minority of the people. The resort to it, which has become so general in modern times, followed the disuse of mercenary troops, hired from a foreign sovereign, such as the Hessians brought here to resist the American Revolution. Neither of these modes of recruiting an army appeals to motives of patriotism. The conscript is at heart seldom glad to be summoned to active service. With the mercenary, or rather with his sovereign, it was always a mere affair of bargain and sale.

The engagement of such troops by England was a natural consequence of her abhorrence of a great standing army. It tended to degrade militarism and all that belonged to it. To hire foreigners to die for your country is something little resembling the personal service of citizens joining to support their state.

Practically the United States did this during the Civil War. Thousands were brought over from Europe for voluntary enlistment by the efforts of recruiting emissaries and the attraction of the large bounties offered by states and cities. It is enough to say that they gave little strength to the Union army. They formed a class not in keeping with our ideals. As they were fused with Americans in the same regiments, there was no ground of objection on the ground of thus raising a large standing army. The opposition to that in the minds of both Englishmen and Americans is deep-seated. They know the effect of their original institution in Europe.

Professor Seeley has described the first establishment of such an army in the early days of the Roman Empire as a "vast social revolution, in comparison with which any changes in the form of political government were insignificant." The Roman citizen, he says, "placed himself under entirely new conditions of life. He parted with all his traditions, and blindly undertook to explore a new world. In the first place he renounced his liberty." In the

second place "he parted with the conception of war as the business of life" for the ordinary man.[1]

That conception no modern nation has tolerated, but the possibility of its development, if great armies were kept on foot in time of peace, has always been felt by statesmen in free governments.

The policy of the United States in this respect has been always consistent. The plan of the President, now before the country, to raise a force of 400,000 citizen-soldiers, enlisting for six years, to stand between the regular army and the National Guard of the United States, has been justly characterized by him as aimed at making the forces of the nation indeed a part of the nation, and not a separate professional organization.

There are two other reasons why militarism is essentially opposed to the nature of constitutional government in the United States: first, that our system rests on the principle of home rule, and war demands centralization of authority; and, secondly, that we clothe our President and the governor of each state with the supreme military as well as the supreme executive power. Whenever, in the presence of an armed enemy or rebel, he declares martial law, its measure is his will. His training, however, will seldom have been a military one. He is given this great authority because he ordinarily is a civilian, and the whole political scheme has been devised to put the civil above the military power.

Even if he has served as a soldier (and after a great war the selection of candidates for the highest offices will be likely to be made from those to whom the war brought distinction) he will feel that his main and normal functions are those which concern civil life. The virtues which belong to modern republics are, as all men know, those that flourish best in peace. Even under the Roman Empire, in the century preceding the death of Marcus Aurelius, these virtues were widely found during the forty years when there was absolutely no breath of war and the people in each city and country lived under laws mainly of their own making.

War and militarism, in one point of large importance, foster a spirit which has much in common with Christianity—that of self-sacrifice. Christianity, however, urges self-sacrifice for other men.

[1] *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 21, 22.

It does not inculcate any duty to the state except obedience. War and militarism, in our day, foster self-sacrifice, not for individuals, but for one's own country, that is, one's own people collectively considered. It may sometimes assume the shape of a joy in laying down life for one's sovereign, but then it is really because he is seen to have become an abstraction and stands for the nation. It is an incident of civilization that in his moral enthusiasms the soldier should rise from loyalty to a person to loyalty to a principle or cause.

If he believes this principle or cause to be identified with his country, any kind of self-sacrifice for it may become sweet. Let me read from a letter written this year by a young German in the field to his mother, in the glow of such a feeling since crowned by his death in battle:

> Ah, mother, how pitifully small our individual human lives appear in this storm of the ages that mounts up with the thunder and lightning of thousands of cannon, and sweeps over, or rather through us! Anyone who has experienced how our German people, with its almost 70,000,000 individual human lives, was fused together into an absolute unity of purpose and might, in the fires of enthusiastic determination and a great and righteous anger—such a one has received a sufficient measure of happiness for this life. Never again will he experience anything so wonderfully great. He has experienced how the individual life, the individual will, was consumed in the white-hot purpose of a united people.
>
> That is the spirit in which each individual member of the German nation in arms has engaged in the struggle that was forced upon it: going forth to meet his own individual destruction, if it need be, in order to save his People from destruction.

Nietzsche, who insisted that now, as fully as in primeval society, the natural state of man is one of war, asserted that the emphasis of self-sacrifice was simply the form that self-assertion takes with the weaklings and decadents. A thousand fold does such a letter as this outweigh his theory.

From the time when the political structure of Europe, based on the institutions of feudalism, and therefore on military service by the landowner, began to decay to the closing years of the nineteenth century, militarism there, and in the civilized world, pretty steadily declined. The next few years will show us whether the decline has been temporarily interrupted or permanently checked. In either case there will have been an entry on a new political era.

NATIONALISM AND STATE SOCIALISM

WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING
Greenwich, Connecticut

The great individualists of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and others, held that economic and social evolution were rapidly making all modern nations into one great economic whole. Great Britain had just established free trade, and Spencer believed that the turning-point of the progress of the world from the period of militarism to that of industrialism had been reached.

But we have now witnessed a revival of militarism, and all the nations of the world, except Great Britain, have applied their energies mainly, not to the increase of national *interdependence* through international trade and investment, but to the increase of national *independence* by means of tariffs, and at last to actual war on a world-scale.

The great individualists believed that the world had definitely turned aside from the régime of status to the régime of contract. On the contrary, the nationalistic tendency of which I have just spoken has resulted, as was inevitable, in the development of "state socialism." This "state socialism" has in turn immensely increased the nationalistic tendencies within the nation that has led in state socialist development; and it seems highly probable that the necessities of national competition will drive other nations to adopt similar policies.

State socialism tends to regard the nation as *a single economic unit.* All the forces of the nation are to be organized and utilized in developing its strength for struggles with other nations. This means, not only that inner divisions are to be repressed and all fundamental social changes which require class struggles eliminated, but also that all the nation's forces, as far as possible, are to be contained within itself, and not used to develop other nations, which are competitors and may become enemies. If there is

emigration of labor, the immigrants are still to be loyal mainly to the country of their origin; in those cases where this "loyalty" to the old, or disloyalty to the new, country has not been accomplished, the accusation is made that the culture of the old country has failed of its purpose. If capital goes to another country in any considerable amount, this in itself sets up a claim of the home country to domination; as we see in China, Turkey, and other parts of the world.

In contrast to the state socialism of the great military land powers, we have had the individualism of the sea powers, and especially of the leading sea power. Nothing has been expected or demanded of the immigrants from such countries; capital has been exported just as freely to powerful and independent foreign nations as it has been to colonies or to weak powers which it was hoped to control.

The same contrast is found with regard to internal policy. The sea powers have realized by experience that when any social class becomes of sufficient real importance to the nation as a whole to be able to demand a share of the governmental powers, there should be no serious effort to prevent it by force—or to crush out those class struggles which have been the very essence of all the great progressive political changes of the past centuries. Great Britain, France, and the United States, for example, have all had one or more successful popular revolutions. Not one of the great land powers of Europe—not Germany, Austria, nor Russia—has had a successful revolution. The same classes remain wholly or largely in control now as in the eighteenth century. This is admitted even by such an ardent defender of the leading experiment in state socialism as Frederick Howe.

But I need not deal with internal revolutions of the past, such as those which have overthrown the landlords and put the capitalists in power, nor need I deal with the probable political revolutions of the near future, which promise to overthrow capitalists and place the control in the hands of the middle classes—as has already happened in Australia. For the spread of nationalistic state socialism promises to postpone for a long period, not only such revolutions, but all political and social progress along democratic

lines—*except such as is based, not upon democracy, but upon the requirements of state socialism itself.*

For not only is it possible for nationalistic state socialism to have certain democratic features—that is, of course, in its attitude to the people of the home country—but it will before many years be *forced* to develop such democratic features for the sake of national efficiency. For this there are at least three imperative reasons:

In order to develop the latent capacities of the lower classes, as well as the upper, every effort will have to be made to extend economic opportunity among them. Of course if this tendency went far enough it would spell pure social democracy (again using the word democracy in its nationalistic sense).

Secondly, in order to handle *efficiently* the problem of developing the efficiency of the masses the masses themselves will have to be consulted at every point. That is, a very large measure of democratic machinery will have to be devised. For example, workingmen have a great many ideas of value to employers. Every effort will have to be used to give the worker a chance to present his ideas and to reward him handsomely for them. Further than this, the problem of the efficiency of the worker extends into his home and all other departments of his life. The state cannot therefore indulge indefinitely in merely autocratic "welfare" departments. Efforts in this direction will necessarily be organized on a more and more democratic basis.

And finally, in view of the increasing economic competition between the nations in the future, parasitical classes will have to be largely, or entirely, done away with. This is the key to the greater efficiency of Germany, as compared with Great Britain and France, in the present war. Autocracy, it is true, gives great advantages in the organization of armies, and in certain other institutions resembling armies in their structure. But this is a war largely of arms and money; that is, it is an industrial war. It is undeniable that Germany, in proportion to its size and resources, has shown a considerable superiority in this direction also. To what is this industrial superiority due? Is it due to the greater autocracy of Germany as compared with the semi-democratic organization of industrial life of certain other countries?

It seems to me it would be easily possible to demonstrate that this is not the cause of Germany's relative industrial superiorities. The cause on the contrary is the great degree of parasitical wealth, idleness, and inherited control of industry which we see in the western European countries when compared with Germany. I believe the influence of the autocratic and class-controlled German state on the industry of that country has probably already done as much harm as good. But all the harm that has been done under the government of Germany by Junkers is more than compensated for by the pernicious influence and deadweight of the enormous and firmly rooted wealthy classes of Great Britain and France. Largely idle, or dilletantes at the best, and in almost every instance given over to foolish and unsocial extravagances of colossal dimensions, they have absorbed a very large part of the nation's income and industrial power. Given over as these countries are, in considerable part, to the manufacture of luxuries, to the furnishing of personal servants, and to other services for the rich, they have in this way wasted all the vast superiority given them by democratic organization—a form of social organization which undeniably furnishes vastly more opportunity, and so calls out into the service of society the talents of a vastly greater proportion of the population, than does any class government. *Political democracy has not failed in these countries; it has not known what to do with its success.*

And now let us see what are the social *costs* of state socialism. Undoubtedly state socialism will introduce from the first a more scientific organization of industry through the extension of nationalization and other forms of government control. It will greatly increase the amount of the most scientific and social form of taxation, namely, heavily graduated income and inheritance taxes and the taxation of the rise in land values. But the financial benefits of both these great classes of social reform for many years will go mainly for military purposes. Similarly everything will be done to increase the individual efficiency of the citizen as a military and industrial unit. This will mean a vast increase of expenditures for public health, technical education, and all the more important types of social reform and labor legislation. But again the growing

taxes—among which must always be reckoned indirect taxation by means of nationalized industries—would be so high as on the one hand to prevent any considerable rise in money wages or salaries, and, on the other, to cause a considerable increase in the cost of living.

The rate of economic advance of the nation as a whole and of nearly all of its component economic units (its inhabitants) would be greatly checked, if not altogether stopped. Personal liberty would be infringed upon in every direction and society would thereby lose a very large part of one of its most valuable forces—personal initiative. An efficiently organized society will not, of course, altogether ignore the importance of such initiative. But to produce the *maximum* of personal efficiency requires the maximum of personal freedom, and above all equality of opportunity. Now these characteristics are among the last developments of social evolution, the most valuable, and at the same time *the most expensive*. The temptation of a society which is aiming—and, for military reasons, must aim—at the maximum efficiency *in the shortest time* is first of all to recognize and accept existing social stratification. Thus the upper classes are willing and able to contribute most, both financially and in other ways, toward fitting their children for the best economic positions; the middle classes may be relied upon to pay for their children's support and education during a somewhat shorter period, but still a relatively long process of preparation, and so on down in the social scale. The children of the common people must for the most part rest satisfied with such educational and occupational opportunities as are left.

But the most serious social cost of nationalistic state socialism has yet to be mentioned. By caring for the health and industrial efficiency of the masses it popularizes itself and secures their support. It may thus be called a sort of economic Caesarism. It does not distribute bread and circuses, but it does distribute jobs and nationalistic culture.

In a word, the democracy sells its birthright for a mess of pottage. It accepts certain limited material advantages in lieu of that always increasing share in the control of government and in the distribution of the benefits of progress, that equalizing of

opportunity, which the European and American democracy has claimed to be its guiding principle in recent years. Doubtless the democracy makes this deliberate choice, not through an intellectual or a moral error, but because of the most solid of psychological and physiological considerations. The immediate physical and spiritual needs of the masses are so great that they consent to postpone, or even to risk, their own future in order that these needs may be satisfied. They are being *driven by need* rather than being led by hope—for example, the hope for equal opportunities for their children. Doubtless the immediate physiological needs of their children are so great that their decision is a wise one.

By the temporary conversion of the masses to state socialism democracy has failed still more seriously than the above statement implies, for the state socialism of today is entirely nationalistic, that is, it enthrones the principle of national egoism and aims to perpetuate and even to develop the conflict of national economic interests. But democracy fighting against democracy ceases to be democratic. In reality there can be no such thing as nationalistic democracy.

No doubt in proportion as this so-called democracy adopts state socialism, state socialism must become "democratic," as I have shown—but at first only in the nationalistic sense. If the people are wedded to Caesarism, Caesar will be glad to give them plebiscites, and even to inaugurate any other forms of "democracy" that may be demanded. Similarly, if the people are ready to adopt militarism, then the militarists will gladly adopt social reforms.

Some years ago Wolfgang Heine, now one of the leaders of the German Social-Democrats, created a sensation by declaring that he was willing to support the military budget on the principle of "cannons for social reform." This phrase created a scandal at the time. But a careful study of the arguments and motives of the German Socialist party, when it voted the government military supplies *a year before the present war*, will show that this was the principle upon which it acted.

The masses elsewhere—including a part of the middle classes—have also abandoned the cause of internationalism and permanent

peace. What then is the hope that the world will resume that evolution upon which it seemed to have started in 1850? The briefest survey of history will show that the hope lies in the evolution of the nations into larger and larger economic groups until the time arrives—which seems now not to be far off—when a single combination will be able to control or police the world; and especially the hope lies in the development of sea power as opposed to land power, and in the control of that power by an international combination strong enough to make it dominant in the world. It is scarcely necessary to draw from history illustrations in support of this position. The periods of maximum war have been those when the world was most divided into small groups, and the development of modern society has been dependent largely upon the superiority of sea over land power. For sea power is represented chiefly by ships, the products of industry and science, while land power is always built in large part upon the mere subjection and discipline of large masses of men. The principle is illustrated from the days when Athens fought Persia to the time when Great Britain prevented the formation of a new European empire by Napoleon.

After what has been said it follows that the nationalistic state socialist democracy of the present tends to oppose the forces which aim at this internationalization of the world. For example, one of the leading causes of the present war is the struggle between the rich nations for the division of the profits to be made from the exploitation of backward regions like India, China, Russia, Turkey, or Africa. But this exploitation ultimately hastens development and so facilitates the struggle of these peoples for independence and thus tends to remove the leading cause of war. The tendency of nationalistic state socialism, on the contrary, is either directly to tax the export of capital or to make it more difficult. Even before the war radical measures in this direction were being advocated in England and France. They are especially favored by state socialists of England, like Sidney Webb, but more orthodox Socialist leaders take the same point of view. Hillquit announces himself as opposed to the export of capital, while Kautsky advocates socialism on the basis of national economic independence. Even the radical Dutch socialist, Gorter, takes the point of view that no *new* capital

should be exported, which means that the socialists are ready to share directly in the profits of capital which has *already* been sent abroad but want to keep the rest for domestic social reform. There is a shadow of an excuse for this position in the fact that in some countries, like India and Russia, it may be claimed that the advent of modern capital, together with railroads, etc., has retarded rather than advanced the masses of the population. But this is certainly not the case in Japan, and it seems probable that it will not be the case in China under Yuan Shi Kai. If the welfare of these foreign populations and not that of the home country exclusively is sought after, it should be done by measures aimed directly at their protection from excessive capitalistic exploitation, and not by denying them the aid of modern capitalism altogether, and thereby retarding their development and independence and at the same time prolonging the existence of this, the chief cause of modern wars.

Next in importance, as a force tending to prevent war, is the free exchange of military supplies between sea powers in war time. Yet we find the leading exponents of radical democracy in America demanding an embargo on the export of arms and further demanding that the manufacture of arms be made a national monopoly. This is a consistent and logical position for state socialists and nationalists. For, if universally adopted, it would not only prevent the export or import of arms, but it would secure all the profits of their manufacture to the home government. Under present conditions every nationalization of industry means an increase of nationalism. The nationalization of munitions would decrease the power of the peaceful nations and increase that of the military and nationalistic peoples. The proposed nationalization of shipping is equally dangerous. For there can be no doubt that governments and peoples would demand a policy for their own ships which would be more aggressive than any governmental policy they would tolerate for privately owned ships. On the other hand, the *internationalization* of shipping by private combinations, toward which we have seen such a strong tendency in recent years, makes obviously in the direction of international peace, since shipping is largely international in its very nature. This

internationalization of shipping will be entirely prevented and discontinued in direct proportion as shipping is nationalized. Thus we see once more how *the policy of nationalization makes for war.* If we imagine our coal, or copper, or oil, or steel business nationalized, as is so widely demanded, the result would be similar. Of course if the so-called democracy were really democratic, if the masses were genuinely international, as in many countries they have claimed to be, the result would be otherwise. But we have seen that the masses are now tied, not to international democracy, but to the nationalistic state socialism.

Another important policy tending to prevent war is *political* democracy. It is true that political democracy does not necessarily mean a pacifist policy. But it is equally certain that an irresponsible autocratic government means the most extreme form of militarism and the gravest danger of war. One of the conditions, then, that should be insisted upon at the close of the present war is that a responsible government should everywhere be introduced. This does not necessarily mean complete democracy, but it does mean a government sufficiently democratic accurately to respond to the actual distribution of economic and social power. For example, the hour has already struck for all purely militarist autocracies and oligarchies composed largely of a land-owning caste. It is evident that the overthrow of such governments is so important for the sake of future peace that it would be worth a considerable prolongation of this or any other war if such a result could be brought about in all the more backward countries.

The doctrine has gained wide recognition of late that no progress in government can be developed by pressure from without. History does not in the least bear out this contention. It is true that a form of government for which a country is not ready cannot be forced from without, but when the nation itself is ready, history provides innumerable cases of the effectiveness of outside pressure. The public usually has in mind the failure of the utopian foreign policy of the French revolutionists at the end of the eighteenth century. But these efforts were after all caused, not by the utopianism of the French, but by the attempt of the backward monarchies to prevent the people of France from taking the political step

within their own country for which history has proved that she was amply ready, and which she did complete within a generation. On the other hand, the other countries of Europe were not then ready to rid themselves of their land-owning aristocracies and military monarchies, which they undoubtedly are at the present time. Moreover it may be pointed out that the alliance of the monarchies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia in 1848 and 1849 was very largely successful in interfering with the internal forms of government throughout Europe and preventing the modernization of several of the smaller nations.

But now what do we find in regard to the attitude of the democracies toward this exceedingly important democratic foreign policy? The Socialists have stated over and over again—I refer especially to those of Austria, Germany, and Russia—that they are ready for, and willing to make, almost any sacrifice to get a constitutional or responsible government. We have also seen that the overwhelming majority of the Socialists of those countries admit that they do not themselves have the power to establish any such government at the present time and may not have it for many years. Unfortunately there is as yet no effort from any outside quarter to demand a modification of Russia's form of government as a result of the war—though doubtless the dependence of that country upon the capitalists of England and France gives great promise of such a demand on their part, since they can expect greater profits from their investments if the form of the government is modernized. But we do find very frequently a proposal that in case of a victory of the Allies a radical modification of the German and Austrian forms of government should be demanded, a modification that would place these countries in the hands of their industrial classes and put an end to their government by military autocracies and land-owning nobilities. And what is the answer of the radical Democrats and Socialists to this proposal? With one voice, both inside of Germany and outside, they give the nationalistic answer, "Hands off; the government of each nation is the affair of that nation alone."

I believe the foregoing is sufficient evidence of the temporary breakdown of democracy as an international force. But never-

theless the prospects for internationalism are excellent. For, fortunately, nationalistic state socialism, though influential and popular in all countries, does not dominate those countries where international sea trade is most developed in comparison with home trade, and by the very nature of things the international economic forces within these countries are bound to remain predominant. France was formerly in large part a land power. She is becoming more and more predominantly a sea power. The United States has given most of its resources to internal development. But its enormous coast line and geographical position determine that its future also shall be largely on the sea. The rapidly developing and complex international relations of these countries guarantee that the future belongs, not to nationalistic state socialism, but to those international economic forces which have already carried us from the age of militarism to the age of industrialism, from mediaeval tyrannies to modern liberty and democracy.

The masses of the people also in all of these countries will in the long run follow the lines of development of the national economic interests, which in these cases are international. At present the tendencies of the democracy is almost wholly in the direction of national egoism. But in proportion as solid economic bonds tie us gradually more and more closely to the other sea powers, international democracy in these countries will have a new birth. It will evolve away from its present close connection with the militaristic land powers, and will place itself once more upon the traditions of genuine democracy, personal liberty, and the striving toward equal opportunity, which so long characterized the popular and middle-class movements of Great Britain, America, and France.

And when democracy becomes genuinely democratic or international, state socialism will become genuinely democratic also—but not before. Then its objectionable features, which I have called its "social costs," will disappear, while all of its beneficent characteristics will remain. Thus nationalistic state socialism, repugnant as it is to every true Democrat—and dangerous as it seems to many—after all offers us by far the most promising bridge to the social and industrial democracy of the future.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR ALBION W. SMALL, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

It is hardly credible that an observation of a general sort could now be made upon the present war which has not in substance been uttered and repeated in countless variations somewhere in the world since the first of August, 1914. So far as the mere thinking of thoughts is concerned, the problem now is to recognize the most significant thoughts that have taken shape, and to give them such currency that they will drive out the less valuable thoughts. I confess that I had written what follows a month before I had read either of the instructive papers which I am now supposed to discuss. Nothing which I could say about these papers, however, in the time at my disposal, would be more pertinent than the few generalities which I had set down in advance. I hope they will help to drive home the main appeal which is between the lines of both papers, much as their arguments differ in other respects. This underlying appeal may be compressed into the proclamation—*For Americans at the present moment, the first great commandment with promise is: After you have thought as much as you can about the problems of the war, keep on thinking until you arrive at something to do.*

Differ as we may about technicalities of group psychology, we all know that a conflict of ideas amounts in the rough to a question of which idea can enlist the most people for an endurance test in keeping the assertion of itself resounding in the group hearing till the hostile ideas are discouraged. It is a question of one idea staying the others out. If the given conflict of ideas is a complex one, if as in the case of the present war it is a collision between coalitions of ideas, it is a question of survival of the fittest among organizing ideas in the given complex. Specifically, it remains to be seen, in the present war, whether the focal point of the final adjustment will be primarily racial, national, economic, political, ethical, or religious; and whether in consequence the program of conduct which emerges from the conflict will have one or another controlling type. On our side of the Atlantic the vital question is: In what proportion shall the general set of life in the United States during the next period get its impulse from each of these cardinal factors or some of their subdivisions and combinations?

Any man who would presume to foretell what is to be the precise course of events in these respects would thereby demonstrate his unfitness to be heard. In the economic field alone, for example, the men most competent to judge are most ready to confess that they can see nothing sure for our industries after the fighting stops except an indefinite period of anxious uncertainty. This is partly because so many unknown quantities besides the fighting will enter into the result. How much more difficult to predict is the whole balance of relations that will be affected! Such being the case, the wisest thing that any man or any nation can do, in present world-conditions, is to emphasize by all legitimate means the ideas which compose his or its profession of faith, and in the

order of importance in which they commend themselves. It is by this process alone that our American group may at last ascertain the precise content of its own sanity or insanity.

The first conviction which this war has vitalized in my mind is the extremely old-fashioned belief that *nations are moral agents*. (By the way, for the world at large the foremost issue in the European conflict is whether it shall ratify this theorem or its contradiction.) It has been said over and over again that this war is due to *nationalism*, and certain thinkers on this side of the Atlantic have drawn the conclusion: Therefore, abolish nationality. To my mind, although the parallel is not exact, it would be quite as rational to argue: Murders are committed by persons; therefore abolish personality. It is of course easy to imagine the peoples of the earth at the present moment arranged with very different boundary lines from those on the map. It is possible even to project our imaginations far into the future, and to assume that the present nations have resolved themselves into two or three gigantic federations, which federations in turn are merely provisional, while details are being arranged for the federation of the world. It is impossible for anyone to command my respect for his clearness of vision who does not see that, for any future within the range of practical calculation, nations substantially as we now have them must be the biggest factors in working out the next stages of humanity's salvation. At present nations are the largest organizations of people's agreements to live together under a single system of control. To be sure, there are elements of arbitrariness in the composition of every nation, and some nations have such a surplus of arbitrariness in their composition that they are, as the chemists say, unstable compounds. Admitting all this, on the other hand nations actually represent what Professor Gidding calls consciousness of kind in ways and degrees that foreordain, for periods which will of course not be uniform, the relative coherence of their members with one another, and the relative detachment of their members from other national groups. That is, nations are not chiefly arbitrary formations. Nations exist largely by virtue of inner compulsions which could not be thwarted without violence; and in most cases the violence that might destroy and reconstruct a nation would amount to physical and moral calamity, not merely for the nation immediately affected, but in some degree for the rest of the world.

In other words, nationality is a normal process, physical, mental, and moral, just as truly as personality is a normal process, physical, mental, and moral. It is no more possible to cancel this national phase from the evolutionary experience of humanity than it is to eliminate the personal phase. Nations are human beings going through an unavoidable stage in achieving themselves. Whether we prefer to regard this stage theoretically as a necessary evil, or an unnecessary evil, or a necessary good, it is here, and for an immeasurable time to come it will be here. It is diabolical mysticism to construe a state or states in general as impersonal "power." For better or for worse states are projections of the human beings who compose them. For a long

time to come, whether we will or no, it will be necessary for us to accept nations as phases of ourselves. It follows that, for an indefinite future, moral realizations will be measured largely by the kind of character we achieve in our co-operative activity as nations. Wisdom then counsels, not the belittling and the discrediting of nationality, but the sublimating of nationality. This points to an ideal of national self-realization which must expand our present stultifying nationalism in the same directions in which we arrived at our present conceptions of personal self-realization by expanding eighteenth-century individualism. Whether we think of ourselves as persons or as nations, the only conception of self-realization which does not turn out to be self-contradiction is the conception of progressively finding ourselves by means of more vital partnerships with one another.

The second conviction which the war impresses on my mind is that at the present moment *the United States of America has not an articulate moral consciousness.* As a nation we are like Hawthorne's Marble Faun before the Transformation. We are a nation of heterogeneous persons, none of us able to assign reasons which many of us will accept, why we have been, are, or should be a nation at all. The people who founded our nation knew why they thought they should be a nation. It is speaking well within bounds to say that we Americans are entering into the year 1916 much less sure than the Americans of 1776 were why we think we should still be a nation. It ought to be needless to state the lessons which this plight teaches.

The third conviction which the war brings home to me is that foremost among the items of preparedness with which we need to equip ourselves is *an audit of our actual moral condition.* What are our opinions about what we owe to one another and to the rest of the world? Whatever any group may think about the political beliefs which our revolutionary forefathers held, we are certain that they had beliefs. They believed in liberty. They believed in self-government. By the logic of events they found themselves reluctantly forced to believe in separate national existence. By a combination of circumstances they came to look upon themselves as under peculiar obligations to maintain these principles against the whole world and for the ultimate benefit of the whole world.

Meanwhile the idea of obligation, of responsibility of any sort, has come to sit more lightly upon the minds and consciences of Americans than upon any other great people. The majority of us seem to regard our nationality and all that goes with it as a capital prize in the lottery, with nothing for us to do but to get the most private enjoyment out of it.

Because this is the case, the sort of considerations I have been suggesting have scant chance of getting an early hearing with more than a fraction of our people. I will restrict myself then to one more judgment. Though it is far enough from the convictions of most of us, it is many degrees nearer to our average mental and moral level than the propositions I have thus far stated. Independent, then, of all questions of ethical principle, and primarily as a

matter of individual and national insurance, we shall be stupidly obtuse if this war does not convince us that *safety lies in a policy of progressive justice*, of broader, deeper, intenser justice, first toward one another, then toward the rest of the world.

There are two chief springs of patriotism: first, participation in great sacrifices; second, participation in great benefits. Accordingly love of country is of two kinds: the patriotism of consecration and the patriotism of gratitude. Yet it is doubtful if genuine types of either are possible without actual or potential admixture of the other. If sacrifice is to be the controlling quality of patriotism, it must spring from some vision of the beneficence of the nation. If benefits received are to inspire true patriotism, they must accrue to people responsive to the implication that benefits create obligations. In short, a people's capacity for patriotic sacrifice is a function of its consciousness of justice in the national institutions.

Few things have been more dramatically conspicuous in the present war than the evidence that the masses will sacrifice for the government only when they are convinced that the government has done its best for them. A nation is only as strong internally as the margin of its contented over its discontented classes. A nation is only as strong externally as its credit among other nations for will to do justice. Those Americans live in a fool's paradise who imagine that our national status is secure in either respect. We shall be the most fatuous nation in history if this war does not teach us that the first duty of citizens is to find out how much they can do to reinforce one another, and that the first duty of states is to see that their care for their own involves no sin of omission or commission toward citizen or government of another state.

To sum this all up: our traditional misinterpretation of George Washington to the contrary notwithstanding, it is my own belief that we have reached a stage in world-integration in which our nation must begin seriously to prepare to satisfy this inclusive positive condition of security—of peace at home and toleration by the rest of the world, viz.: we must consent to assume our share of the burdens of maintaining righteous civic and international relations. Adequate armaments, military and naval, are of course items in the necessary program, but they are merely subsidiary and instrumental. The great task is to inform ourselves of the present demands of national and international righteousness upon us, and to achieve national will not to be found wanting. The concrete problem for Americans in the immediate future is: Can we achieve these *minima* in such measure that we may be free to proceed with our experiment of vindicating democracy?

PROFESSOR JAMES W. GARNER, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

There is one statement in Governor Baldwin's paper that I wish to make the basis of my remarks, namely, his assertion that "Militarism is not in accord with the tendencies of the times," and that it "makes against government by

the people and for the people." With this view I agree fully. In my opinion militarism, in the form in which it exists for example in Germany, is unfavorable to, if it is not actually incompatible with, true political democracy. I am aware that one of the common arguments advanced in favor of militarism on the Continent of Europe and especially in Germany and in Austria is that universal military service is a school of democracy, and that the army is the most democratic of institutions. This is so, we are told, because under a system of compulsory military service which spares no one physically capable of bearing arms, whatever may be his profession, his social position, or his political influence, the army is in effect the nation and not a select body representing the nobility, the aristocracy, or any other particular class. Standing side by side in the ranks, mingling together at the mess, and accupying the same quarters in the barracks are princes of the blood, savants, artists, and the humblest of provincial peasants, laborers, hodcarriers, and apprentices. Socialist deputies of Parliament who earn their daily bread by the sweat of the brow, and who hate militarism and war, touch elbows with the rich aristocratic defenders of the Hohenzollern autocracy who regard with contempt the democratic principles for which the representatives of the unwashed multitude stand. Here all are equal; here is the nation democratically organized.

But when this is said, the brief for the army as a democratic institution is exhausted. It does not follow that because the army is recruited on a democratic basis it is a democratic institution. The fact is, in its organization, government, and spirit it is essentially aristocratic, if not autocratic. Its officers belong to a different social class from that of the rank and file whom they command. The control and direction of the army are centered in one of the most autocratic of bodies, the great General Staff, composed of a small group of professional military officers of high rank. The dominating rôle of the General Staff in the national life at times surpasses even that of the Kaiser. The Parliament is largely under the spell of its influence. It has only to ask for millions and the amount is promptly granted, sometimes without question or without inquiry as to how it shall be used. Recently we have seen even the Social Democrats joining in this parliamentary abdication and voting for the demands of the General Staff or cowardly dodging the issue by abstaining from voting at all, thus sacrificing the principles which they defend with so much courage in time of peace. In democratic America, one of the most fundamental principles of the Constitution is the subordination of the military to the civil authority. In Germany, and to a less extent in other continental states, ministers are not responsible to the representatives of the nation, and hence the conduct of the military is beyond the control of Parliament. Recently when the German Reichstag, by an almost unanimous vote, passed a resolution of censure against the government for certain high-handed acts committed by the military authorities against civilians in connection with the Zabern affair, the Imperial Chancellor, the Minister of War, and all their colleagues simply ignored the vote of condemnation and continued to pursue the even tenor,

of their way as if the resolution had been a vote of confidence and approval. The German Parliament may protest and criticize, but it has no power to dismiss a war minister for outrages committed upon the civil population by the army. The fact is, no army can be a democratic institution, for it is the essence of a democratic organization that those who control it shall be responsible to those who compose its membership. The whole notion of military discipline implies the sacrifice of the individual; it exacts blind and unthinking obedience to orders and does not tolerate criticism. Once he is enrolled in the army, the individual ceases to be free; his only right and duty is to obey orders; he becomes the servant of his commanders and the bondsman of the state. Treitschke, the arch-priest of militarism, tells us that the army must yield absolute obedience to the head of the state; it must have no will of its own, and the young men who go into the army must yield absolute obedience to the head of the state.[1]

Moreover, militarism means the existence in the state of a large class who live apart from the rest of the population, who tend to lose the point of view and the feeling of the citizen, and who in some countries constitute virtually a caste. M. Ferrero in his book on *Militarism* thus describes the position of the military class in Germany:

> Soldiers occupy the most important positions in the official world. The military class is a class apart. Officers lead a separate existence; they have their own habits, laws, jurisdiction, and almost a *weltanschaung* of their own; they take more part in civil government than in other countries. Thus, while in France you can find a bourgeois minister of war, in Germany, on the contrary, civil ministries are to be found directed by generals, notwithstanding the fact that officers on active service have not the right of suffrage. Bismarck was originally a Doctor of Law, who had only fulfilled the ordinary period of military service, and yet, when it was wished to consecrate his high position in the state, he had to be made a general; and in a general's uniform he was wont to make his appearance in the Reichstag. The second chancellor was also a general. All the citizens belonging to the *landwehr*, or reserve list, have to appear in uniform at official ceremonies. At the inauguration of the new Reichstag palace the president actually appeared in the uniform of a *landwehr* major. The German Emperor always appears surrounded by swarms of generals at official ceremonies, and sometimes he has even criticized the conduct of the Reichstag at a military assembly.[2]

In the atmosphere of a community where the streets swarm with soldiers, where no social function is complete without the presence of shoulder straps and spiked helmets, where civilians have no rights which the military are bound to respect, democracy cannot thrive, and the civil authority cannot command the respect which it does in countries which know not militarism. European liberals have frequently remarked upon this fact. It is not without significance also that the great militarists like von Clausewitz, Treitschke, Moltke, and Bernhardi have professed more or less contempt for democratic government for the very reason that militarism, at least of the Prussian type, can hardly

[1] *Die Politik*, II, 366. [2] P. 278.

coexist with a truly democratic state; while those who believe in universal suffrage, responsible ministers, separation of church and state, social reform, and other measures in harmony with the democratic tendencies of the time, have been the only combatants of militarism. It will of course be said, in reply to this view, that Switzerland in fact furnishes an example of a democratic state in which compulsory military service prevails. This is true, but it will scarcely be pretended that Swiss militarism has anything in common with that of Germany. The Swiss system is far more democratic. The commander-in-chief of the army is in fact chosen by the legislature, and the legislature exercises a control over the military authority which the German legislature does not. The Swiss army as a body is far less removed from the people. Swiss soldiers do not play the social and political rôle in the life of the nation that German soldiers do, and the military authority is strictly subordinate to the civil authority. The Swiss system of militarism, if it may be called a system of militarism at all, is not, therefore, incompatible with true political democracy.

Let us now turn to the effect of war on government and politics. With the outbreak of war, the civil authority retires into the background and the military power emerges from its shades and occupies the leading place; the legislative power abdicates or assumes a subordinate rôle; liberty of speech and of press, freedom of trade and of commerce, disappear or are permitted subject only to grievous restrictions. As is well known, the parliaments of practically every billigerent nation virtually abdicated their powers with the outbreak of the present European war. Representative democracy all but disappeared. Not a parliament was consulted until after the war had broken out. The English Parliament voted $3,000,000,000 for the use of the government without specifying except in the most general terms the uses to which this huge sum was to be devoted, and the German Parliament did likewise. The civil populations of practically all the warring nations are now under martial law, and their rights and liberties are largely at the mercy of the military authorities. They are living under a government of men rather than of laws. In England the Parliament made haste to give the crown the most extraordinary powers in respect to aliens, the press, speech, trade, travel, etc., ever known. A distinguished English book on international law says, "Practically every newspaper proprietor or editor acts at his peril in publishing anything whatsoever."[1] Publication of all unfriendly criticism of the military administration or speculation about the military operations is not tolerated. The powers of courts-martial have been so extended that civilians may be sentenced to penal servitude for life or to death without trial by jury for the first time in 250 years —this notwithstanding the fact that, although England is at war, war does not exist in fact in the British Isles, that the courts are open, that the King's writ runs throughout the realm, and juries are being impanelled every day.[2]

[1] Baty and Morgan, *War, Its Conduct and Legal Results*, p. 107.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

Summarizing the situation, Baty and Morgan say:

Certainly never in our history has the Executive assumed such arbitrary power over the life, liberty, and property of British subjects. The net of restriction is now so finely woven, so ingeniously designed, that it enmeshes every activity of the citizen. The military authorities can, by an ukase enlarging the definition of "specified areas," deport the whole population of any town or village from one part of the country to another. They could totally close all the public houses throughout the United Kingdom for every hour of the day for the whole period of the war. They can, on mere suspicion and without proof of any offense having been committed, treat any private citizen as a ticket-of-leave man, and require him to reside where they please and to report himself whenever they think fit. They can, on mere suspicion, arrest anyone without warrant, and can equally without warrant enter any house by day or by night. They can punish with penal servitude for life any journalist who speculates as to the plan of campaign of the British or French forces, and with six months' imprisonment if he criticizes the dietary or accommodation of the new recruits. They can stop any citizen in the streets, and compel himself to answer questions even though they incriminate himself. They can compel the whole population of England to keep indoors by day as well as by night. They can stop up any road or arrest any vehicle. The private citizen is placed under the absolute orders of any major holding his Majesty's commission.[1]

In other countries at war the situation is essentially the same or even worse. It is an amazing spectacle, says Professor Hart, to see the interior of lands which have yet hardly seen an enemy—England, Scotland, Ireland, Brandenburg, Bavaria, and Southern France—practically governed by martial law.[2]

The fact is, war is the negation of freedom; it is destructive of many of the highest and best ideals for which democracy stands. Nevertheless, General Bernhardi tells us that war is a biological necessity and that it is the greatest factor in the furtherance of civilization and power.[3] Treitschke likewise tells us that it is an institution ordained by God, and that without it all progress would be at an end.[4] The living God, Treitschke, assures us, will take care that war shall always recur as a drastic medicine for the human race.[5] To this teaching ninety-three German savants have recently added their view that war is inseparable from German *Kultur*, and that without it "our culture would have long since been wiped from the earth." Such opinions have always been held by those who believe in the divine right of kings, who are opposed to government by the people, and who see in militarism and war the most effective agencies for the maintenance of monarchial ideals. But they are not the opinions of the 3,000,000 German voters who believe in universal suffrage, responsible ministers, freedom of the press, and other democratic

[1] Baty and Morgan, *War, Its Conduct and Legal Results*, p. 112.

[2] *Problems of Readjustment after the War*, p. 11.

[3] *Germany and the Next War*, ed. by Powles, pp. 11, 18.

[4] *Die Politik*, II, 546.

[5] *Ibid.*, I, 76.

measures, because they well know that the atmosphere of militarism and war is not favorable to the realization of such reforms.

Regarding the political effects of the present war upon the countries which are involved in it, we can only speculate. The extensive socialistic undertakings which all the warring nations have been forced into have no doubt been a great victory for the principle of socialism. Professor Hart remarks that the results have given the Socialists ammunition for half a century to come, since they have proved their contention that the community can work more efficiently through collective effort than through individual effort.[1] There is therefore a possibility that the socialistic régime thus established may be continued and even extended to include the operation of other industries. But as to this we cannot speak with certainty because with the return of normal conditions the old spirit of individualism may reassert itself. In any case, if the régime of state socialism is retained, it by no means follows that it will give the same results under conditions which are less favorable than those under which it is now operating.

Regarding the changes likely to be wrought by the war on the forms of government, we can predict with still less certainty. We are probably safe in saying, however, that the triumph of the German armies will have the effect of strengthening still more the power of the military autocracy and will render militarism more popular than it was before the war. There is no likelihood that in any state the monarchy will be displaced by a republican form of government. In none of the monarchial countries engaged in the present war is the opposition to monarchy very strong or widely diffused. In all of them the masses have little conception of a government without a crown. It is somewhat significant that not even the Social Democrats have formally demanded the abolition of the monarchy. For the most part, they have been content to insist upon a wider and more equal suffrage, ministers responsible to the representives of the people, the betterment of the condition of the working classes, and other measures in the interest of the social improvement and political enfranchisement of the masses.[2] It is not improbable that the patriotism which the Social Democrats have shown in the present crisis has put the Conservatives under such a heavy obligation to them that the latter may, upon the return of peace, be willing to concede some of the socialistic demands in respect to universal suffrage, responsible ministers, etc. Herein lies the only encouraging sign that democracy may possibly gain something by the war.

ARTHUR MACDONALD, ANTHROPOLOGIST, WASHINGTON, D.C.

There are two kinds of war, one between soldiers and the other between citizens and soldiers. This last is abnormal warfare, leading to atrocities, which are frequently increased in horror by drunkenness and blood frenzy.

[1] *Problems of Readjustment After the War*, pp. 19–20.

[2] Cf. Fisher, *The Republican Tradition in Europe*, pp. 226–27.

1. There are two kinds of atrocities in war, physical and sociological; the physical are often exaggerated, being committed when victims are dead or unconscious; the sociological, depriving thousands of their homes, are much more serious, causing long and continuous suffering through exposure, exhaustion, and starvation, frequently resulting in death.

2. Atrocities and outrages are usually in the enemy's country, and all nations commit them, as illustrated in Sherman's march through Georgia, the horrors of Libby Prison, water cure in the Philippines, devastation in South Africa by English soldiers in the Boer War, killing of citizens by German soldiers in Belgium, and the expulsion of Russian peasants from their homes by order of the Russian army itself.

3. Statements as to atrocities are *ex parte*, mainly by what they omit. Thus an English report on atrocities in Belgium gives 296 pages of depositions by 500 Belgians, but little or nothing as to whether these Belgian citizens shot at German soldiers. On the other hand, a German report gives 320 pages of depositions concerning shooting of German soldiers by Belgian citizens. These two reports counterbalance, explain, and confirm each other.

4. Atrocities are, unfortunately, published to create sympathy for one nation and hatred of the other, which latter usually excuses them on the ground of military necessity, which covers a multitude of sins in war.

5. However terrible and detestable atrocities are, let us condemn not them, so much as war, which causes them.

6. National dignity and honor are elastic terms. Thus, if countries are very friendly, discourteous acts will not lead to war, but if unfriendly, the least thing may wound national dignity and honor, as seating at table one ambassador in advance of another. National humiliation is nevertheless an evil, but a much less evil than war.

CAN WAR BE DONE AWAY WITH?

BROOKS ADAMS
Quincy, Massachusetts

Man is now and ever has been, I apprehend, his own worst enemy. Unable to reconcile himself to the calamities of his lot, he is forever dreaming that he may escape self-denial and hardship by omitting those duties which entail a sacrifice. In the pursuit of this illusion he has run great risks, and, like a fretful horse, has countless times plunged over terrific precipices to avoid a falling leaf. Especially is this tendency highly developed in our hysterical and feminized population, which has been so long petted by nature that it resembles a peevish and spoiled child impatient of restraint.

Under such conditions no man could anticipate a sympathetic hearing in dealing with war, according to the evidence, as it touches us, and yet at the risk of exciting anger or ridicule, I see not how a man standing here as I stand today can avoid speaking the truth as he sees it, whether in so speaking he offend or not.

Before entering upon the evidence with which I shall presently have to deal, however, I must ask your indulgence for a few moments, while I, as briefly as I may, draw your attention to a philosophical problem which, I conceive, underlies not only war, but all civilization on earth, and even life itself. I refer to man's eternal struggle with a restless nature to maintain order and some approximation to social unity amidst universal and endless change.

For incomputable eons of time men have been aspiring, hoping, toiling, and dying to realize on earth certain intellectual abstractions, or, as we call them, ideals, which they have confidently believed would make life almost perfect, could they be enforced among us. Among such ideals have always been truth, justice, and mercy, and now in our age our democratic society has added two more, which it holds dearest of all—*Individual Liberty and Peace.* Obviously enough these two last ideals conflict with one another; but, for our purposes, that objection may be allowed to pass.

Now the proposition which I wish today to pose categorically is that no society ever has succeeded, or ever can succeed, in realizing any ideal or abstraction whatever, because, as Paul pointed out in the Epistle to the Romans, the interposition of the flesh makes impossible the fulfilment of the law. And yet today our democratic society gravely proposes to cause infinite nature to permit man to live in peace, by imposing upon it the command of an immaterial, impalpable substance which man is pleased to call his mind, and that without demanding of his mind that it shall clothe its behests in the tangible form of a supreme energy, or in other words, of a competent army. The object of democracy, of course, is to relieve itself of military duty, in order that it may have more time and money for self-gratification, exactly as under the Pax Romana democracy refused military service, but demanded food and the games of the circus. I take it that human recklessness and self-complacency can hardly go farther than this readiness to risk the common safety for selfish ends, and possibly, before we commit ourselves in our own minds to the search for this illusion, it might be well for us to meditate upon the risk we run. For war is like disease. It may be mitigated by forethought, patience, self-devotion, and courage, but it is always there ready to burst upon the reckless unaware. Let us consider for a moment how we stand in the face of nature, and what our powers really may be of changing the sequences of the infinite causes, of which we are the playthings, one hair's breadth.

If we insignificant atoms look abroad upon the immensity about us, we may perceive a measureless space whose void is at intervals partly filled by a scattered torrent of matter streaming furiously, and, so far as our unaided reason permits us to judge, aimlessly, from out of an inconceivable past toward an equally inconceivable future. What matter is, whither it is going, and what object its headlong flight may serve, we know not, nor could we, perhaps, comprehend, were we told; but this much possibly we may be permitted to infer from the evidence of our senses. The substance we describe as "matter" would seem to be manifestations of perpetual movement, never being at rest, never in perfect equilibrium, but assuming countless forms which have the aspect of competing

selfishly with each other, to find a vent for a surplus energy which rebels against restraint. If the needed vent be found and remain long enough open, the fragment of matter so favored seems to us to discharge its surplus energy into space where the energy is absorbed, reaching perhaps an equilibrium. Then the fragment so relieved suggests to us the idea of relative repose, as does a star which has exhausted its heat and grown cold, or as do our bodies in the chill of death. The point, however, in this which immediately concerns us is that our bodies are doubtless a form of matter, and thus are subject to all the stimulants and to all the limitations of that chaotic mass which we may not unreasonably conclude to be the substance of which material nature consists. For, on the evidence palpable to our senses, though perhaps not to the eye of faith, we should seem to be justified in inferring that order, as order is understood by our intelligence, does not reign in the material universe, but rather chaos; and this supposition is supported by the fact that no man has as yet been able to conceive, far less to formulate, any theory by which the apparent diversity about us may be resolved into a harmonious progression from a first cause to a final effect, or from a beginning to an end.

In our ignorance, therefore, and in our helplessness, I shall assume as a working hypothesis that our bodies, like all other matter, are condemned to eternal movement in their effort to adapt themselves to the exigencies of a restless environment, whose demands can be denied only at the cost of extinction. For should our bodies fail to make this adaptation to their environment punctually, the tragedy of untold ages is before us, exhibiting to us the hecatombs of laggards whom nature remorselessly and continuously sacrifices to other bodies equally competing for existence but who are more supple or more agile.

Yet, in spite of this obvious impossibility of any civilization reaching a status at which it may enjoy an equilibrium consistent with the cessation of that human movement which causes competition and therefore friction and strife, it is the sternest fact of nature that man must in some way contrive to reach a social relation with his kind in which the mass can co-operate, more or less effectually, against the individual. For, in the first place, standing

alone, man is helpless in the face of animate and inanimate enemies, and in the second place, unless the individual can be mastered and denied liberty of combat, even an approximation to order, justice, mercy, peace, or any of the ideals is impossible. As we approach civilization thus we perceive that probably man's first, as certainly his greatest, social triumph was the organization of the permanent family. The family is the cornerstone of all of civilization which has much significance for us. And yet, although even a progressive society may still recognize our debt to the family, there has been no curb against which men and women have always chafed, and still do chafe, so furiously as against the permanent family bond. For, in the ideal family, the man and woman are bound together inexorably and for life. In practice this permanent bond has been impossible to enforce. It has burst asunder. And we futile men, who cannot save our own families from dismemberment, expect that we shall bind nations, propelled by infinite forces, to observe relations founded only on interest which no one is to enforce by combat, and which the stronger may rend at his pleasure or at his necessity.

Hitherto we have been dealing with matter, but matter is not the only substance with which men have to cope. They have also to deal with mind, and more especially with those mental hallucinations which are the fruit of our desires.

What mind may be we know not. Whether it be a substance foreign to the body, though encased in it and outliving it, or whether it be as material as the body itself and sharing its fate, are, and must remain, mysteries to us. But this much we do know: Apparently in all lands and in every age man has assumed by instinct that mind and matter are not one, and that an antagonism exists between them which hinders the mind from attaining to that perfection to which it has aspired.

The difficulty has always been, and still is, that the mental ideal of perfection presupposes a code of moral standards which are, in sum, restraints upon the flesh, and against which the flesh rebels, as does peculiarly our democratic society, yearning for the indulgence of personal liberty. In effect this carnal revolt has generated disorder; and as on the one hand intellectual disorder

is equivalent to insanity, on the other hand, as manifested in the flesh, disorder is war.

In this conflict between mind and matter, on the whole, matter has decisively prevailed. From the remotest antiquity the mind has formulated abstract ideas, such as the notions of unity, obedience, justice—Paul called them "The Law"—and has wrought to realize these abstractions in many, many civilizations, but only with the most slender success. For example, the abstraction which our race has formulated to express a beatitude is the absolute despotism of the Kingdom of Heaven, ruled by a perfect but incomprehensible intelligence. But, in order to make the realization of such an abstraction even conceivable, the mind has first been constrained to imagine itself liberated from the body. For with the incumbrance of the body the ideal of Heaven would be absurd if not repulsive. Perfect order, perfect obedience, and perfect peace are incompatible with the flesh. Friction is inevitable. At a certain intensity it invariably kindles into flame.

I need not insist further. In the greatest chapter of his greatest epistle Paul has expounded to us the despair of the idealist at his impotence when in conflict with reality: "Oh, wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Such of you, if any such there be, of the less progressive school of thought, who still read Paul, may perhaps permit me to concur with him in this philosophic surrender; though our modern society holds such surrender to be unworthy of the dignity of the emancipated man and woman.

We now come to our point. If these premises be sound, universal permanent peace is an abstraction impossible to realize even with the organization of a universal armament capable of suppressing all local physical opposition within the world, because universal permanent peace presupposes that man, when driven to extremity by privation, shall not try to relieve himself by force, but shall resign himself to die by inanition. For his environment being in ceaseless movement man must adapt himself at his peril to the changes of condition which are thus imposed upon him, and compete as best he can. Those with warlike instincts will prefer to fight, those who can survive on scanty nutriment may elect to

try starvation; but, ultimately, a point must be reached when the least tenacious of the two surviving races must resist by arms or resign themselves to extinction.

Men, therefore, from the outset have recognized that compromise with nature, in their struggle for an ideal of order and unity, is a necessity. And they have rather usually instinctively confined themselves in attempts to cohere *en masse* to organisms in which races of different degrees of tenacity of life should not be constrained to compete with each other on a peaceful and equal basis. This was attempted under the Pax Romana, and the race which was responsible for the Pax Romana vanished from the earth. Such conditions, nevertheless, as those of mediaeval Rome led also to war through disintegration. Rome fell amidst chaos. On the other hand, it is equally true that civilization has hinged upon the ability of men to pass from social chaos, or unrestrained physical force, to such a degree of social unity that the energy of the mass may be used to coerce the individual. Hence the organism we call the family in small, and government in large, is only an expression of physical force whose end is to obtain order and obedience for the community at the expense of individual liberty. When we come to the physical form of societies we find that geographical and topographical conditions have molded the rise of nations, and often wrought their ruin, but however raised or depressed, empires never rise or fall without generating the intense friction which kindles war.

Viewing continents from this standpoint, their divers regions may well assume to our imagination the aspect of skeletons which, when clothed with flesh in the form of human population, shall be kingdoms. Their mountain chains, their plains, lakes, rivers, and seas, shall cohere together in political unities as the paths of least resistance which traverse each particular domain shall converge at a common heart; the bond which binds the whole together will loosen should the paths for any reason shift. The organism will die should the circulation which nourishes it be cut off. Man can do little or nothing to control or hinder all this. Consider, for an instant, how man is placed amidst the infinite. Without food or weapons adequate for his defense, he must perish, and almost the

first instinct of primitive man is to supply himself with what he lacks, either by conquest or by trade. Thus driven forward by necessity he does not choose his direction; he moves along the easiest path toward the sources of supply, and as he approaches them his alternative is forced upon him. He must buy or fight; but in the one alternative, as in the other, his case is desperate without an armed force to protect him. For if he would trade he must have near him a police to shield him from robbers, and if he would fight he must have behind him men with whom he can conquer. The points at which men must fight and trade are not found fortuitously; they are fixed. They are either crossroads or ports, or fords where caravans must break bulk, or the like, or else they are positions dominating these. They are called markets or capital cities by civilians, and strategical points by soldiers, but wherever they are, or whatever they are called, men have no volition about them; they occupy them at their peril. And though a strategical point may exist without a city near by, the city never has as yet permanently flourished, and probably never can, without an adequately defended frontier either distant or near at hand. Hence all civilized administration by a logical sequence of cause and effect relates back inexorably to the army. Before the army is organized free private combat prevails, which is the worst form of savagery—a condition equivalent to that of wild animals. After the army has rotted, chaos or savagery again supervenes. Speaking in cold blood, dispassionately, and in the light of the historical evidence, the army has been the creator and the bulwark of civilization and the friend of man. The calamities of the race have arisen, not from disciplined armies, but from those resistless and incessant movements of the human environment which cause empires, armies, and civilizations to dissolve and to cohere about some other heart than that which was their own. History literally bristles with examples of such progressions, their inevitableness, and their horror. Indeed, it may be said to consist of little else of vital moment to our race.

About the year 500 B.C., when Darius reigned in Persia, in spite of the already pronounced tendency of Central Asia to stretch out toward the metals of the Mediterranean countries in which she

was deficient, and for which she was in imperative need, Babylon stood at the center of international exchanges and was the capital of the world. And, probably, had the art of navigation remained stationary, Babylon might long have retained a certain quasi-supremacy; but nevertheless Babylon's economic system was already pretty early seriously threatened to the west, as Darius, who was a man of great intelligence, seems to have been perfectly aware.

Babylon became the seat of empire in Central Asia because it lay at the head of the ancient navigation of the Euphrates, and also at the junction of the chief roads leading both east and west. The great northern road leading east forked at Bactra, one branch leading to China by Kashgar, the other to India by the valley of the Indus. The southern route east passed along the coast by Susa and Persepolis. The ships were undecked and feeble, but they closely skirted the coast and managed to ascend the Persian Gulf, though the voyage was toilsome and dangerous. The natural and desirable outlet to the west for the Babylonians was to follow the valley of the Euphrates about four hundred miles north, perhaps to Anatho, and thence by caravan by Tadmore to Tyre. This commerce made Tyre a mighty seaport and the Tyrian exchanges stretched in one continuous system by way of Carthage to Spain and probably for copper even to Cornwall. But there was competition for Babylon by the astutest race of antiquity. After the Greeks opened the Dardanelles by the capture of Troy, it became more direct to travel straight from Bactra to the Caspian, and by the Volga and the Don through Russia to the Sea of Azov, or else to take the usual modern route across the Caspian and by Baku and Poti, or by some such line, to the Black Sea. In either event this shortening of the trade route cut Babylon off, and the Greeks who had penetrated the whole Black Sea region after the fall of Troy, and who were eminently bold and intelligent seamen as well as merchants, pushed their advantage to the utmost. The result was that all Greece, but particularly Athens and Corinth, rose to fortune contemporaneously with Darius, and this rise and the wealth incident to it were probably the inciting causes of the first Persian attack on Russia, and of the attempt to seize pos-

session of the Caspian route, whose outlet was by way of the Crimea. Disappointed in this campaign, Darius appears to have decided that he must, to compass his end, conquer Greece itself, so that he could control her movement. He tried in 490 B.C., but failed at Marathon, having made insufficient preparations. Ten years later his son, Xerxes, a much less able man, made the campaign of Salamis, and in that action the Persian defeat was decisive. So ended Persian splendor. Babylon began sinking forthwith, being deprived of half of its nutriment. It withered so fast that the adventurer Xenophon, in 401 B.C., only about eighty years after Salamis, marched with only ten thousand of his countrymen whither he would throughout the land and found no one to oppose him. By regular progression the inevitable end came rather quickly. In 332 B.C., a couple of generations later, Alexander the Greek took Tyre, after a momentous siege, and sacked it, and his purpose would seem to have been obvious; for Alexander was a great statesman and soldier with an eye for an economic and strategical problem. Probably he intended to drive the water-borne trade from the Euphrates and force it up the Red Sea to Egypt. Could he do this he would throw Babylon altogether out of the line of competition, and make Alexandria, his capital in Egypt, the commercial and political capital of the world.

Doubtless the event justified the soundness of Alexander's judgment. He perceived that the equilibrium of forces in the world had decisively changed, and he seized upon his opportunity. Babylon had fallen into eccentricity. Greek energy and Greek intelligence had cut it off both to the north by occupying the Black Sea, and to the south by making the Red Sea practicable for navigation. In a generation or two Alexandria had become a rich and splendid city and Babylon had crumbled into ruin, but on one head Alexander did not make a due allowance. He did not calculate, from a military standpoint, the effect upon the rise of empires of his own death. And the effect of that event may, possibly, have been considerable, even on the fortunes of Rome.

As the fourth century before Christ draws to a close, we may examine at leisure the spectacle of a great society in the agonies of dissolution by war, and may admire the demonstration of human

impotence in the face of nature. The focus of human activity moving westward with measured pace, amidst the fierce though involuntary crash of falling empires, hung poised during nearly one hundred and fifty years, while battle should determine which of two contending races, expressing themselves through two antagonistic civilizations, should prevail. Daily the great trade route was resistlessly elongating itself toward the Atlantic, and, as the tension grew, men fought more furiously and continuously until one race or the other should die. At the point we have reached we should surely be able to perceive what men of genius like Alcibiades had perceived, long before the catastrophe, that with the disturbance of the Persian equilibrium the world must recentralize to the westward or fall into chaos, and that should it recentralize it would depend on the relative energy of competing races whether the seat of empire should fall to the north or to the south of the Mediterranean. At the beginning of the third century the Romans and the Carthaginians faced each other, incarnating two hostile expressions of energy.

The Carthaginians were, by instinct, economic—moneyed men, merchants and manufacturers, having no genius for war, and willingly hiring other men to fight for them, when possible. Their weapon was money. The Romans were the exact converse. They embodied the principle of universal, personal, military service. They were the greatest soldiers, administrators, and lawyers of antiquity, perhaps the greatest the world has ever known. They crushed the Carthaginians. We can surely see that, brought together thus by resistless forces, Romans and Carthaginians had but the one alternative to conquer or to perish. Indeed, nature in competition knows no other solution than the death of the weaker. Man has no other destiny than to conquer or to die. To recoil from this, the supreme teaching of human experience, is for a nation to write its own doom, as the Carthaginians wrote theirs. There is no escape possible for us men. There can be no mercy for the weaker, for man, the finite, is dealing with the infinite, and the infinite is in movement. The ideal of peace can never be realized. It is for man to defend himself as best he may and to save himself as he can.

When facing a capital emergency like this the Romans were very great. They accepted their limitations as men. They resigned themselves to do men's work and bear men's lot without impatience and without complaint. Cato the Censor was a typical Roman peasant. His ideal was that great soldier Dentatus, who farmed five acres when, having been thrice consul, he was recognized as the first citizen of Rome, and whom the Samnite ambassadors found cooking turnips in his chimney corner, though none could withstand him in the field. Cato was a hard-fisted, practical farmer, and at the same time a clear-sighted economist and soldier, and Cato understood perfectly well that though it might answer for him and Dentatus to live off their farms if they could sell their crops at reasonable prices, they and their like would starve to death if forced to compete unprotected with African labor. His breed of peasant freemen were always ready to fight but they could not live on the diet of slaves. Cato grasped absolutely the threat of a successful Carthage. No anecdote of antiquity is more suggestive than that of Cato's figs. One day in the senate Cato produced a bunch of figs of peculiar beauty and perfection. "Those early figs were picked," said he, "three days ago in Carthage. If Carthage is so near, and can produce food like this, there is for us no choice. *Delenda est Carthago*, Carthage must be destroyed." And Cato was right, and so obviously right that he carried the Roman people unanimously with him. They felt that they could not survive under free African competition. Therefore they fought the Punic Wars.

And history also has proved Cato to have been right. With their limitations the Romans could not have survived economic competition with Carthage. The Romans followed their appointed path. They conquered and they plundered humanity. Not by industry nor by commerce did the Romans make Rome the moneyed as well as the political capital of the world, but by blood and by amassing on the Tiber plunder from every subject land. Also they built up a superb administrative and legal mechanism—probably, relatively speaking, the best the world has ever known. And the cornerstone of this juridical system was the equality of Roman citizens before the law. In essence, this juridical theory amounted

to free competition between races of low and high vitality thus brought to the test of survival by abstinence under the Pax Romana. As a result the Roman peasant disappeared, and we find the bankrupt rabble of the Forum clamoring for the dole of slave-grown grain and for the hecatombs of the circus. It was for this peace, this realization of the ideal, that Dentatus and Scipio, Cato and Caesar, had fought, that they might save their race from degradation. I question whether we should not think the Pax Romana dear if offered us at such a price, especially as the Pax Romana was but a respite. For as the Roman people died out before the Africans and Asiatics, the northern barbarians flowed across the frontiers that none were left to guard, and all the glories of Babylon, Memphis, Alexandria, Athens, Corinth, and Rome sank in five centuries of chaos which I care not to recall.

As the Western Empire slowly sank from inanition until its remains were burned to ashes by war, the seat of international exchanges, which had a thousand years before been drawn from Babylon toward the Mediterranean by the attraction of the European metals, and which had been anchored for a time in Rome by Roman supremacy in war, began, for precisely converse reasons, to recede toward Asia, since the metals were exhausted which had first stimulated movement westward, and the Romans who conquered were dead. Therefore the market failed; the economic system contracted; and as it contracted, a new equilibrium had to be sought by human society. Accordingly war blazed continuously, as men struggled to adapt themselves to the demands which their restless environment imposed upon them.

The contraction ended in the ninth century. Science had receded. Navigation no longer, when Bagdad had become the seat of empire, permitted commerce to ascend the Red Sea. Bagdad was near the site of Babylon, and though about the year 800 Haroun-al-Rashid, the Caliph of Bagdad, was perhaps the greatest potentate of the world, Bagdad could clearly remain a dominant capital only as long as no metallic or industrial attraction developed in Europe to draw exchanges, and as long as seamen dared not ascend the Red Sea. Both phenomena soon followed. During Haroun's reign the mariner's compass crept slowly into use. In the first half of

the tenth century the silver mines of the Harz were opened under Henry the Fowler. This sufficed to unsettle the world once more. The trade routes lengthened anew, and amidst ferocious wars and crumbling empires the focus of civilization and the seat of energy began its weary journey westward, seeking a new equilibrium. The glory of Bagdad endured only from Haroun-al-Rashid in 786 to Al-Rhadi in 940. Then chaos supervened in Mesopotamia. By 1000 Venice was mistress of the Adriatic, the great trade route elongated itself over the Alps, and, extending down the Rhine and up the Rhone, built up the German Empire about the Harz, while the Fairs of Champagne, the focus of the woolen industry, became the heart of France. But a new motor now had come into being. The Crusades were at hand.

I take it that man's greatest enemy is always his own vanity and self-esteem. He cannot bring himself, like Paul, to admit his own intellectual impotence in the face of the infinite, and endure with resignation his destiny. He is always aspiring to dominate nature and is always suffering defeat. He is probably today harboring dreams at once more confident and yet more fantastic than ever before, certainly far more so than were the dreams of our eleventh-century ancestors who marched in the Crusades.

For our ancestors of the eleventh century, if they flattered themselves that they had grasped the key to infinite energy, at least founded their hope on centuries of patient and arduous experiment, demanding an unselfishness and a purity of purpose which I fear would transcend our powers, and which, on the whole, from their standpoint, pretty conclusively upheld their thesis. At all events, at the present day neither the savant, nor the emotionalist, nor the economist, nor the statesman, nor the soldier has evidence one-tenth part as convincing to lead to the conclusion that universal peace lies before the world. For, in truth, the contrary is the fact. So far as the evidence attainable bears in any direction it points to a chaotic and not to an orderly future.

In the eleventh century there were but two forces in the world —the martial and the moral, the soldier and the monk. The soldier might be considered to have been incarnated in such a man

as William the Conqueror or one of the Otho's, and the monk in, perhaps, St. Hugh or St. Anselm. Of the soldier little need be said. He was simple. But the monk was complex. The monk represented a conviction which had long been gathering consistency that by leading the perfect life, by obedience, chastity, poverty, and self-sacrifice, a man might so expand the divine spark, which they called his soul, within him that he might become semi-divine himself, and might prove his semi-divinity by working miracles. Then he grew to be worthy of worship. The Church canonized him after death, and his body, his tomb, and all things that had been impregnated with his virtue during life, continued to suspend the laws of nature on proper occasion after death, indefinitely. And this supernatural phenomenon was held in that age to have been proved by universal and daily experiment, as conclusively as, for example, an electric tension is held to be proved now.

An enormous investment was made by those generations in the development of this energy, just as we make similar investments in dynamical science. And an enormous value was placed upon it, for it was clear that, as between it and the soldier, whoever should prevail on the supreme test must absolutely dominate the world. I should hardly suppose that even the most ardent pacificist would contend that this issue could have been set at rest by an appeal to reason without an appeal to the ordeal of battle. Certainly in those days no one reached that point of simplicity. Both sides prepared for the combat, and the issue was joined on control of the patrimony of the church.

In 1076 a Cluniac monk, named Hildebrand, sat on the papal throne, and the Emperor Henry IV, a great soldier, wore the imperial crown. At the Diet of Worms the Emperor Henry IV deposed the Pope, because the Pope would not yield to him the high patronage. In retaliation the Pope excommunicated the Emperor and released his subjects from obedience. Then the Emperor tried to seize the Pope with an army, but the army dissolved through fear of the supernatural, and the Emperor was reduced to doing penance barefoot in the snow at Canossa. Nor was this his worst humiliation. The penance over, the Pope offered

the Emperor the opportunity of clearing himself by ordeal from the accusation of crime, but the Emperor shrank from the test. After this wars long raged, but the Cluniac monks never relaxed their hold upon Henry's throat until he died, forsaken by all. *Prima facie* no better evidence of the superior energy of supernatural to carnal force could have been given, and our ancestors, as scientists and statesmen, were fully justified in accepting it as they did. We act on inferences touching cause and effect in our daily affairs far less conclusively tested than the potency of relics in war appeared to have been tested then. For if a solitary Cluniac monk at Canossa could with so inferior an amulet as the sacred wafer crush the greatest soldier of the age, there could be no limit to what the man might do who conquered in Palestine the cross and the sepulcher.

Constantine the Great won the battle of the Milvian Bridge, fighting under the sign of the cross, in 312 A.D. From thence to Canossa in 1076 lay a span of seven hundred and fifty years, during which, by a series of drastic and most public tests, the efficiency of the relic as an engine of war, and a worker of miracles in disease, seemed to have been demonstrated. On the strength of this colossal demonstration in the home, in the convent, and on the battlefield, our ancestors assumed that they had discovered the key to infinite energy and tested their theory by invading Asia. We know that they failed, but, if we have any appreciation of historical relations, we shall perceive that, under the same conditions, we should have done as they did, and could not rationally have done otherwise. And we should have fought as they fought, for the prize for which they fought, because the prize they fought for was the supremest of prizes, and would have brought them to perfection had there been no error in their analysis of cause and effect.

Also, although the failure of the Crusades did not affect the fact that afterward, as before, war acted, as it always must act, as the supreme test of human competition, yet the disaster of Hattin did modify profoundly the social moral standard, making money and not a moral ideal the object which men sought to attain. For example, when Godfrey de Bouillon made his campaign in 1099 against Jerusalem he made it as a test of moral excellence. In

order that he might conquer and use the cross he must be himself worthy of the cross, and when the Crusaders chose him king of Jerusalem, he exposed his whole private life to the public view to show that it was blameless.

St. Louis, on the other hand, in 1249, a couple of generations after Hattin, attacked Cairo in much the same spirit in which Great Britain occupied the city in 1882, as a strategical point, and the key to the great trade route.

From Hattin onward there has been less and less idealism in war. War has been put on a scientific and money-making basis. Consequently, wars can now be calculated upon with some confidence when the problem presented by the movement of converging forces has been worked out by highly skilled men.

The war now raging is a beautiful illustration of this progression going on through a long series of years and finally, apparently, estimated as a probability within a very narrow margin by the chief combatants—men, for example, like Lord Roberts, to say nothing of the German staff.

Nevertheless, for our purposes, it may be more convincing to go back farther and follow a little through some generations the automatic variations of trade routes as they have generated wars.

In the twelfth century, for lack of the mariner's compass and of rigging which would enable them to work to windward with safety, ships could not pass the Straits of Gibraltar. At the points on the southern coast of Europe where the roads northward were easiest, goods had therefore to be unloaded and packed on animals. Hence not only Venice and Genoa but towns on the German waterways, like Regensburg, Nuremburg, Frankfort, and Cologne, rose to high fortune. Also on the other side of the Rhine a like phenomenon occurred. Travel crossing the Alps from Genoa passed through Macon, where lay Cluny, and so by Dijon to the Fairs of Champagne, making a market between the East and the woolen manufactures of Northern France and Flanders. A partial equilibrium was thus secured. That equilibrium was fatally disturbed when science had solved so far the art of navigation that ships could sail the Atlantic Ocean, and thus eliminate the long and expensive land passage of the Alps. Transport by pack train was computed

to be ten times as costly as by water. The trade route, therefore, began to shift its path in 1317, when Venice organized a direct packet service to Flanders. Within a generation France had entered on disintegration and one of the most frightful wars of history had begun. It was then that Edward III, claiming the French crown, invaded France, and in 1346 he won the victory of Crecy. But by the date of Crecy the Fairs of Champagne had sunk into insignificance and France could not resist. Such was the origin of the Hundred Years' War, fought because mariners had learned how to navigate ships upon the stormy open ocean out of sight of land.

Nor could the variation of the trade route stop here. On the contrary, as science advanced social acceleration gained in momentum. In 1492 Columbus discovered America, and in 1497 Vasco da Gama reached India by sea. Forthwith the arteries of traffic shifted more violently than before. The path of movement abandoned Egypt and passed around Africa, where it could no longer be taxed by the Saracens. The Christians after centuries of war admitted that they could not conquer the key to the Red Sea at Suez, but at least by ingenuity they could turn the enemy's position. And behold the cost: The Levant became what it still is. Italy fell into eccentricity, Venice and Genoa began to wither, while Spain and England came into competition for the seat of international exchanges, which of necessity had to rest at some point on the western or northern European coast. Hence the Armada, and the wars of Spain against the United Provinces which culminated in the sack of Antwerp, the conquest of what is now Belgium, and the flight of exchanges to Holland, which, unlike Flanders, knew how to protect itself.

The retrospect is tremendous. For two hundred years Europe almost continuously dripped with blood because for two hundred years such scientific activity prevailed that the trade routes could not stay for a generation at rest.

The moment the sequence of cause and effect is seriously considered, that moment it appears evident why scientific activity should induce long, frequent, and inveterate wars, unless haply universal conquest may supervene to stay them. And, moreover,

modern scientific wars are absolutely divorced from moral standards, since in science moral standards are impossible. The problems now to be solved by combat are matters of exact calculation, not manifestations of emotion.

The more active the advance in science the more restless are the avenues of trade and the more likely the routes are to change in every direction; and hence the more likely they are to displace the social equilibrium. Cast a single glance at the chasm opening before the United States. Obeying an entirely resistless impulsion in the seventeenth century, European population poured into America from various countries, of which I shall refer to only two. The French, penetrating, perfectly automatically by the St. Lawrence, the heart of the continent, by what was self-evidently the path of least resistance, reached the Allegheny from Lake Erie and floated down the river to its junction with the Monongahela, where the valley of the Ohio lay open before them. There they fortified themselves at what is now Pittsburgh. Had the French been unopposed no argument is needed to demonstrate that North America must presently have been theirs. If the English race were to survive and dominate here, it had necessarily to develop a superior energy at the point of contact. Accordingly, Washington ascended the Potomac, crossed the mountains, and at Great Meadows in 1754 fired the first shot in the Seven Years' War, which was destined to rage from the Ganges to the Mississippi. Were the same conditions to be presented to mankind now, precisely the same friction would follow. It could not be, humanly speaking, otherwise. These are not questions of volition but of dynamics. They could not stop the flow of population and of movement then, no matter to what extremity it led. We cannot stop the same phenomena now. And yet movement in certain forms means war. Man is not and can never be a free agent. He is an instrument charged with energy by nature, or, as our ancestors would have said, by God. Man has not by a conscious volition caused the movement of the last seventy years which has changed Germany from a simple and semi-stagnant community into the very focus of human activity. That movement has been an effect of applied science, and has been as resistless as has been the coloni-

zation of the Mississippi Valley. Nor can we even yet foresee what this movement may portend. It may well be that nature contemplates shortening the trade route east and west so that instead of passing by Egypt through Gibraltar to London, as heretofore, it shall pass direct from Constantinople, Saloniki, Venice, or some such port, across the Alps and by way of those German cities whose growth has of late astonished us, to Antwerp, where it shall find vent as in the time of the Fuggers. Such a disturbance would account not only for this war but for deeper and more prolonged disturbances still. The English Empire would perforce dissolve and be redistributed. Central Europe would change its aspect. We should be deeply compromised. Occupying the main trade route between Europe and Asia, we should be most open to attack. No race has ever held the main trade route save at the price of blood, from Sargon's time till now.

If this appreciation of the economic and military situation be sound, Americans, instead of debating platitudes touching peace, might possibly with advantage turn their attention to considering what social and political changes a hard-fought war for the jugular of modern civilization might portend. It is clear that we are at once the richest, the most helpless, the least capable of unified thought, and at the same time the most careless, reckless, impatient, and limited of all the great Western nations of modern times, or perhaps of any nation at any time. And we are in the worse position for effort because we are perfectly self-complacent and incapable of comprehending, as a community, either a general military or economic proposition.

It would seem to be obvious, on the most casual inspection, to anyone who would give the subject ten minutes of serious thought, that the present war is only the prolongation and accentuation of that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century acceleration of movement which began by sending Washington to Great Meadows, Clive to Plassey, Wolf to Quebec, and Frederick the Great to Silesia and Posen. The peculiarity of this double acceleration was, however, that the eighteenth-century part was essentially maritime, caused by advances in the art of navigation, and exemplified for example by Captain Cook and the explorers of an earlier age still, while the

nineteenth-century portion was a land-travel acceleration, embodied in Stephenson, the locomotive, and modern Germany and America.

The first half of this vast series of changes opened with the conflict between England and France for the possession of this continent, which was in essence a war for the control of the trade route by water from India to the Mississippi, by way of the St. Lawrence. The military catastrophe began with Great Meadows, included the American and French revolutions, together with the War of 1812, and ended with Waterloo. Its most notable phenomenon, as far as we personally are concerned, was the rise of the United States to a possibility as a social unit. Philosophically, its most notable phenomenon was that it closed in 1815 precisely as the epoch of the accelerated movement by land opened. In 1814 Stephenson completed his first locomotive engine.

Then the second phase of the revolution began as soon as railroads could be built. We men could not have held back railroad building though we flatter ourselves on being free agents, and we might have known that war would probably result. The first symptom of an increment of tension was the American Civil War, when the United States became a partly unified fact. However interesting that phenomenon may be, I must ignore it now and pass onward to the end. For just at the moment of our Civil War the same tension manifested itself in war in Europe. Eastern and Central Europe had long been cut off from the world's main water-route trade by the promontory of Denmark. In 1864 the slack northern route took up its first link. It was cohering. Prussia absorbed half of Denmark. Here lay the embryo of the Kiel Canal, of maritime Germany, of competition with England, and of the present war. From Stephenson's engine of 1814 each step has been the logical, inevitable, inexorable sequence of its predecessor. The war of 1864 in Holstein; the cohesion of Germany along the northern trade route in 1867; the crushing of the opposition of Western Europe in 1870 to the readjustment incident to the cohesion of the northern trade route; and now this final catastrophe. It behooves us to meditate also on what this catastrophe may portend for us. Mark that all the old familiar phenomena have recurred under our eyes. Nature would seem to have indicated to us her

purpose beforehand. The unification of the northern trade route from Petersburg and Moscow, by Warsaw, to Antwerp; the intense industrial and commercial activity of Germany; the apparent decline in English energy, may be phenomena freighted with an inference. It may be that the great trade route is shortening and that England is falling into eccentricity, as Babylon and Tyre, Rome and Bagdad, Venice, Spain, and Antwerp have fallen into eccentricity heretofore. Should Nature have this disposition man can only resist, as Rome resisted Carthage, by the destruction—the annihilation, rather—of his competitor. There can be no arguing otherwise with the infinite.

And if this supposition should be by chance correct, we Americans—careless, heedless, helpless, reckless, vain, spoiled children as we are—stand surely in mortal peril. Astride of the great trade route now prolonged around the world, we occupy the position which has always been, from Sargon's time, the supreme objective of attack. Babylon might as well have expected Alexander to spare Tyre; Carthage might as well have looked to Rome for kindness; England might as rationally have cultivated peace on the Rock of Gibraltar; or France have held Hague conferences at Quebec, as we maunder of brotherly love in Panama and Mexico; and it matters nothing who wins this phase of an all-embracing war whose end is not, and cannot yet be.

Then, even self-complacent and self-indulgent, careless pleasure-seekers and money-makers such as we, sneering at all sober thought as pessimism, may some day find an idle moment in which to ponder a further fact. Governments for our purposes may be divided into two categories—the deliberative and the administrative. Of the inefficient, or deliberative, type, we stand easily foremost. Such social organisms as ours are those most open to attack and least capable of defense; they have little faculty for unified thought and less for unified action. If the present war has proved nothing else it has proved the capital disadvantage at which such governments stand in relation to the administrative type.

Of the administrative type the Roman always has been, and I suppose always must remain, the model. In our day the German type has to a degree shaped itself on the Roman. And it

is for the people of America to appreciate as they can—or as, in their wisdom, they will—that, perched astride of the great trade route in the position which has ever been that of supremest peril, they, the most hopelessly inefficient, because the most stupidly deliberative, democracy in the world, have their whole fortunes, their honor, their safety, and their lives staked on their ability to parry the deadliest of all possible blows which will certainly be aimed at them with the suddenness of lightning, at the moment when they expect it least. It is this which will happen or all history shall reverse itself.

DISCUSSION

ROGER W. BABSON, SECRETARY OF THE SOCIETY TO ELIMINATE THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF WAR

As is the case with many business men, I ally myself neither with the "military" nor with the "peace" group. I believe that peace with disarmament is something to be desired, but that until the nations are united (at least commercially) and until some sort of an internation is organized for such an economic union, each nation must continue to arm independently. I recognize the tremendous waste from war and the preparations therefor; but I agree with the militarists that it is useless to talk about disarmament until the economic causes of war are eliminated. As these causes are gradually removed, the nations will, of their own accord, give less attention to armaments and battleships.

Disarmament will never come all at once, but gradually, as it came among the different states of the United States. Even Massachusetts, when the federal government was formed in 1789, gave up her own right to enact tariffs and to have a postal and monetary system of her own, but she insisted on having her own little army and navy. Moreover, she has not given up this right as yet, although no such proportional attention is given by Massachusetts to its militia as was the case one hundred years ago.

BEWARE OF COURTS ONLY

Furthermore, I believe that there should be no halfway position between a strong military-naval policy and the placing of

international trade and like affairs under the joint control of all the nations.

Although opposed to forceful aggression, I just as violently object to the attempts of many pacifists to hold the world *in statu quo*. I believe that the fittest must survive and ultimately lead in the determination of world-policies, whether these fittest be English, Teutons, Latins, or Japanese. Hence, although indorsing plans for a world-organization, I emphasize the statement that such an organization must consist of more than a court and a police power to enforce the rules of such a court. Before the growing nations can consent to world-federation there must first be a law-making body in which nations are represented according to their self-supporting literate population. In other words, I believe that the most any world-organization can accomplish is to provide some means by which the fittest shall rule without resort to war. Furthermore, statistics teach me that an international organization can be devised which will do this. Such a plan has already been worked out by Raymond L. Bridgman, of the State House, Boston, who will report his work at Faneuil Hall, Boston, Monday afternoon, January 10.

PREPAREDNESS AND PEACE

I suppose you think it queer for the secretary of a peace society to speak in favor of military preparedness. I not only so speak, but am glad to help in arousing the citizens of this country to the great peril which confronts us. Certainly, under existing conditions, we should all unite and influence Congress to make larger appropriations for land and naval defenses, and should stand ready to uphold our government in any action it may make toward preparation for war. Until the causes of war are eliminated, international conflicts are inevitable, and we should be prepared for them.

This is especially important at the present time, when the pacifists are showing such opposition to preparedness. If, in their talk against armaments, they would endeavor to eliminate the causes of war, their attitude would not be so bad. As it is, however, I believe much of their talk is doing harm. Militarism can never

be wiped out arbitrarily any more than can disease be abolished without removing the causes thereof. War is an effect, and until its causes are eliminated we must prepare for it. War can be eliminated only by removing the temptation to war.

On the other hand, statistics show that the best form of preparedness consists of providing the means by which nations can secure and retain peacefully, through some representative organization, righteous ends which they would otherwise seek to secure through war. Furthermore, history shows that war can be done away with only as the nations are provided with some other safety valve than that which war now provides. Although the world cannot remain *in statu quo*, there must be a more efficient means of determining policies and bringing about changes than by resort to war. I believe that there is, and from this latter point of view I believe that gradually war will be done away with between nations as it has already been eliminated between states now composing these nations—namely, through federation.

THE CAUSES OF WAR

It is generally agreed that the causes of war in modern times are largely matters of commerce and other economic conditions. If some plan can be found by which international trade routes shall be neutralized, further legislation by one nation against another shall cease, and economic opportunity to all shall become more nearly equal, a long step toward the elimination of wars will have been taken.

To this end, I am interested in four steps, viz.: (1) the development of an efficient army and navy, furnished with the most approved guns and other inventions procurable; (2) the adoption of an internation trade flag, which shall serve legitimate commerce at all times as the Red Cross flag serves its purpose in times of war; (3) the systematic teaching in the public schools that legislation by any one nation, class, or sex against the people or trade of any other nation, class, or sex reacts upon all to the ultimate disadvantage of all; (4) the striving to secure more equal opportunities for individuals, and finally the organization of a representative international commission, supported by international force, to supervise

and protect persons and their property either when outside their own country or when engaged in the manufacture and carrying of goods for foreign trade.

INTERNATIONALISM OR PATRIOTISM?

These measures would provide what perhaps no other plan does: an incentive to the establishment of intimate commercial relations among states. Nations will naturally co-operate to protect the neutrality of trade routes and the joint regulation of the extension of national restrictions or barriers—once such neutrality and joint regulation have been secured—as the cheapest and easiest method of protection. Commercial alliance appeals where political alliance does not.

The plan involves the yielding of some so-called sovereign rights; but this is more than offset by an ultimate advantage of almost incalculable value. Unless nations are willing to join in a movement for international co-operation, they must continue to compete in expenditures for national defense. There is no halfway ground. Thus I do not share the hopes of the peace societies, which seem not to realize that the world cannot remain *in statu quo*, nor am I in sympathy with those who are working only to prepare for war. We should either prepare for war or eliminate the causes thereof. Today we are doing neither. Personally, I want to eliminate the causes of war, even though these causes can be eliminated only by the United States and the other large nations giving up something to the growing nations, as old age gives up to youth. By this method I believe that war can be done away with, but only by such a method.

PROFESSOR A. B. WOLFE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

It would be idle to discuss this question without attempting throughout to go to basic facts and forces. Any attempt to do this in a ten-minute paper must necessarily lead to what will appear a dogmatic form of treatment. Nevertheless I wish to deal with what I regard as fundamental, although I shall be able to give but the barest outline of what I should wish to develop at length.

The causes of war are not always the same. In the past they have been various. Today the fundamental cause of war is the modern business man, actuated by the modern business ideal of efficiency and reduction of costs. Dig down through all the self-assertive nationalism and all the intrigue of lying diplomats, and beneath it all you find one great, present motive to war—that motive is profits. Search for the fundamental cause of the wars of the future, however, and while historically that cause will have been created by the profit-hunger of the present, it will be a thing weighted with necessity, not with simple greed. The sufficient cause of future wars will be the dire, hard, basic fact of overpopulation. The wars of the present are criminally inspired for commercial gain. The wars of the future will be necessary conflicts for food supply. If the stereotyped ethics of modern business continue to determine national policies, and unless we face intelligently and with a long vision forward the problems of population, the peoples of the future will have left only the simple Malthusian choice: fight, kill, conquer—or starve.

Back of all the parade and blare of militarism, back of all the stampeding for preparedness, which is a euphonious name for compulsory army service, crushing taxation, and blustering, chauvinistic, national egotism, are always the solid business men—the men who measure national greatness, not by the morality, the culture, and the happiness of the people, but by the tonnage of merchant marines, the size of foreign investments, and the mounting of export statistics; the men who send their astute and expert agents into the far corners of the earth, pushing, bullying, insinuating, competing for markets which the crafty but always scrupulous agents of business men in other countries are also bound to secure.

We ourselves are hankering after the fleshpots of Egypt. Trade expansion is in the air. We must capture the South American markets. And to what end? To the end, first, that our bankers and manufacturers may reap larger profits; secondly, that our population may grow, immigration of cheap labor be stimulated, human life become cheaper than it is even now, and our natural resources be somewhat more rapidly used up. After we get these markets, what then? International competition will be keener than

ever; the chances of friction will be multiplied; and we may in very truth need the leadership of a navy league, a rampant militarism, and the guidance of an expansive Monroe Doctrine. But have no fear. The hustling commercialism and the strenuous Americanism which will have created the need for these defensive equipments will also in due time have encouraged the growth of a population large enough to give them the most ample use.

The mercantilist and cameralistic philosophy of the modern business world, in essentials, is not the dotting of an "i" nor the crossing of a "t" different from that of the cabinets and counting-rooms of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Now, as then, business men are the employers of labor. To the business man, laborers are instruments of production and labor is a commodity to be bought at a market price, like any other commodity. The law of market price is simple. The more there is of a thing the lower its price. The more people there are the more laborers there will be. The more laborers, the lower wages; the lower wages, the lower will be costs of production, and therefore the more keenly we can compete in foreign markets; the more goods we can sell, the more profits some of us, the successful, can make. The case is proved. It is clear that we cannot compete in foreign markets with cheap foreign labor unless we have cheap labor ourselves, and we can have cheap labor only with an unlimited birth-rate, unrestricted immigration, and an unwieldy population. This is the apotheosis of Business. This is neo-mercantilism.

Meanwhile the business men of other countries are pushing after these same foreign markets. There too they are crying for cheap labor, and issuing tracts against the sinfulness of the declining birth-rate. Two cannot have the same thing at the same time. Rivalry, friction, irritation, war—these are the logical steps in market expansion. The battle flag follows trade. The case for cameralism is unassailable. National greatness is directly proportional to the size of exports; exports depend upon the size and efficiency of armies and navies; it is as clear as noonday that we must have a gigantic population, not only as cheap laborers, but as men to fill the ranks of our far-flung armies. A restricted birth-rate is not only a sin against nature, it is a crime against

trade expansion. Breed, breed, and send forth the best ye breed! Never mind if your population be larger than your land can support, or if it be poor and gross and miserable. National glory is at stake, and national glory is ability to compete. Moreover the state is an end in itself. The people are only means to the state, just as they are to industry. This is the apotheosis of the state. It is neo-cameralism.

Should the masses question this philosophy of trade and power, it is easy to point out to them that unless we expand our foreign sales there will be widespread unemployment and distress and that, by the same token, compulsory military service is the only protection of the home. True, their own excessive multiplication which we encourage, may have something to do with low wages and unsteady employment, but the masses are cattle and cannot be expected to understand abstract truths of that sort.

It is evident, when we reach this point, that neo-mercantilism and neo-cameralism are ethically bankrupt. We are caught in a vicious circle. We expand our trade, for profits; every nation is doing so; every nation is straining for more people; but with the growth of populations all the nations of the earth are gradually coming to the point where each must sell manufactured goods to the rest in return for foodstuffs or starve. Business men and statesmen recognize this fact perfectly. But with oriental fatalism they go on creating the Frankenstein which will be their own undoing. There is no real democracy in their hearts; consequently they call to arms for the gigantic inevitable conflict, which would not be inevitable at all if they would only read intelligently and apply to life the Malthusian chapter in social economy. Out of mercantilist philosophy, if we supinely permit it to govern life, we must expect hell to break loose about every forty years. The logical outcome of present tendencies is a state of affairs in which one miserable and redundant population will be in perpetual conflict with other miserable and redundant peoples for a kind of existence which only a blind instinct of life, and no possible rationality, could persuade them to put up with. The blame for this sort of thing will not rest alone upon the business men of today, nor yet with the Nietzsches and Pearsons who see no progress except in natural selection,

but upon the sociologists, economists, political scientists, and clergy, who quietly sit by while men of business and men of the military spirit pursue policies which perpetuate ancient population doctrines,the continued application of which can bring only disaster.

No fact of experience is better demonstrated than the law of diminishing returns in agriculture. Yet there are peace advocates of the utmost prominence, socialists, and sociologists who seem either incapable of understanding it or blind to it, because it stands squarely across the way of their easy and direct search for universal peace, and, like the Boig in *Peer Gynt*, say, "Go round about!" These persons are under the ancient and fond illusion that where God sends a new mouth he sends two new hands which can feed it. Nothing could be sadder than to hear a leading peace advocate assert that intensive farming will take care of the population problem. Such a belief is based, not only upon ignorance of economic and physical fact, but upon a failure to read the records of agricultural production and population growth during the nineteenth century.

That fear of overpopulation as the ultimate cause of future war is no fantastic creation of a diseased imagination will be evident to any open-minded person who examines these records, imperfect as they are. I have time to offer only one or two isolated examples. In spite of intensive, scientific farming, the yield of wheat in Germany increased only 70 per cent during the nineteenth century, while her population was increasing 127 per cent. In 1880–84 Germany had an annual importation of only 1,850,000 metric tons of grain; in 1905 she imported nearly five and a half million metric tons. Take our own case, as to export of foodstuffs. In 1891–95 we exported nearly one-third (31 per cent) of our wheat; in 1911–13 a little over one-eighth (14 per cent) of it. In 1880 foodstuffs comprised 56 per cent of our total exports; in 1913 only 21 per cent, and at the present rate of population growth it will be but a few decades before we cease to export foodstuffs altogether.

Then consider population growth during the nineteenth century. Look not to the new countries but to old Europe. Thirteen countries of Western Europe show an estimated increase of 112 per cent between 1800 and 1908, and that in spite of frequent wars

and heavy emigration. Suppose population should continue to double every century. Would there be much hope for universal peace? But, you say, the birth-rate is declining. So it is, in spite of the moralists and militarists, but the death-rate is declining just as fast, so that the natural rate of increase—the excess of births over deaths—is as great as it was fifty or a hundred years ago. It is, for instance, 24 per thousand in Uruguay, 18 in Bulgaria, 15 in Holland, Prussia, Servia, and Australia. Unless, then, we have soon a marked decrease in the birth-rate of the masses, modern sanitation and medical art will bestow upon us a surplus population which nothing but war will reduce to a workable limit. Do not offer immigration as a solution: that is only a temporary relief. What will be the situation when not only Europe and the United States, but Russia, Argentina, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Japan have become so populous that the only way their people can get a living is to send abroad manufactured goods in return for foodstuffs, and there are no surplus foodstuffs to return? Who then will be the agricultural exporting nations? The nations cannot subsist by taking in one another's washing.

There are now mediaeval laws upon our statute books which prescribe fine and imprisonment for anyone caught giving the masses any information as to how to exercise birth-control. Church and state join hands to keep the working classes in dense ignorance with regard to reproductive physiology and responsibility in reproduction. Unless you are willing to repeal these laws and spread the propaganda of birth-control, you may just as well cease all talk of peace. You can look for but two alternatives in the immediate future, the next two or three hundred years—either periodical wars or forced labor (that is, the virtual enslavement of tropic peoples) in the tropics, which may conceivably be made, for a time, to furnish food to the temperate zones. The latter, alternative will furnish only a temporary respite from war, however, for it would not be long till the great nations fell to fighting over the then necessary tropical markets, as they are now the unnecessary ones.

I do not think that such extreme conditions as I have suggested will actually come. We may perhaps in time attain to a social, as

well as a business and a national, consciousness. Can, then, war be abolished? Yes, by following a rational program which looks to ultimate causes, and does not limit its forward vision to the year 2000. Ultimately the earth can support a certain population at a certain high standard of living. The economic and the moral ideal should be a population limited to that number. Moreover, socialist or individualist, no one who believes seriously in real democracy can look forward with pleasure to the continuation of an economic and social philosophy which regards the laboring classes as means, not ends. As long as men and women are regarded essentially as industrial pawns, men will be regarded and used as instruments of industrial warfare also. As long as population is unlimited human life will be cheap. Human life must be made respectable. That can be done only by teaching the people the immorality of bringing children into a world which has no moral place for them. Here the nations of the East and the West must come to common ground, whatever differences otherwise persist. It is desirable that there be a further decline in the Western birth-rate; but it is doubly desirable that the nations of the Orient be given that missionary enlightenment which will lead them to cut their birth-rates in half, set free for themselves the forces of enlightenment, and remove from Western minds the haunting fear of a yellow peril.

If all this suggests a long and difficult program, I affirm nevertheless that it is the only one that will bear promise of lasting success. I am not interested in mere truces, however long they may last. All the world-federations and international courts imaginable will not prevent armed conflict when strong nations face starvation.

H. M. Chittenden, Brigadier-General United States Army, Retired

War is the attempt to accomplish purposes of state by resort to coercion. It is a means to an end, or better, perhaps, a method of obtaining an end.

The interrogatory form of the title of the paper which I am discussing implies that it is desirable to do away with war. Such

indeed is the universal popular view; but is it subject to any qualification? To answer this it is necessary to discriminate between war as a means to an end and the incidental features of war as a method. The one may be necessary and therefore desirable, while the other may be highly objectionable.

Is war necessary? If so, why? And must it continue to be necessary? Imagine a community in which legal authority is not yet established—as in the early mining camps of this country. Absence of authority does not extinguish rights. If these are not respected, it may become necessary for the individual, if he does not wish to submit to injustice, to defend or enforce his rights by his own strong arm. Some may question the expediency of the method; very few would question the rightness of it.

Now it is in precisely this status that the society of nations exists. Over the state there is no super-authority. In spite of some modern contention to the contrary, the state must be treated as something which, like an individual, has aims, ambitions, and a mission in human existence; and it must be accorded the same rights that are accorded the individual when there is no organized authority to which he may appeal. In controversies which are inevitable in international relations, if expostulation, concession, reason, and conciliation fail, the state must attempt to defend or enforce its just rights by physical power. Under existing conditions, therefore, it would not be right, however desirable otherwise, to do away with war, were such a thing possible, for it might mean the enthronement of wrong in the relations of states.

Consider now what it is that creates the almost universal repugnance for war and weigh it against the argument just set forth. The popular hatred of war springs from its incidental features as a method. First, and by far most important, are the loss of life and limb and the sorrow and suffering resulting therefrom. This, however, relates to immediate social conditions rather than to permanent biological effects; which, contrary to general opinion, are practically negligible. In addition to loss of life there are the destruction of wealth, the dislocation of business, and a general interference with the normal course of affairs. All these things, affecting individual life in its minutest details, come

home to the consciousness of society as abstract reasoning upon cause and effect cannot possibly do. In spite of many compensating influences, the obvious and immediate effects of war so obsess the average mind as to preclude all other considerations, and make it feel that nothing whatever can offset the horror and wickedness of the thing itself. Yet, strange as it may seem—though really a fine tribute to the nobility of human nature—let an agressor appear against the state and all this horror is forgotten in universal willingness to rush to the defense of country.

It is very apparent, as an abstract proposition, that the second of the considerations set forth above is not in all cases an adequate offset to the first. The horrors of the war method cannot be permitted to prevent a resort to war when the integrity, welfare, or just rights of the state are at stake; and the possibility of such recourse cannot and should not be done away with until a substitute is found which shall satisfy the state that its rights will not be jeopardized.

But are there possible substitutes for the war method of settling international disputes? The form in which the title to this discussion is expressed suggests that there may be positive means by which war may be definitely prohibited, or *done away with*—as a league of peace, a world-court, an international police. Any such possibility is very doubtful. It implies compulsion, and compulsion will not work—it is itself war. If the subject had read: "Is War Likely to Disappear?" an affirmative prediction would be much safer. The distinction is fundamental. War cannot be *abolished*, but must be *outgrown;* just as the custom of torture has been outgrown, and other once universal customs have been or are being discarded. The process has generally been subconscious, so to speak—a growth of public opinion fostered by a few great minds, until finally, when the change has come, governments have written it into the statutes. So, in the case of war, the constant pressure of the best thought, the gradual removal of causes, an increasing disposition to concede the just rights of others, the growth of international acquaintance and confidence, and accumulating experience in referring disputes to an impartial tribunal—all these, with a

growing sense of the horror of the war method, may gradually undermine the method itself.

What is the prospect that this process will prove successful? Is not the present outlook hopeless? Has there been another quarter-century in the annals of the race so vexed with strife as that leading up to and embracing the present war? Truly the superficial aspect is discouraging, but may we not discover beneath the surface the springs of abundant hope? The most notable characteristic of this war is its universal support by the people of the warring countries, coupled with a keen insight into the broad meaning of the struggle. It is a democratic war, as few others have ever been. There seems to be a feeling that it is a prodigious cleaning of Augean stables—the brushing away of the useless rubbish of worn-out systems—and that it must be done so thoroughly that it will not have to be done again. From every warring country has gone up the uttered conviction: "It was necessary." There is a danger, indeed—a very grave one—that the result may not be as favorable to the cause of peace as it should be; but if the possibilities of this war are made the most of it should truly mark the beginning of the end.

It is not necessary to this consummation, as many think, that human nature itself change for the better. Reliance upon this dogma has brought accentuated grief as a result of the present war But the dogma itself is a confusion of quite distinct things. The qualities of mind and heart which make up what we call human nature are immutable. One cannot conceive of envy, for example, as something different now from what it was in the days of Joseph and his brethren. There is not the smallest reason to believe that the infant born into the world today is one whit more or less intellectual, more or less spiritual or moral, conditions of race being the same, than was the infant of ten thousand years ago. The raw material is as unchangeable as the gold of the mine. But the process by which that raw material is developed into form for practical use is ever undergoing change. The grown-up product is a result of environment, which is itself ever changing, particularly that intellectual environment—the outgrowth of civilization—which is the controlling factor in the development of the individual. On

the whole, this environment is becoming better, though there have been many sad lapses in the course of history. Little by little wicked customs and beliefs are discarded and the conscience of the race conforms more and more to the simple principles of truth. In this accumulating fund of experience—the invisible and intangible environment which determines the training of manhood—lies the hope of humanity. If it be maintained in ever-increasing strength and purity, there is no limit to its accomplishment. The ultra-pacifist, therefore, who holds that human nature changes—for the better, of course—and that therefore war will cease, is wrong in his premise, though possibly right in his conclusions; and the ultra-militarist, who holds that human nature does not change and that therefore war is inevitable, is right in his premise but probably wrong in his conclusion. The truth lies between them, and our faith reposes in the integrity and continuous growth of civilization.

We are considering here general tendencies and not the various panaceas, specifics, and palliatives by which many earnest minds hope to do away with war. The ultimate goal of all these projects is some form of world-state which shall control purely international affairs. But in our present limited vision it is impossible to see how even this far-off consummation can prevent war altogether, any more than the most efficient government can absolutely guarantee the prevention of crime. And it is very difficult now to believe that nations will soon relinquish that degree of sovereignty which is necessary for the creation of an effective world-organization. Some things, we can readily understand, states will be very loath to give up. So long as pan-Germanism, for example, has the hold which it now has on the German mind, is that nation likely to consent that any super-authority be permitted to say, "Thus far shalt thou come and no farther"? In this may we not sense Treitschke's loathing when he said, "The idea of a world-state is odious"? And can it be expected that Russia will ever relinquish her purpose to secure for her vast empire, by her own might if necessary, a winter outlet to the sea not subject to the "yes" or "no" of any foreign state? Will Italy ever willingly relinquish her purpose to free herself from the pistol point now resting in her very bosom? Will France and England be willing to leave the question of their

existence as independent states in the hands of any outside combination? And could even the United States ever consent that a higher authority should compel adjustments which might subject the Pacific Coast to an oriental race? These are a few suggestions of the enormous difficulties in the way of a genuine surrender of sovereignty such as would be necessary to form a world-state. The growth in that direction must be gradual. It would seem to be the ultimate goal and that its attainment would mean abandonment of the war method, but while it is a consummation toward which we may hopefully look, and while it may be nearer than some of us think, there can be no hard-and-fast guaranty of its realization.

C. H. STOCKTON, PRESIDENT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

The desirability of doing away with war is without question. War has been defined as such a conflict of wills as to lead to military effort. It is the evidence that diplomacy and the ordinary means of international intercourse have broken down and hence that resort is made to arms. The conflict of wills is not, so modern history tells us, the result of the conflict of any group or caused by any clique of people, but is from popular impulse. In these times no war can be made or continued in defiance of the popular will.

Westlake says:

> Whatever is done or omitted by a state is done or omitted by the men who are grouped in it, or at least the deed or the omission is sanctioned by them. That must be so, because a state is not a self-acting machine. The impulse which its wheels receive can only be a human impulse, its rulers can employ only human agency, and that agency must at least tacitly consent to be so employed. But if we look more closely at the facts we shall probably find that in the foreign affairs of a state the rulers oftener act under the impulse of the mass than by its tacit permission, and that tacit permission is seldom conceded by the mass except to those who embody and represent the national character.

This statement of Westlake's is, I believe, true, and in our history it has been shown that the popular impulse has made war. In no case, either in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, or the Spanish-American War, has any clique or set of men caused war. The usual outcry against the army and the navy and even the munition-makers is historically

untrue and the veriest claptrap in its nature. Such statements are insults to the intelligence of educated people, and yet they are proclaimed vociferously by people who claim to be competent to legislate and rule in a republic or a democracy.

The causes of the popular impulses that lead to war I do not find are confined to economic reasons only. The desire for independence more than the desire to be free from petty taxes was in my opinion the cause of the Revolutionary War. The War of 1812 was a war of resentment on account of our interests afloat, it is true, but it was also a survival of that opposition to the mother-country which had survived the War of the Revolution. The war with Mexico was largely for the extension of slave-holding territory and bordered on the question of economics so far as that peculiar phase of property was concerned. The Civil War was, I believe, a war for the preservation of the Union and for the abolition of slavery as a matter of righteous and philanthropic sentiment. The Spanish-American War was, I believe, contended to be a war waged from the impulses of humanity and philanthropy, though it resulted in the acquisition of territory which was and is of dubious value to the United States. The Venezuela affair approaching war was purely in my mind a question of boundary lines, but was distorted into a defense of the Monroe Doctrine. This is the history of our own country, so far as the causes of war are concerned, in a nutshell. So far as the causes of war are concerned in the world at large I do not find them, in my opinion, to be confined to the conflict of interests which may be called economic. There were wars for religion, wars for independence, wars for the assertion of rights, wars for conquest or recovery of territory, and wars for a combination of causes which have hardly been differentiated by historians.

The more democratic and universal the impulse is for war, the wider the responsibility and necessarily the less individual responsibility. The impulse comes up suddenly, and with men in power who are simply followers and not representatives of the people the danger of war and such excitement becomes greater. It is difficult in times of excitement to reason with or explain to the multitude the necessity for caution, calmness, and deliberation. Even men of

prominence who have been advocates of universal peace, members of peace societies, and at times denouncing war in the abstract, have been found among those crying for war and for its bitter prosecution when some incident has occurred arousing their passions and prejudices. James Russell Lowell, who ridiculed the Mexican War, was found in the Civil War calling for more men and more war. Charles Sumner, whose oration on the "True Grandeur of Nations" is still recited by schoolboys, was an earnest and radical advocate of war during the Civil War, while members of the Society of Friends, by profession nonresistants, entered in large numbers in the Civil War to such an extent that it has been said that an able-bodied Quaker with his war paint on was one of the most dangerous of foes.

In time of peace, when the popular feeling is not too quickly aroused, and in matters principally economic, I think that war can be avoided by diplomatic negotiation, by tribunals of arbitration or investigation, and by judicial settlements by international courts. But, in these days of extremely rapid mobilization, in times of excitement, of bitter feeling, all these measures are cast aside except possibly that of diplomatic negotiation. Consequently measures of international tribunals are, I believe, of little avail for the avoidance of war in times of high excitement, either with or without a constabulary. An international constabulary would be too feeble to stop a nation in arms, or any nation having a very considerable system of compulsory service, from going on with its war. A syndicate of nations, though formed by the resigning of a certain amount of freedom of action and independence on the part of individual states, would be likely to divide into groups or alliances similar to those existing outside, at the time of the assembling of such a syndicate. As for individual nations suppressing war, it would either be impossible from the extent of the forces required or so unpopular on account of the cost of the necessary force as to be impracticable in its nature.

It is a matter of the utmost difficulty to my mind to see any proposed plan or nostrum as a practical remedy for war. The cry of the present day that we must war to prevent war means in Europe a war among nations. Not only must we consider the

limited possibilities on the part of the United States for carrying war beyond the sea, caused by the lamentable want of preparedness on the part of this country in transportable military forces; but the fact must not be lost sight of that the limitations of means of transport across the Atlantic would be such as to render the forces conveyed to meet a first-class military power absurdly small in comparison, while it would be extravagant in its cost and unpopular in consequence, especially if brought into a dispute concerning which the people of the United States were indifferent.

So far as our own country is concerned, the lack of preparedness which in the past has cost us such an unnecessary expenditure of life and money, is a temptation for attack on the part of a large nation with military forces available, even with the fragments left after a war like that now going on, the result being intimidation or the levying of tribute on a country whose unique position is that of a country habitually unprepared, with territory and wealth inducing attack and the levying of tribute. I have no plan to propose for the avoidance of war except sufficient preparedness to cause much hesitation in attack, a government which can place brakes upon the popular impulses, and a general endeavor to cause an amendment upon the practice of Christianity by a close following of its precepts. Tennyson, who dreamt the federation of nations and the brotherhood of men, also wrote the words: "Pray God we may not fail of greatness through craven fear of being great," in regard to his own country.

MRS. J. O. UNGER, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

So many interesting and instructive things about war, national defense, preparedness, and the possibility of doing away with war in the future have been said at these various meetings that it is difficult to add anything new and valuable. Yet it seems to me that one point of view has not yet been presented, a point of view so original, valuable, and suggestive that it is well worth while to present it to this audience, though perhaps most of the sociologists are familiar with it, as it is the viewpoint of our own late and honored president, Lester F. Ward.

I do not mean the standpoint taken in *Pure Sociology* where he merely takes the static view and tries to show what agencies have been at work in shaping society as we find it today—and there he shows that war indeed *has* been a great factor in progress—but the standpoint reached when we look at this *philosophy as a whole*, the cosmic standpoint, as I might call it. Professor Ward always thought in "world-thoughts"; he was, as Professor Gumplowicz said, a mental giant such as very few countries have produced. And so his point of view in regard to war and whether it can ever be done away with was as sweeping, as big, as cosmic as the rest of his philosophy. I refer to his original and far-reaching idea of the contrast between the method of nature and the method of mind in bringing forth results.

To those who are not familiar with Ward's philosophical works I shall briefly point out this great distinction which has been so little perceived by mankind in general and has not been appreciated in its full meaning even by sociologists, though, to my mind, it seems to mark an epoch in human thought.

The great cosmic forces of nature, as they manifest themselves all around us in the inorganic world, are blind forces, devoid of intelligence, of foresight, of purpose. The only way by which they were enabled to secure the actual results of cosmic evolution which we know has taken place was a continuous gigantic struggle—struggle between integrating and disintegrating, between constructive and destructive, forces, progress being attained only through infinitesimal increments, owing, not to any working together of these forces, but to their difference, their algebraic sum, after they spent the greatest part of their energies in neutralizing each other. Ward changed Spencer's formulation of the law of evolution by demonstrating these facts.

And such [says Ward] is the character of all natural or *genetic* progress; the dynamic condition is brought about by infinitesimal increments; the great bulk of the force expended is neutralized in so nearly maintaining the statical condition; there is incessant rhythm destroying at intervals most of the little that has been gained. When correctly viewed, therefore, and thoroughly understood, the process of nature proves the *least economic of all conceivable processes*, a fact which the vastness of the scale on which it operates, and the absolute magnitude of the results actually accomplished by it, have

in great measure concealed even from the most clear-sighted and thoughtful students of nature.

But this natural or genetic method of accomplishing results, as opposed to the artificial or *telic* process, has not only been the method applied to the cosmic process of evolving worlds, species, and individuals; it has also been, according to Ward, except in a limited sense, the nature of all social progress that has taken place thus far, and this is because, though we have developed an individual intelligence and individual consciousness which take care of our individual needs, we have not yet, except in a limited sense, evolved a social consciousness and social intelligence which take care of our social needs.

There was a time when men believed that the universe was governed by intelligent foresight and conducted with definite purpose to a final goal. Science, penetrating deeply into the secrets of nature and discovering the untenability of that view, came to the conclusion that the process of biological evolution was like that of cosmical evolution, the result of a blind struggle for existence in which, according to Darwin's principle of natural selection and Herbert Spencer's "survival of the fittest," only those remained alive who proved strongest in the fight or were best able to adapt themselves to the necessities of their environment. The conviction that this was the way in which nature had attained her results took such hold on the imagination of men that most scientific minds, including those who studied man and society, the economists and sociologists, came to the conclusion that it was useless to struggle against this universal process—these gigantic forces of nature, compared with which man was but a speck of dust, a drop in the ocean, who could entertain no hope of ever defeating or counteracting this method of universal war, struggle, and competition. They believed that this, being the method by which nature had accomplished her vast results, was the only method that *could* be successful and that man could do nothing better than imitate this grand and seemingly effective, albeit cruel and wasteful, process. They therefore encouraged the *laissez-faire* policy, the policy of competition, war, unscrupulous struggle for ascendency and dominance, asserting that this was the only natural and effective

policy by which nature weeded out the weak and unfit and kept alive the strong and efficient.

It has been pointed out in these meetings that "social Darwinism," as this viewpoint has been called, is wrong, that it is a mistaken view of social progress; it was pointed out that even in the lower realms of nature, among plants and animals, we find co-operation and mutual protection. This may be true in single instances; but as a rule in these lower realms we *do* find a continual and deadly struggle for existence, and the law of the survival of the fittest holds true. For this reason Nature, out of her limitless resources, has to multiply her seeds and germs to such an enormous extent that, for instance, one codfish has to lay a million eggs in order merely to reproduce his kind, i.e., let two eggs come to maturity. The dangers surrounding her creatures on every side, in consequence of this universal war, make this tremendous waste of reproduction necessary. *It is only when mind enters the arena that these conditions gradually begin to change.* The advocates of the *laissez-faire* doctrine, the doctrine of the desirableness or at least inevitableness of competition, struggle, and war, completely overlooked the fact that with the development of mind a virtually new factor or power was introduced into the world.

Ward explains thus:

> To say this is no startling announcement. It is no more than has taken place many times in the course of the evolution of living and feeling beings out of the tenuous nebulae of space. For while it is true that nature makes no leaps, while so long as we consider their beginning, all the great steps in evolution are due to minute increments repeated through vast periods, still, when we survey the whole field, as we must do to comprehend the scheme, and contrast the extremes, we find that nature has been making a series of enormous strides, and reaching from one plane of development to another. It is these independent achievements of evolution that the true philosopher must study. . . . . Just as the metaphysicians lost their bearing by an empty worship of mind and made of philosophy a plaything, so the modern evolutionists have missed their mark by degrading mind to a level with mechanical force; they thus seem about to fling away the grand results that the doctrine of evolution cannot otherwise fail to achieve. . . . . In spite of all philosophy, whether mythologic, metaphysical, or naturalistic, declaring that man must and can do nothing, he *has*, from the very dawn of his intelligence, been transforming the entire surface of the planet he inhabits.

Indeed, we have only to look around us to see that all the results that man has really attained, all the actual progress he has brought about in life and society, all the civilization that lifts him above the savage and which is his most valuable and precious possession, were achieved, not by imitating the methods of Nature, but by counteracting them; not by struggling wildly with the forces of wind, water, wild beasts, and all the elements that opposed his progress, but by *circumventing* them through the power of his intellect; not by pitting his feeble strength against theirs, but by studying their actions, understanding their laws, and by reason of this *knowledge* leading them into paths of his own advantage through all kinds of intelligently worked out designs, called *inventions*. In short, it was done by *the method of mind*, which is the method of intelligent foresight, of definite purpose, of wise control. And this method is so infinitely superior to the method of Nature, that man, feeble and miserable as he is compared with her gigantic forces, has nevertheless succeeded, all over the globe which he inhabits, in bringing these forces under his control and making them do his work; the whole material civilization is nothing else. Man has become master of the earth, not by imitating the method of Nature—the wasteful, ineffective method of universal war—but by reversing it and substituting therefor the method of knowledge, of intellectual foresight, of indirection and invention. No animal performs anything comparable to what man performs. This is solely because no other being possesses the developed psychic faculty.

I like to dwell on this point because the advocates of the war policy and the *laissez-faire* policy like to call the pacifists and advocates of co-operation pusillanimous, weak-minded, and generally lacking in vigorous intelligence. In reality it is they who lack intelligence and stick to primitive methods; it is the method of mind, the telic method which has reached all the great results in the world. It is true, as Ward says, that in social intelligence we are still woefully behind, in "statesmanship we are still in the Stone Age." Not only the progress out of barbarism into civilization, but the march of civilization itself, has been attended by the same incidents that characterize the development of a species or an

individual. Besides his wars with the elements, man has been perpetually afflicted by wars with his own kind. And yet these wars of men with one another are the strict analogues of those of the lower forms of organized existence. Even the silent battle for subsistence has its counterpart in the competitive struggles of industry. The same wasteful method prevails in society as in the animal kingdom. Man has learned to control the elements by the application of his intellect; he has not yet learned to control his own instincts and passions by the same means.

One of the reasons for this is of course that psychic and social phenomena are far more complex than physical phenomena; another is that reason, while the cause of all his progress, is also the cause of all his errors. The animal does not err, because it follows its instincts; it does not progress either. Man, by trying to explain things by his incipient reason before he had acquired knowledge, explained them wrongly and was led into a labyrinth of fallacies. This has led him to distrust his reason and to follow either instinct and desire or some mysterious power which he imagined outside and above Nature. Yet, in spite of all error, reason, *guided by knowledge*, is his only guide. All the implements, machines, and devices by which man has guided Nature's forces into paths of his own advantage and compelled or induced her to produce results which she would not otherwise have produced, devices which his reason has invented, may be called artificial; and, as Ward has expressed it in his famous paradox, "The artificial is superior to the natural," at least so far as man is concerned. Art is the antithesis of Nature; if we call one the natural method, we must call the other the artificial method. If Nature's progress is rightly called natural selection, man's is artificial selection. The survival of the fittest is simply survival of the strong, which may as well be called destruction of the weak. And when Nature progresses by the destruction of the weak, man progresses by the protection of the weak—not, of course, protection of the unfit and diseased (these will have to be eliminated), but protection of all against adverse surroundings. This is easily seen; for, by defeating the destructive influences of the elements and hostile surroundings and by forcing Nature to

yield an unnatural supply of man's necessities, many who would have succumbed from inability to resist these adverse agencies —the feebler members of society—were able to survive and population increased and expanded. Without expanding population man could never have peopled and conquered the whole earth.

But besides these activities of making life easier for the less strong, almost all the institutions by which civilization is distinguished from barbarism were inaugurated for the protection of the weak. The chief value and function of government is this protection of those who cannot or have not the time to protect themselves against the aggressiveness of others. Great systems of jurisprudence have been elaborated for the same purpose, and finally the last sentiment to be developed and doubtless the highest is so universally recognized as peculiar to man that his very name has been given to it—the sentiment of *humanity*.

How then can it be maintained that war, this absolutely wasteful, genetic method of bringing about progress, is still necessary and unavoidable? It can be done only on the ground that intelligence, which, as we have shown, has taken its place in so many other instances, is still in its swaddling clothes—at least social and national intelligence. Certainly all questions which are now settled by war *could* be settled by intelligence; no civilized nation denies that. More difficult questions, at least questions where more gigantic forces were concerned, have thus been settled. But the number of those who are not only intelligent and abhor war, but who are also convinced that the power of intelligence *can* do away with war, is still too small and scattered. As long as the majority of mankind, and even some of its best minds, are still unsettled as to which is the best way to pursue and can be persuaded either way by a few powerful and selfish intellects, we shall have wars again and again. It is only when social intelligence shall have risen so high by universal education of the right kind that everybody recognizes the terrible waste of war, and the social will shall have become so strong as to enforce its demands, that we can attain a peaceful, intellectual régime.

Wars will have to continue, says Ward, *until, just as man has gained dominion over the brute, so the highest type of man shall gain dominion over the lower types.* This can take place only through ever-wider dissemination of knowledge. It has been done slowly, but can be done with accelerated velocity if society sees fit to do so. The dike which social intelligence had built, as Dr. Hayes so well said, was almost complete when it was once more swept away by the tide of primitive instincts; but we can and must build it up again until it is high enough and stands as an international bulwark against individual and national aggression.

MEMBERSHIP STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY FOR 1915

Members as in 1914		579	
Members resigning	62		
Members dropped	61		
Members deceased	5		
Total lost		128	
Members renewing for 1915		451	
New members for 1915		300	
Total membership for 1915			751

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements for the Year December 17, 1914, to December 17, 1915

Receipts

a) Balance on hand, December 17, 1914	$1,766.39	
b) Royalty on sale of publications to June 30, 1915	167.50	
c) Dues from members for 1914, excluding exchange	6.00	
d) Dues from members for 1915, excluding exchange	1,578.12	
e) Dues from members for 1916, excluding exchange	831.25	
f) Exchange	10.20	
g) Rebates on *American Journal of Sociology*	33.51	
h) Interest on savings and bond	30.00	
i) *Proceedings*, Vol. IX	1.75	
Total receipts		$4,424.72

Expenditures

a) *American Journal of Sociology* sent to members for 1914	$ 3.13	
b) *American Journal of Sociology* sent to members for 1915	991.32	
c) *Proceedings*, Vol. IX	695.48	
d) Printed supplies (circulars, duns, slips, etc.)	57.28	
e) Office expense (equipment, files, typewriter, etc.)	73.16	
f) Stationery (letterheads, envelopes)	41.36	
g) Rebates on dues from members for 1915	3.78	
h) Exchange	16.15	
i) Stenographic and clerical aid	295.90	
j) Postage, including telegrams	71.49	
k) Insurance	1.45	
l) Savings bond	503.83	
m) Petty cash fund	20.00	
n) Campaign for 1915 members	215.98	
o) Campaign for 1916 members	97.32	
p) Expenses—President's office	11.00	
q) Expenses—Secretary to Princeton meeting	68.64	
r) Expenses—Committee on Academic Freedom	94.00	
s) Expenses—August meeting in San Francisco	100.00	
Total expenditures		3,361.27
*Balance on hand		$1,063.45

* The society has $500.00 invested in a bond, which does not appear in this balance.

AUDITOR'S CERTIFICATE

I have audited the accounts and vouchers of the American Sociological Society, and hereby certify t in my opinion the foregoing statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements correctly sets forth financial transactions of the Society, from December 17, 1914, to December 17, 1915.

(*Signed*) Culver Hand
Auditor, Evanston, Ill.

December 18, 1915

CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ARTICLE I—NAME

This society shall be known as the American Sociological Society.

ARTICLE II—OBJECTS

The objects of this society shall be the encouragement of sociological research and discussion and the promotion of intercourse between persons engaged in the scientific study of society.

ARTICLE III—MEMBERSHIP

Any person may become a member of this society upon payment of Three Dollars and may continue such by paying thereafter annually a fee of Three Dollars.

By a single payment of Fifty Dollars any person may become a life member of the society.

Each member is entitled to a copy of the current publications of the society.

ARTICLE IV—OFFICERS

The officers of this society shall be a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer—elected at each annual meeting—and an Executive Committee consisting of the officers above mentioned *ex officio*, together with six elected members whose terms of office shall be three years; except that of those chosen at the first election two shall serve for but one year and two for two years.

The offices of Secretary and Treasurer may be filled by the same person.

ARTICLE V—ELECTION OF OFFICERS

All officers shall be elected only after nomination by a special committee of the society appointed by the Executive Committee; except that the officers for the first year shall be nominated by a committee of three to be appointed by the chairman of the meeting at which this constitution is adopted.

All officers shall be elected by a majority vote of the members of the society present at the annual meeting.

ARTICLE VI—DUTIES OF OFFICERS

The President of the society shall preside at all meetings of the society and of the Executive Committee, and shall perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him. In his absence his duties shall devolve,

successively, upon the Vice-Presidents in the order of their election, upon the Secretary, and upon the Treasurer.

The Secretary shall keep the records of the society, and perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him.

The Treasurer shall receive and have the custody of the funds of the society, subject to the rules of the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee shall have charge of the general interests of the society, shall call regular and special meetings of the society, appropriate money, appoint committees and their chairmen with suitable powers, and in general possess the governing power in the society except as otherwise specifically provided in this constitution. The Executive Committee shall have power to fill vacancies in its membership occasioned by death, resignation, or failure to elect, such appointees to hold office until the next annual election.

Five members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive Committee, and a majority vote of those members in attendance shall control its decisions.

ARTICLE VII—RESOLUTIONS

All resolutions to which objection is made shall be referred to the Executive Committee for its approval before submission to the vote of the society.

ARTICLE VIII—AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this constitution shall be proposed by the Executive Committee and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the society.

AMENDMENT I

(Adopted in 1914)

The Executive Committee shall appoint each year a Managing Editor for the annual volume of *Papers and Proceedings*. It shall be his duty to collect, edit, and arrange the material for the *Papers and Proceedings* of the annual meeting.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR THE YEAR 1916

(Numbers in parentheses indicate year of joining)

Abbott, Edith, Hull-House, 800 S. Halsted St., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Adams, James F., Broad and 5th Sts., Phillipsburg, N.J. (1915)
Adams, Marjorie, 233 Langdon St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Adams, Samuel B., 205 Gaston St. E., Savannah, Ga. (1915)
Addams, Jane, Hull-House, 800 S. Halsted St., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Ainsworth, Harry, Moline, Ill. (1915)
Akerley, A. W., National Home, Danville, Ill. (1914)
Allaben, M. C., Room 710, 156 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. (1910)
Allen, Benjamin Franklin, Lincoln Institute, Jefferson City, Mo. (1915)
Allen, William H., 51 Chambers St., Institute for Public Service, New York, N.Y. (1916)
Alling, Mortimer H., Box 1232, Providence, R.I. (1910)
Almy, Frederic, 181 Franklin St., Buffalo, N.Y. (1915)
Andrews, John B., American Association for Labor Legislation, 131 E. 23d St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Armstrong, Samuel Treat, Hillbourne Farms, Katonah, N.Y. (1915)
Arner, G. B. L., 301 17th Ave., Columbus, Ohio. (1911)
Arnold, Felix, 824 St. Nicholas Ave., New York, N. Y. (1911)
Arnold, Sarah Louise, 233 Westminster Road, Rochester, N.Y. (1911)
Arvold, A. G., Agricultural College, N.D. (1916)
Ashley, Henry Winfield, Miltimore Apartments, Toledo, Ohio. (1915)
Athey, Mrs. C. N., 100 S. Patterson Park Ave., Baltimore, Md. (1911)
Atkins, Paul Moody, Hotel Plaza, Detroit, Mich. (1915)
Austin, Charles Burgess, 419 W. 119th St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Avery, Samuel P., 61 Woodland St., Hartford, Conn. (1915)
Babcock, Albert, Box 85, Providence, R.I. (1914)
Babson, Roger W., 41 Abbott Road, Wellesley Hills, Mass. (1915)
Badanes, Saul, 565 Madison St., Brooklyn, N.Y. (1914)
Bailey, George, 5007 Brooklyn Ave., Seattle, Wash. (1916)
Baker, O. E., 3614 Newark St. N.W., Washington, D.C. (1912)
Baker, Oris J., Carlisle, Pa. (1916)
Balch, Emily G., Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass. (1911)
Baldwin, Simeon E., New Haven, Conn. (1913)
Ballard, Lloyd Vernor, 915 Park Ave., Beloit, Wis. (1915)
Barlow, Burt E., Coldwater, Mich. (1911)
Barstow, George Eames, Barstow, Tex. (1915)
Bartholomew, E. F., 741 34th St., Rock Island, Ill. (1913)
Beach, Walter G., University Station, Seattle, Wash. (Prior to 1910)
Beardslee, Claude Gillette, Southington, Conn. (1916)
Beck, Edward J., 94 S. Liberty St., Delaware, Ohio. (1915)
Bedford, Scott E. W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1912)
Beebe, Margaret, Haven House, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Beer, William, Howard Memorial Library, New Orleans, La. (1915)
Behrens, P. E., 150 Iota Court, Madison, Wis. (1916)

Belcher, Alice E., Milwaukee-Downer College, Milwaukee, Wis. (1915)
Bell, Finley F., Legislative Reference Bureau, Springfield, Ill. (1916)
Bellamy, George A., Hiram House, 2723 Orange Ave., Cleveland, Ohio. (1916)
Bellamy, Raymond, Clark University, Worcester, Mass. (1915)
Beller, William F., 51 E. 123d St., New York, N.Y. (1913)
Beneke, H. H., 800 W. 8th St., Topeka, Kan. (1916)
Bengtson, Caroline, 1201 E. 60th St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Benton, Andrew A., 79 Wall St., New York, N.Y. (1913)
Berger, Julius, 526 W. 124th St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Berger, Victor L., 980 1st St., Milwaukee, Wis. (1915)
Berks, Lothar von, care of German Savings Bank, 157 4th Ave., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Bernard, L. L., 1610 University Ave., Columbia, Mo. (Prior to 1910)
Bernheim, Isaac W., Louisville, Ky. (1915)
Bernheimer, Charles S., Hebrew Educational Society, Hopkinson and Sutter Aves., Brooklyn, N.Y. (1910)
Bettman, Alfred, 1514 First National Bank Bldg., Cincinnati, Ohio. (1916)
Bidgood, Lee, 1806 Broad St., Tuscaloosa, Ala. (1915)
Bigham, J. A., Atlanta University, Atlanta, Ga. (1915)
Binder, Rudolph M., 64 Roosevelt Ave., East Orange, N.J. (1910)
Binnewies, W. G., Fairmount College, Wichita, Kan. (1916)
Bittner, W. S., 407 S. Grant St., Bloomington, Ind. (1912)
Bixby, W. H., 735 Southern Bldg., Washington, D.C. (1915)
Bizzell, William B., Agricultural and Mechanical College, College Station, Tex. (1912)
Blackmar, F. W., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan. (Prior to 1910)
Blagden, Edward S., 114 E. 84th St., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Bodenhafer, W. B., Lawrence, Kan. (1916)
Bogardus, Emory S., 1133 W. 41st St., Los Angeles, Cal. (1913)
Bond, Jesse H., University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho. (1916)
Bonney, Ethelind M., 431 S. San Joaquin St., Stockton, Cal. (1915)
Bossard, James H. S., 47 S. Madison St., Allentown, Pa. (1913)
Bosshard, Jessie M., 425 N. Park St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Bostwick, Arthur E., St. Louis Public Library, St. Louis, Mo. (1912)
Bowerman, George F., Public Library, Washington, D.C. (1911)
Boyd, Mabel, 116 Waverley Place, New York, N.Y. (1916)
Boyer, E. Sterling, Madison, N.J. (1915)
Brackett, Jeffrey R., 41 Marlborough St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Brandenburg, Earl W., 315 N. Mill St., Madison, Wis. (1915)
Bridge, Norman, 10 Chester Place, Los Angeles, Cal. (1911)
Bristol, Lucius Moody, Morgantown, W.Va. (1914)
Bronk, Mitchell, 562 Congress St., Troy, N.Y. (1915)
Brooks, John Graham, 8 Francis Ave., Cambridge, Mass. (1914)
Brown, Christine E., 233 Langdon St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Brown, Herbert J., P.O. Box 108, Portland, Me. (1915)
Brunner, Edmund de S., 225 N. 10th St., Easton, Pa. (1916)
Bucher, Herman, Hollis, Long Island, N.Y. (1916)
Buech, W. F., 127 E. Johnson St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Bullock, Charles E., Canton, Pa. (1911)
Burdette, Mrs. Robert J., 891 Orange Grove Blvd., Pasadena, Cal. (1913)
Burgess, Ernest W., 1711 Summit St., Columbus, Ohio. (1912)
Burgess, S. A., Lamoni, Ia. (1915)
Buseck, Lena, 268 Howe Ave., Passaic, N.J. (1916)

Bushee, Frederick A., University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. (Prior to 1910)
Bushnell, C. J., Forest Grove, Ore. (1910)
Calhoun, Arthur W., Clark University, Worcester, Mass. (1913)
Calvert, J. G., 222 Lake Lawn Place, Madison, Wis. (1916)
Campbell, Walter J., Y.M.C.A. College, Springfield, Mass. (1915)
Canis, Edward N., The Canis Cabin, Clermont, Marion County, Ind. (1910)
Cape, Mrs. E. P., 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Capen, Edward W., 146 Sargeant St., Hartford, Conn. (Prior to 1910)
Carlson, Robert Clarence, 113 S. Oxford St., Brooklyn, N.Y. (1916)
Carpenter, Allen, Fargo College, Fargo, N.D. (1916)
Carpenter, S. J., 8 W. 40th St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Carroll, J. Murray, 242 Oak St., Lewiston, Me. (1915)
Carstens, C. C., 43 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Carter, Ada, Northrup House, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Carter, James, Lincoln University, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Carver, Thomas N., 7 Kirkland Ave., Cambridge, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Case, Clarence M., 325 N. 8th St., Oskaloosa, Ia. (1915)
Case, Mills E., 236 6th Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Chaddock, Robert E., Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. (1911)
Chamberlain, Walter, B., 540 Van Vorst Place, Union Hill, N.J. (1916)
Chaney, Lucian W., Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. (1916)
Chapin, F. Stuart, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. (1910)
Clark, Georgie, 10816 Fairchild Ave., Cleveland, Ohio. (1914)
Clark, J. G., 222 Lake Lawn Place, Madison, Wis. (1916)
Clark, Lois E., Northrup House, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Clark, Robert Fry, Pacific University, Forest Grove, Ore. (1912)
Clarke, Clarence L., Lewiston, Idaho. (1915)
Clarke, Edwin Leavitt, Box 266, Clinton, N.Y. (1913)
Clow, Frederick R., Oshkosh, Wis. (Prior to 1910)
Cochran, T. E., Crozer Seminary, Chester, Pa. (1916)
Cohen, Joseph E., 1827 N. Marshall St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1915)
Colbert, Roy J., 119 19th St., Toledo, Ohio. (1915)
Cole, Dorothy, Haven House, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Coleman, George W., 177 W. Brookline St., Boston, Mass. (1915)
Collier, Henry P., 98 E. Chicago St., Coldwater, Mich. (1915)
Cooley, Charles H., 703 Forest Ave., Ann Arbor, Mich. (Prior to 1910)
Coolidge, Ellen H., 81 Marlborough St., Boston, Mass. (1913)
Cotterman, Harold F., 89 W. Lane Ave., Columbus, Ohio. (1916)
Coulter, Charles W., 1437 E. 116th St., Cleveland, Ohio. (1916)
Cowper, Mrs. Mary O. Thompson, 1540 New Hampshire St., Lawrence, Kan. (1915)
Cozzens, Mildred J., 233 Langdon St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Craig, Wallace, University of Maine, Orono, Me. (1913)
Crampton, H. E., Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. (1911)
Crane, Harry W., State Hospital for Nervous Diseases, Little Rock, Ark. (1913)
Cromwell, Mary E., 1815 13th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. (1916)
Cross, William T., 315 Plymouth Court, Chicago, Ill. (1911)
Cutler, J. Elbert, Adelbert College, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio. (Prior to 1910)
Cutler, U. Waldo, 63 Lancaster St., Worcester, Mass. (1911)

Czukor, Eugene J., 6 E. 126th St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Daily, Alice, 220 N. Brooks St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Dalke, Diedrich L., Rockport, Mo. (1916)
Daniel, J. W. W., Wesleyan Female College, Macon, Ga. (1915)
Daniels, John, 801 Garrett Bldg., Baltimore, Md. (1914)
Davies, G. R., University, N.D. (1915)
Davis, Edward H., Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind. (Prior to 1910)
Davis, Mrs. John N., 515 N. Carroll St., Madison, Wis. (1915)
Davis, Michael N., Jr., 58 Shepard St., Cambridge, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Davis, Otto W., 1120 N. Vincent Ave., Minneapolis, Minn. (1913)
Davis, Ralph, 6088 Selma Ave., Los Angeles, Cal. (1916)
Day, Jane, 512 W. 123d St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Dealey, G. B., care of *The News*, Dallas, Tex. (1915)
Dealey, James Q., Brown University, Providence, R.I. (Prior to 1910)
Debs, Eugene V., Terre Haute, Ind. (1916)
Deibler, Frederick Shipp, 2119 Sherman Ave., Evanston, Ill. (1916)
Dennis, Laban, 49 Ridge St., Orange, N.J. (1913)
Dennison, Henry S., 26 Franklin St., Boston, Mass. (1914)
Derrick, Calvin, Waterman, Cal. (1915)
Devine, Edward T., Room 607, Kent Hall, 116th St. and Amsterdam Ave., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Dewell, James S., Missouri Valley, Ia. (1913)
Dewey, F. A., 12 Charles St., New York, N.Y. (1913)
Dewey, Melvil, Lake Placid Club, N.Y. (1915)
Dice, C. A., 210 N. Warren St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Dickson, B. W., 82 Middle Divinity Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Dimock, George E., Elizabeth, N.J. (1913)
Dodge, LeVant, Berea, Ky. (1916)
Doeller, Dorothy D., Dickinson House, Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Doheny, E. L., Jr., Chester Place, Los Angeles, Cal. (1916)
Dornheim, Henry G., 202 E. Tabor Road, Olney, Philadelphia, Pa. (1916)
Doten, C. W., American Statistical Association, 491 Boylston St., Boston, Mass. (1915)
Doubler, Margaret, 221 N. Brook St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Dow, G. S., Olivet College, Olivet, Mich. (1915)
Dowd, Jerome, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla. (Prior to 1910)
Du Bois, Charles G., 15 Dey St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Dudley, Albert W., 6303 N. 11th St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1916)
Dummer, Mrs. W. F., 679 Lincoln Park Blvd., Chicago, Ill. (1910)
Duncan, Kenneth, care of Trustees, Canton Christian College, 156 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Dunham, Inez D., 4617 Central Ave., Los Angeles, Cal. (1916)
Dunlap, Raymond B., 1528 N. Alexandria Ave., Los Angeles, Cal. (1916)
Earp, E. L., Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N.J. (Prior to 1910)
Easly, W. I., 1513 25th St., Des Moines, Ia. (1916)
Eaton, Allen B., Boise, Idaho. (1915)
Eaves, Lucile, 176 Huntington Ave., Boston, Mass. (1910)
Eddy, Sarah J., Bristol Ferry, R.I. (1915)
Edmonds, Franklin S., 614 Franklin Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Egartner, Z. T., North Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Elkus, Abram I., 111 Broadway, New York, N.Y. (1915)
Elliott, John Lovejoy, Central Park West and 64th St., New York, N.Y. (1916)

Ellwood, Charles A., 407 College Ave., Columbia, Mo. (Prior to 1910)
Elmer, M. C., 385 8th Ave. S., Fargo, N.D. (1912)
Emerson, Charles F., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H. (1916)
Estabrook, Arthur F., 15 State St., Boston, Mass. (1913)
Evans, Anne, 814 B St. S.W., Washington, D.C. (1916)
Evans, Ira Hobart, Austin, Tex. (1913)
Ewing, James Rees, 5854 Harper Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Eyerly, Elmer Kendall, University of South Dakota, Vermilion, S.D. (1911)
Fairchild, H. P., 185 St. Ronan St., New Haven, Conn. (1911)
Fairchild, Milton, National Institution for Moral Instruction, 3730 McKinley St., Washington, D.C. (1916)
Farnam, H. W., 43 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, Conn. (Prior to 1910)
Farnum, Mrs. P. E., 122 E. 82d St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Faust, Charles J., Box 7, Valley City, N.D. (1911)
Fehlandt, August F., Ripon, Wis. (1913)
Felton, H., 647 Phillips Ave., Detroit, Mich. (1915)
Ferris, Woodbridge N., 515 Elm St., Big Rapids, Mich. (1915)
Feuerlicht, Morris M., 3034 Washington Blvd., Indianapolis, Ind. (1913)
Field, James A., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Fieser, James L., 175 S. High St., Columbus, Ohio. (Prior to 1910)
Fischer, E. G., East Lansing, Mich. (1910)
Fisher, Clarence C., Stanfordville, N.Y. (1916)
Fisher, Irving, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (Prior to 1910)
Fisk, Herbert F., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. (1911)
Fiske, G. Walter, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio. (1916)
Fiske, H., 1 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Fitz, Emma J., 65 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass. (1915)
Fitz, Margaret, 84 Englewood Ave., Brookline, Mass. (1915)
Foley, Roy William, Colgate University, Hamilton, N.Y. (1912)
Follett, Mary P., 5 Otis Place, Boston, Mass. (1915)
Folsom, Joseph Kirk, Clark University, Worcester, Mass. (1915)
Fox, Hugh F., 50 Union Square, New York, N.Y. (1910)
Frankfurter, Felix, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. (1915)
Fredenhagen, Edward Adolph, 303 New England Bldg., Kansas City, Mo. (1915)
Freer, H. H., Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Ia. (1912)
Friedrich, A. A., 803 W. Grand Ave., Beloit, Wis. (1916)
Friend, Mrs. Joseph E., 1807 Palmer Ave., New Orleans, La. (1916)
Fukuya, Shoan Masuzo, 110 Middle Divinity Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Fuller, Frederic Henry, 277 Brook St., Providence, R.I. (1914)
Fuller, Grace, Supt. Women's Dept., Illinois State Penitentiary, Joliet, Ill. (1914)
Furth, Jacob, 5243 Waterman Ave., St. Louis, Mo. (1913)
Garst, Julius, 29 Oread St., Worcester, Mass. (1911)
Gary, Frank E. H., 10 Tremont St., Boston, Mass. (1915)
Gavisk, Francis H., 126 W. Georgia St., Indianapolis, Ind. (1916)
Gehlke, C. E., Adelbert College, Cleveland, Ohio. (1912)
Geisse, W. F. G., R.F.D. No. 2, Great Barrington, Mass. (1911)
George, W. H., Geneva College, Beaver Falls, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Gephart, A. R., E. 418 17th Ave., Spokane, Wash. (1915)
Gerin, Leon, Coaticooke, Quebec, Canada. (1910)
Gilbert, Minnie Ellen, 1102 W. Springfield Ave., Urbana, Ill. (1916)

Gilbert, Richard H., 111 E. Front St., Berwick, Pa. (1915)
Gilkeson, Rebecca Baxter, Ward-Belmont School, Nashville, Tenn. (1915)
Gillette, John M., University, N.D. (1911)
Gillin, J. L., 209 Highland Ave., Madison, Wis. (Prior to 1910)
Gilman, Charlotte P., 627 W. 136th St., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Giltner, Emmett E., 418 W. 118th St., New York, N.Y. (1911)
Glenn, John M., 136 E. 19th St., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Godard, George S., State Library, Hartford, Conn. (1913)
Gompers, Samuel, Ouray Bldg., Washington, D.C. (1914)
Gottschall, Robert J., Pennsburg, Pa. (1915)
Gove, George, 533 W. 112th St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Granbery, John C., 916 Walnut St., Georgetown, Tex. (1915)
Grant, Percy S., 7 W. 10th St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Gregg, Wells K., 562 Reed St., Milwaukee, Wis. (1915)
Greider, Eugene, Great Kills, N.Y. (1916)
Grossman, Louis, 528 Camden Ave., Avondale, Cincinnati, Ohio. (1911)
Groves, E. R., New Hampshire College, Durham, N.H. (1912)
Gurinian, V. G., 4117 Greenview Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Hagerty, J. E., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. (Prior to 1910)
Hahne, E. H., 6021 Drexel Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Hale, Robert L., 12 E. 85th St., New York, N.Y. (1912)
Hall, A. B., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (1913)
Hallenbeck, Charles A., Hertzog Hall, New Brunswick, N.J. (1916)
Halsey, John J., Lake Forest, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Hamilton, William J., Y.M.C.A., Champaign, Ill. (1916)
Handman, Max S., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo. (1916)
Hanson, J. M., Youngstown, Ohio. (1915)
Hanson, T. I., 71 Wilsey St., Newark, N.J. (1916)
Harriman, Edward A., 800 Second National Bank Bldg., New Haven, Conn. (1915)
Harris, Abram W., 31 W. Lake St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Harris, Thomas L., 310 E. Church St., Oxford, Ohio. (1911)
Harris, W. A., Dept. Public Welfare, City Hall, Cincinnati, Ohio. (1913)
Harrison, S. J., Benton City, Wash. (1915)
Harward, George N., Crozer Seminary, Chester, Pa. (1916)
Havemeyer, Loomis, 90 Wall St., New Haven, Conn. (1912)
Hayes, E. C., 915 W. Nevada St., Urbana, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Hayford, F. Leslie, 12 Raymond Ave., West Somerville, Mass. (1916)
Haynes, Fred Emory, State Historical Society, Iowa City, Ia. (1916)
Haynes, George Edmund, Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn. (1915)
Hays, Samuel H., 310 Boise City National Bank Bldg., Boise, Idaho. (1915)
Hazelberg, Esther, Barnard Hall, Madison, Wis. (1916)
Hebard, Grace Raymond, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyo. (1914)
Hebberd, Charles, 428 W. 18th St., Spokane, Wash. (1915)
Heffner, W. C., 3312 Woodland Ave., Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Heineman, Mae E., 434 Sterling Place, Madison, Wis. (1916)
Helleberg, Victor E., 1725 Mississippi St., Lawrence, Kan. (Prior to 1910)
Henry, C. L., 619 Lake St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Herron, Stella, 1933 Elysian Fields, New Orleans, La. (1913)
Hewes, Amy, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass. (1910)
Hicks, Howard Harlan, 444 S. State St., Ann Arbor, Mich. (1916)
Hiester, A. V., Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Hildreth, Philo C., Parsons College, Fairfield, Ia. (1912)
Hill, Fred B., Carleton College, Northfield, Minn. (1916)

Hill, Robert T., Union College, Schenectady, N.Y. (1910)
Hiller, E. T., 312 S. Ashland Blvd., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Hills, Bertha, 59 N. Prospect St., Burlington, Vt. (1916)
Hintzman, W. F., 37 S. Mills St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Hitchcock, J. E., Oberlin, Ohio. (Prior to 1910)
Hoben, Allan, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Hodgson, Caspar, Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y. (1916)
Hogg, William C., Carter Bldg., Houston, Tex. (1915)
Hollingshead, George G., 216 3d St., Jersey City, N.J. (1916)
Holmes, George K., 1323 Irving St., Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Holmes, Roy H., Hillsdale, Mich. (1913)
Holt, Lt.-Col. L. H., West Point, N.Y. (1913)
Holton, Henry D., Brattleboro, Vt. (1915)
Hompe, Marjorie, 2003 Hughitt Ave., Superior, Wis. (1916)
Hood, Blanche, 334 W. 23d St., Los Angeles, Cal. (1916)
Hooker, George E., 315 Plymouth Court, Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Hoover, H. D., Carthage, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Hopkins, Louis J., Winnetka, Ill. (1913)
Hoppert, A. H., 740 Langdon St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Horner, M. B., Juniata College, Huntingdon, Pa. (1916)
Hosford, George Lewis, Box 615, Wichita, Kan. (1913)
Houghton, Cora Emily, 3243 Washington Ave. N., Minneapolis, Minn. (1916)
House, J. T., State Normal School, Wayne, Neb. (1911)
Hoverstadt, T. A., Soo Bldg., Minneapolis, Minn. (1913)
Howard, George E., 1910 E St., Lincoln, Neb. (Prior to 1910)
Howat, William F., 832 Hohman St., Hammond, Ind. (1911)
Howerth, I. W., 1421 Scenic Ave., Berkeley, Cal. (1911)
Huang, F. H., 311 N. Murray St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Hubbard, William P., Schmulbach Bldg., Wheeling, W.Va. (1915)
Hubbell, George A., Lincoln Memorial University, Harrowgate, Tenn. (Prior to 1910)
Huber, Kate D., 2330 Rowley Ave., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Huston, Charles A., 1040 Ramona St., Palo Alto, Cal. (1913)
Ingersoll, Charles H., 315 4th Ave., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Ingersoll, Raymond V., 149 S. Oxford St., Brooklyn, N.Y. (1916)
Ingram, Frances, 428 S. 1st St., Louisville, Ky. (1914)
Irving, Bertha A., 102 Henderson Ave., New Brighton, N.Y. (1913)
Israel, Henry, 124 E. 28th St., New York, N.Y. (1911)
Jackson, S. Trevena, Hackettstown, N.J. (1915)
Jacobs, Phil P., 13 DeHart St., Morristown, N.J. (1911)
Janzen, C. C., 5553 Drexel Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Jennings, Samuel, St. Clair, Mich. (1914)
Jensen, Jens, Steinway Hall, Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Jensen, Jens P., 1724 Como Ave. S.E., Minneapolis, Minn. (1916)
Jeremiah, J., 117 W. 58th St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Johnson, Axel, Omaha Agency, Macy, Neb. (1911)
Johnson, C. First, 601 Dauphin St., Mobile, Ala. (1915)
Johnson, Gertrude K., 425 N. Park St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Johnson, Harriet E., 32 Chestnut St., Boston, Mass. (1913)
Johnston, W. Dawson, St. Paul Public Library, St. Paul, Minn. (1915)
Jones, Thomas Jesse, U.S. Bureau of Education, Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Joseph, Isaac, 1827 E. 82d St., Cleveland, Ohio. (1913)
Joy, Josephine, 217 N. Murray St., Madison, Wis. (1916)

Judell, M. F., 711 W. Johnson St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Kaplan, Nathan D., 826–30 Otis Bldg., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Karsner, Eleanor F., 1320 S. Broad St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1916)
Kaufman, Imogene Hope, 925 University Ave., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Keech, Mary L., Box 1, Franklin, Neb. (1916)
Keefe, Harry L., Walthill, Neb. (1915)
Kehew, Mrs. M. M., 29a Chestnut St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Keller, A. G., 55 Huntington St., New Haven, Conn. (Prior to 1910)
Kellor, Frances A., 20 W. 34th St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Kelly, Charles P., 156 E. 5th St., Erie, Pa. (1912)
Kelsey, Carl, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Kerby, William J., Catholic University, Washington, D.C. (1912)
Kiekhoefer, William, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (1913)
King, Lyndon M., care of Northrup, King & Co., Minneapolis, Minn. (1915)
Klee, Max, 1340 E. 48th St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Kleihege, George W., 1201 New Jersey St., Lawrence, Kan. (1916)
Kletzien, A., 711 W. Johnson St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Knauth, Oswald W., Princeton, N.J. (1914)
Knight, Howard Roscoe, 130 E. 22d St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Knorr, A. H., 1214 W. Dayton St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Koch, Eloise, 1003 W. Oregon St., Urbana, Ill. (1916)
Kolls, Mrs. Gladys Grimm, 103 W. Monument St., Baltimore, Md. (1914)
Koos, L. V., 6120 University Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Krebs, Henry J., Newport, Del. (1915)
Kulp, Daniel Harrison, II, Shanghai Baptist College, Shanghai, China. (1914)
Kursheedt, M. A., 302 Broadway, New York, N.Y. (1911)
Lacy, L. D., 908 Indiana Ave., Lawrence, Kan. (1916)
Laidlaw, Walter, 240 5th Ave. Bldg., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Laidler, Harry W., Rooms 413–14, 70 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Laidman, Charles S., 5467 University Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Lamberson, R. A., 226 N. Brooks St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Lantis, L. O., North High School, Columbus, Ohio. (1916)
Lathrop, Julia C., Children's Bureau, Washington, D.C. (1915)
Lauder, Frank, 803 Long Bldg., Kansas City, Mo. (1913)
Laufer, Berthold, Field Museum, Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Lautner, J. E., Marquette, Mich. (1914)
Lawson, Victor F., 1500 Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Leavell, R. H., 6019 Kimbark Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1914)
Lee, Guy C., 172 W. High St., Carlisle, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Lee, Ivy L., 26 Broadway, New York, N.Y. (1915)
Lefavour, Henry, 3 Brimmer St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Leiser, Frederick O., 1812 Monroe St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Lemstrom, Ammy, 312 E. 27th St., Minneapolis, Minn. (1915)
Lewis, E. St. Elmo, 700 Lakeview Ave., Jamestown, N.Y. (1915)
Lewisohn, Sam A., 61 Broadway, New York, N.Y. (1915)
Lichtenberger, J. P., Logan Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Lies, Eugene T., 168 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Lindsay, Samuel M., Columbia University, New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Lindsey, Edward, National Bank Bldg., Warren, Pa. (1911)
Loeber, Maud, 2315 Carondelet St., New Orleans, La. (1916)
Lombardi, C., Dallas, Tex. (1910)
Longden, Mrs. Harriet E., 603 66th Ave., Oak Lane, Philadelphia, Pa. (1916)
Loring, A. P., 40 State St., Boston, Mass. (1915)

Lovejoy, Owen R., General Secretary, 105 E. 22d St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Lowber, James W., 1706 Brazos St., Austin, Tex. (1911)
Lowden, Frank O., Oregon, Ill. (1915)
Lowrie, S. Gale, 3411 Clifton Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio. (1915)
Lubs, K. C., Arcadia, Wis. (1916)
Luce, Robert, 8 Bosworth St., Boston, Mass. (1915)
Luehring, F. W., Princeton, N.J. (Prior to 1910)
Lumley, F. E., College of Missions, Indianapolis, Ind. (1913)
MacClean, E. A., Room 2401, 16 Dey St., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
McClean, H. J., 1403 Elm St., Long Beach, Cal. (1916)
McClelland, George Hamilton, 201 Wilberham Road, Springfield, Mass. (1915)
McCoy, Frank, 644 N. Francis St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
McCoy, J. P., 5802 Maryland Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
McDevitt, P. R., 21 S. 13th St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1911)
McDowell, Mary E., 4630 Gross Ave., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Macfadgen, Mrs. Anna Stephenson, 852 N. 24th St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1916)
MacFarland, Charles S., Room 613, 105 E. 22d St., New York, N.Y. (1912)
McGregor, Tracy W., 239 Brush St., Detroit, Mich. (1913)
MacIver, Robert Morrison, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. (1916)
McKenzie, F. A., Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn. (Prior to 1910)
McKenzie, R. D., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. (1916)
McKinlock, George A., 320 S. 5th Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
MacLean, Annie Marion, 5343 Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
MacVeagh, Franklin, 2829 16th St., Washington, D.C. (1913)
Mackey, Ebenezer, 314 Hamilton Ave., Trenton, N.J. (1913)
Macy, V. Everit, 68 Broad St., New York, N.Y. (1911)
Madeira, Lucy, 1330 19th St., Washington, D.C. (1911)
Magnuson, T. A., San Fernando, Cal. (1916)
Magnusson, P. Magnus, State Normal School, St. Cloud, Minn. (1915)
Mangold, George B., 4002 Lexington Ave., St. Louis, Mo. (1916)
Mann, A. R., 5461 Greenwood Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Marquis, Eva M., Board of Public Welfare, Kansas City, Mo. (1916)
Marshall, L. C., 1320 E. 56th St., Chicago, Ill. (1914)
Marston, Edwin S., P.O. Box 72, Florham Park, N.J. (1915)
Mason, Jarvis W., Oakwood Ave. and Hawthorne Terrace, Corcoran Manor, Mt. Vernon, N.Y. (1915)
Mason, J. Leonard, care of Board of Recreation, 587 City Hall, Philadelphia, Pa. (1915)
Mather, Samuel, Western Reserve Bldg., Cleveland, Ohio. (1915)
Maxson, C. H., Bishop College, Marshall, Tex. (1914)
Maymon, Thomas B., 55 Eddy St., Providence, R.I. (1914)
Mead, Daniel W., 120 Gorham St., Madison, Wis. (1915)
Meloy, Luella P., Pennsylvania College for Women, Pittsburgh, Pa. (1914)
Mertzke, A. J., North Freedom, Wis. (1916)
Mez, John, American Peace Society, Colorado Bldg., Washington, D.C. (1915)
Miller, Dora, 410 S. Madison St., Stoughton, Wis. (1916)
Miller, G. R., State Teachers College, Greeley, Colo. (1910)
Miller, H. A., 151 N. Professor St., Oberlin, Ohio. (Prior to 1910)
Miller, Nina, 12 Lathrop St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Mitchell, Harry W., State Hospital, Warren, Pa. (1913)
Model, Charles, 366 Hewes St., Brooklyn, N.Y. (1915)

Mohr, Lewis, 349 W. Illinois St., Chicago, Ill. (1911)
Moncrief, J. W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Monroe, Paul, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Morgan, D. S., 209 N. Carroll St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Morrison, H. C., Department of Public Instruction, Concord, N.H. (1916)
Morrow, Verle, 705 N. Sheridan Road, Waukegan, Ill. (1916)
Morton, Charles D., 222 Lake Lawn Place, Madison, Wis. (1916)
Mossman, Frank E., Winfield Commercial Club, Winfield, Kan. (1916)
Mounts, Lewis H., 509 E. Jefferson St., Iowa City, Ia. (1916)
Muensterberg, Hugo, 7 Ware St., Cambridge, Mass. (1913)
Munsell, Mrs. A. H., Chestnut Hill, Mass. (1915)
Nasmyth, George W., World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass. (1916)
Naumberg, Mrs. Elsa H., 142 W. 77th St., New York, N.Y. (1913)
Nave, Junia, 2505 S. Grand Ave., Los Angeles, Cal. (1916)
Nealley, E. M., R.F.D. No. 1, Santa Ana, Cal. (1911)
Nearing, Scott, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio. (1915)
Neill, Charles P., Room 616, Woodward Bldg., Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Nelson, S. M., 860 Wood Row, Madison, Wis. (1916)
Neustadt, Richard M., 386 E. Market St., Akron, Ohio. (1916)
Newell, Jane I., 53 Crescent St., Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Newman, Stephen M., Howard University, Washington, D.C. (1910)
Newsom, Vida, 814 Franklin St., Columbus, Ind. (1915)
Nichols, C. A., Georgetown, Tex. (Prior to 1910)
Nisley, Olive A., 6 Ahwaga Ave., Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Nolin, Mary E., Castle Shannon, Pa. (1916)
Nystrom, Paul H., 1790 Broadway, New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
O'Connor, J. J., Jr., Mellon Institute, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. (1912)
Oehler, Miss Sidney, St. Mary's Hall, Jessfield, Shanghai, China. (1916)
Okuntsoff, Mrs. Elaine, 31 E. 7th Ave., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Olson, S. B., 423 N. Lake St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Osborne, Thomas M., Auburn, N.Y. (1915)
Pace, Homer St. Clair, 30 Church St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Page, Edward D., Oakland, Bergen Co., N.J. (1911)
Park, Robert E., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1914)
Parrish, C. H., 807 6th St., Louisville, Ky. (1914)
Parsons, Edward S., Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colo. (1914)
Parsons, Mrs. Elsie Clews, 115 E. 72d St., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Parsons, Philip A., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. (1911)
Patten, Frank C., Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Tex. (1915)
Patten, Simon N., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Patterson, Gaylard H., 260 Mooreland Ave., Carlisle, Pa. (1914)
Pattison, Francis Wayland, Box 216, East Northfield, Mass. (1915)
Peixotto, Jessica B., Cloyne Court, Berkeley, Cal. (Prior to 1910)
Perky, Scott H., Apt. 27, 110 Morningside Drive, New York, N.Y. (1914)
Persons, W. Frank, 45 Meadow Lane, New Rochelle, N.Y. (1916)
Peskind, A., 13035 Euclid Ave., East Cleveland, Ohio. (1913)
Peterson, Conrad, 625 St. Paul St., St. Peter, Minn. (1914)
Pierce, Walter C., 712 Laura St., Jacksonville, Fla. (1915)
Pinkham, Henry W., 24 Vine St., Melrose, Mass. (1915)

Plaisted, Elizabeth, 126 E. 19th St., New York, N.Y. (1913)
Potter, Blanche, 410 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Pound, Roscoe, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Powell, Hannah B. Clark, 5227 Blackstone Ave., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Powlison, Charles F., 30 E. 42d St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Pratt, D. Butler, 325 College St., Washington, D.C. (1912)
Price, Theodore H., 15 Wall St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Prussing, A. W., 225 Lake Lawn Place, Madison, Wis. (1916)
Putnam, Bertha Haven, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass. (1915)
Raddatz, W. G., 220 E. Mifflin St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Ranck, Samuel H., Public Library, Grand Rapids, Mich. (1915)
Randall, J. Harvey, Bacone College, Bacone, Okla. (1913)
Randolph, E. D., 1717 11th Ave., Greeley, Colo. (1916)
Randolph, E. F., 1654 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass. (1911)
Rantoul, Mrs. Lois B., 101 Forest Hill St., Jamaica Plain, Mass. (1914)
Rath, James A., Box 514, Honolulu, Hawaii. (1910)
Redstone, Edward H., Social Law Library, Boston, Mass. (1914)
Reed, Truman G., Lucerne, Colo. (1916)
Reinemund, J. A., Box 95, Muscatine, Ia. (1912)
Reuter, E. B., 822 E. 56th St., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Reynolds, James Bronson, 105 W. 40th St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Rhoades, Mabel C., Wells College, Aurora, N.Y. (1912)
Riddell, Walter A., 600 W. 122d St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Riley, Morgan T., 628 W. 114th St., New York, N.Y. (1912)
Riley, Thomas J., 447 Rugby Road, Flatbush, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Ritter, William E., La Jolle, Cal. (1915)
Roark, Mrs. Mary C., 1814 Madison St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Robbins, Jane, Riis House, 48 Henry St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Roberts, Frank H. H., New Mexico Normal University, East Las Vegas, N.M. (1913)
Robinson, G. Wilse, 937 Rialto Bldg., Kansas City, Mo. (1915)
Robinson, Harry Dixon, 617 W. Vanango St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1916)
Robinson, William Henry, Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N.J. (1916)
Rockey, Carroll J., 40 Irving Ave., Minneapolis, Minn. (1913)
Rockwell, Leon Howard, 18 Bank St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Roeder, Herbert J., 174 E. 95th St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Rogers, L. E., Chadbourne Hall, Madison, Wis. (1916)
Rolf, A. A., Room 1212, 72 W. Adams St., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Rosenwald, Julius, care of Sears, Roebuck & Co., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Ross, Edward A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (Prior to 1910)
Ross, Frank A., Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. (1915)
Rubinow, I. M., The Ocean, 59 John St., New York, N.Y. (1914)
Rueckert, Frederick, 7 Marlborough Ave., Providence, R.I. (1914)
Saito, Waichi Joseph, 6028 Ingleside Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Sanderson, Dwight, 1109 E. 54th Place, Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Sanderson, Edward F., 125 Remsen St., Brooklyn, N.Y. (1915)
Schattschneider, Elmer, Y.M.C.A., Butler, Pa. (1912)
Schenck, Harold W., 34 Hertzog Hall, New Brunswick, N.J. (1916)
Schmidt, Peter, University, N.D. (1916)
Scholefield, E. O. S., Provincial Library, Victoria, B.C. (1915)
Schweichler, L. A., 312 N. Mills St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Scroggs, William O., Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, La. (1911)
Seligmann, E. R. A., 324 W. 86th St., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)

Seliskar, John, St. Paul Seminary, Groveland Park, St. Paul, Minn. (1911)
Serven, Isaac A., 265 S. 2d St., Lakeview, N.J. (1916)
Sessions, Kenosha, Indiana Girls' School, R.F.D. No. 18, Indianapolis, Ind. (1915)
Sharkey, Edith L., 1232 Hood Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Sheffer, Homer Lewis, 51 Hertzog Hall, New Brunswick, N.J. (1916)
Shenton, H. N., Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. (1912)
Sherman, B. F., 833 Belmont Ave., Grand Forks, N.D. (1916)
Siddons, H., 625 State St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Siedenburg, Frederic, 617 Ashland Block, Clark and Randolph Sts., Chicago, Ill. (1913)
Silver, Mrs. Edgar O., 66 N. Walnut St., East Orange, N.J. (1916)
Simons, Sarah E., 1528 Corcoran St., Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Simpson, Joshua Baker, Virginia Union University, Richmond, Va. (1913)
Sims, Newell L., 409 E. Lassiter St., Gainesville, Fla. (1910)
Skoss, Solomon L., 1424 Raleigh St., Denver, Colo. (1915)
Small, Albion W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Smith, Alice L., University, N.D. (1916)
Smith, Alice M., Watertown State Hospital, Watertown, Ill. (1911)
Smith, C. Henry, Bluffton College, Bluffton, Ohio. (1914)
Smith, Eugene, 39 W. 68th St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Smith, Frederick M., P.O. Box 255, Independence, Mo. (1913)
Smith, James B., California, Pa. (1915)
Smith, L. Emory, Port Gibson, Miss. (1915)
Smith, Sam Ferry, 404 Southern Title Bldg., San Diego, Cal. (1913)
Smith, Wilberforce, W., 151 N. Fairview Ave., Decatur, Ill. (1911)
Smith, William, 1329 W. 5th St., Los Angeles, Cal. (1916)
Snedden, David, 500 Ford Bldg., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Snelling, Charles M., University of Georgia, Athens, Ga. (1916)
Snow, Alpheus Henry, 2013 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. (1915)
Snyder, G. J., 55 S. Maple Ave., Ridgewood, N.J. (1915)
Sokoloff, Lillian, 480 Centennial St., Los Angeles, Cal. (1916)
Spaeth, J. Duncan, Princeton, N.J. (1916)
Spalding, S. M., 1008 Security Bldg., Los Angeles, Cal. (1915)
Spencer, Mrs. Anna Garlin, 669 Alden St., Meadville, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Splawn, W. M. W., 1014 E. 61st St., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Stahl, John Meloy, 6063 Harper Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Stanly, Martha, Chadbourne Hall, Madison, Wis. (1916)
Stebbins, Lucy Ward, University of California, Berkeley, Cal. (1913)
Steiner, B. C., Enoch Pratt Library, Baltimore, Md. (1911)
Steiner, Jesse F., 5616 Kimbark Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Sternheim, Emanuel, Baton Rouge, La. (1913)
Stetson, George R., 1441 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C. (1911)
Stevens, James G., University Club, Urbana, Ill. (1915)
Stevenson, Beatrice Louise, 14 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Stewart, Anna, 852 W. 35th Place, Los Angeles, Cal. (1914)
Stewart, Charles Leslie, 309 Commerce Bldg., University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill. (1916)
Stires, Ernest M., 3 W. 53d St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Stone, Alfred H., Dunleith, Miss. (Prior to 1910)
Stone, R. W., 5623 Drexel Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Straw, Darien Austin, Wheaton College, Wheaton, Ill. (1916)
Stridsberg, Carl, 266 Grand Ave., Englewood, N.J. (1915)

Stringfellow, Ervin E., Box 46, University Place Station, Des Moines, Ia. (1916)
Strong, Josiah, Bible House, Astor Place, New York, N.Y. (1913)
Stuckey, Lorin, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Ia. (1916)
Sullivan, Richard Thomas, Houston Electric Company, Houston, Tex. (1915)
Sumner, G. S., Pomona College, Claremont, Cal. (Prior to 1910)
Sutherland, E. H., William Jewell College, Liberty, Mo. (1911)
Suzzalo, Henry, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. (1910)
Swann, John A., Bridgehampton, Long Island, N.Y. (1916)
Swanton, John R., Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. (1913)
Sweetman, Verna B., 31 N. Irvington Ave., Indianapolis, Ind. (1915)
Swift, Harold H., Union Stock Yards, Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Talbert, E. L., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio. (1915)
Talbot, Marion, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Tawney, G. A., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio. (1916)
Taylor, Carl C., Mt. Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass. (1916)
Taylor, F. B., Jamestown College, Jamestown, N.D. (1914)
Taylor, Graham, Chicago Commons, Grand Ave. and Morgan St., Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Tenney, Alvan A., Columbia University, New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Tenney, Ashton Melville, 521 W. 185th St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Thomas, Oscar D., 6160 Webster St., Philadelphia, Pa. (1916)
Thompson, George, 340 Summit Ave., St. Paul, Minn. (1915)
Thompson, Warren S., 817 McKinley Ave., Ann Arbor, Mich. (1912)
Thrasher, Frederic M., 31 Hitchcock Hall, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Todd, A. J., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. (1912)
Tourtellat, Ida A., Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va. (Prior to 1910)
Towne, E. T., Northfield, Minn. (1914)
Trainum, W. H., Ohio Northern University, Ada, Ohio. (1916)
Tretheway, Lucile, 1090 W. 35th St., Los Angeles, Cal. (1916)
Tungeln, George H. von, Iowa State College, Ames, Ia. (1914)
Tunicliffe, R. M., 3 Chestnut St., Potsdam, N.Y. (1913)
Tyson, Francis D., School of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. (1912)
Uchikata, Henson M., 111 11th Ave. S., Seattle, Wash. (1916)
Underwood, J. H., University of Montana, Missoula, Mont. (1916)
Unger, Mrs. J. O., 3344 Broadway, Chicago, Ill. (Prior to 1910)
Vanderlip, Frank A., 55 Wall St., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Vander Poel, Mrs. S. O., 14 E. 60th St., New York, N.Y. (1916)
Van Driel, Gertrude R., 3967 Drexel Blvd., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Valentine, B. W., Benedict College, Columbia, S.C. (1916)
Van Ingen, Philip, 125 E. 71st St., New York, N.Y. (1911)
Veditz, C. W. A., Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. (Prior to 1910)
Veiller, Lawrence, 102 E. 22d St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Vincent, George E., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. (Prior to 1910)
Voegelin, Frederick E., 18 Waterbury Road, Upper Montclair, N.J. (1915)
Vogt, Paul L., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. (1912)
Waggoner, Alvin, Philip, S.D. (1915)
Walker, Edwin C., 211 W. 138th St., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Walling, William English, 116 Field Point Road, Greenwich, Conn. (1913)
Walton, Thomas W., 736 G St. N. W., Washington, D.C. (1916)
Warbasse, J. P., Woods Hole, Mass. (1910)

Ward, Florence M., 30 Belmont Ave., Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Warner, C. B., 404 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. (1915)
Warner, Mason, 3846 Byron St., Chicago, Ill. (1916)
Warren, H. K., Yankton College, Yankton, S.D. (1916)
Warren, Howard C., Princeton, N.J. (1913)
Waters, Chester C., 32 President Ave., Providence, R.I. (Prior to 1910)
Watkins, George P., 154 Nassau St., New York, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Watrous, Paul Jerome, Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. (1914)
Watrous, Richard B., 913 Union Trust Bldg., Washington, D.C. (1915)
Watson, Mrs. Frank D., 5 College Ave., Haverford, Pa. (1913)
Weatherly, U. G., 527 E. 3d St., Bloomington, Ind. (Prior to 1910)
Webster, D. Hutton, Station A, Lincoln, Neb. (Prior to 1910)
Weeks, Rufus Wells, 346 Broadway, New York, N.Y. (1914)
Weil, A. Leo, 821 Frick Bldg., Pittsburgh, Pa. (1915)
Weinstock, H., 19 Presidio Terrace, San Francisco, Cal. (1913)
Welch, A. A., 21 Woodland St., Hartford, Conn. (1914)
Wells, Mrs. Bettina Borrmann, 509 W. 121st St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Wheeler, J. T., 206 N. Orchard St., Madison, Wis. (1916)
Whitcomb, Selden L., P.O. Box 57, Lawrence, Kan. (1915)
Wilder, Constance P., 53 Fairmount Ave., Newton, Mass. (1913)
Wilkie, E. A., 50 Oliver St., Boston, Mass. (1911)
Willcox, Walter F., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. (Prior to 1910)
Williams, Mrs. C. D., 12 Hawthorn St., Cambridge, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Williams, Ellis D., 560 Drexel Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa. (1913)
Williams, James M., Hobart College Library, Geneva, N.Y. (1910)
Williams, Jesse Lynch, 122 E. 82d St., New York, N.Y. (1915)
Wilmot, Sally, 19 Arnold Ave., Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Wilson, Guy, 1501 Locust St., St. Louis, Mo. (1913)
Wilson, J. E., 528 S. 5th Ave., Chicago, Ill. (1915)
Wilson, M. L., Bozeman, Mont. (1915)
Wilson, Warren H., 156 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. (1912)
Wissler, Clark, 77th St. and 8th Ave., New York, N.Y. (1913)
Witter, Margaret S., 19 Arnold Ave., Northampton, Mass. (1916)
Wolfe, A. B., 909 W. 18th St., Austin, Tex. (Prior to 1910)
Wood, Arthur Evans, Overbrook, Pa. (1916)
Wood, Iris L., 21 E. Johnson St., Madison, Wis. (1915)
Woodhead, Howard, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. (1911)
Woodruff, Clinton Rogers, North American Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa. (Prior to 1910)
Woods, Charles S., Methodist Episcopal Hospital, Indianapolis, Ind. (1915)
Woods, Erville B., Hanover, N.H. (Prior to 1910)
Woods, Frederick Adams, 1006 Beacon St., Brookline, Mass. (1911)
Woods, Robert A., South End House, Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)
Woodworth, A. H., Hanover College, Hanover, Ind. (1911)
Woolston, H. B., 110 Morningside Drive, New York, N.Y. (1910)
Work, Monroe N., Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, Ala. (1910)
Wright, Jonathan, Windy Rock, Pleasantville, Westchester Co., N.Y. (1911)
Yaczo, A. H., Cody, Wyo. (1915)
Yockey, F. M., Alexandria, Minn. (1911)
Young, Allyn A., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. (1915)
Zeeb, Frieda B., 318 N. 1st Ave., Maywood, Ill. (1915)
Zeller, J. C., R.F.D. No. 2, Yazoo City, Miss. (Prior to 1910)
Zueblin, Charles, 9 Myrtle St., Boston, Mass. (Prior to 1910)